



Development of Nationalism in Egypt 1870-1914

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PH. D.

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
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I N T R O D U C T I O N

The present work aims at presenting a thesis on the development of nationalism in Egypt during the period 1870-1914, which begins after the cutting of ^{the} Suez Canal and ends with the outbreak of the First World War.

This period of forty-five years is important in many respects: It is during this period that, after the cutting of the Canal, Egypt was involved in international politics. It is during this period that Egypt was Europeanized in education, administration and culture. Again, it is during this period that Egypt became indebted with huge sums to European creditors, which resulted in European intervention and finally ended in British occupation. During the period of British Occupation, culminating in a declaration of British Protectorate in 1914, new nationalist forces were awakened and the immature national consciousness of the pre-Occupation days took a definite turn towards Western type of nationalism. Led by the new middle class it reached its maturity during this period, and although little was achieved towards the goal of national independence, the movement at least made the people politically conscious and, immediately after the end of the First World War, gave rise to a new and more powerful

movement for the liberation of Egypt. The post-War movement, resulting in a semi-independent status for Egypt in 1922, was the direct outcome, or rather the continuation, of the pre-War movement.

Hitherto, the work of analysing or appraising the Egyptian national movement has been mainly of two kinds: One produced by Western writers, both antagonists and protagonists of the movement; secondly, produced by the Egyptians themselves. The Western writers, mostly English and French, are, as a rule, interested in Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Egyptian relations rather than in the Egyptian people or their movements.

As for the Egyptian writers, few of them aimed at analysing the development of nationalism in Egypt. Most of them ~~rather~~ seem to be interested in persons rather than in movements, and as such their description of the national movement also becomes a narrative of the personal achievement of a leader. Again, nobody has yet attempted to describe the movement as a whole and in its true perspective. Most of these works deal with different aspects of the national movement, thus giving only a partial picture of the whole.

I have attempted to analyse the causes of the development of nationalism in Egypt, and in doing so, I had to trace it back from the closing years of the eighteenth century whence the history of Modern Egypt starts. It was, therefore, necessary to cover the entire period preceding the year 1915.

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The scope of the present work has been limited and ends with the beginning of the First World War, for the national movement, by this time, had in a way reached a definite stage.

As for the sources of the present work, I have mainly depended upon the published materials. The British, French, and the Egyptian archives were out of my reach. But since some of the writers on Egyptian affairs have gone through the archival material, I was able, ^{to} were necessary, to make use of it though only in second-hand.

Apart from the scattered data that I have collected from the Egyptian sources which deal with the problems of my topic only incidentally, the works of 'Abd ar-Rahmān ar-Rāfi'ī have been very much helpful to me in so far as he has collected all the available data regarding the history of nationalism in Egypt. His works lack scientific analysis and an historical perspective; he lays emphasis on persons rather than on movements, and his works seem to be records of events and personalities. But inspite of all limitations we find here a great deal of information, otherwise not available from any source .

European works, manly in English and a few in French are usually a narration of diplomacy and war, occupation and post-occupation administration. If some of these works deal with any aspect of Egyptian peoples' movement, it is some particular event or some person significant during the period

With the exception of W. S. Blunt, few writers have been directly interested in the entire movement of the period. However, the account of contemporary observers, travellers, and residents have been very helpful in my analysis of the facts and the events. It is in the travellers' accounts and in the accounts of contemporary observers that we get glimpses of plain truth which throws new light on the actual situation as it existed. This material had so far remained unexplored, and I was fortunate in having access to most of these reports and observations written during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Invaluable material is found in contemporary periodicals and newspapers, most of which has hitherto remained untouched. The information contained in this category of material is not unquestionably reliable; but it may often supplement or at times explain certain ambiguities. It has thus been used only by way of getting some clarification or supplementation.

I have confined myself to using works of contemporary authors or evidence of a contemporary nature only, as very few of the secondary sources seem to deal with the subject authoritatively. Wherever inevitable, as a last resort, I have used such sources but of a more reliable nature.

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The scheme of the thesis is as follows:

Chapter I is a historical summary of the period preceding the year 1870. It deals with the forces that ge

birth to a vague consciousness among the people with a desire for a change in their conditions. Beginning with the period preceding the French invasion and describing the general political and economic conditions of that period, the chapter proceeds on to narrate and analyse the effects of the French rule in Egypt. Then follows the period of Muḥammad Ali. During this period popular misery reached its apogee and culminated in general discontentment and resentment against the despotic rule of one man. No trace of an open revolt is found during this period, yet such feelings were ripe and speedily came into the open in the "post-Canal" period.

Chapter II deals with general social, political, educational and economic conditions prevalent during Khedive Isma'il's period. It begins with the cutting of the Canal and deals with an analysis of its aftereffects, and covers a discussion on the policy of Isma'il that made European intervention inevitable.

Chapter III deals with the stormy period of the first Egyptian Revolt. Going into the background of the militant national movement, it deals with the causes of the Revolt, the actual Revolt, its failure, and the causes of the failure. Lastly, it deals with the contribution the Revolt made towards the national awakening. This chapter ends with the British Occupation.

Chapter IV is an account of the period immediately following the Occupation. It deals with the trends and movements current inside and outside Egypt for the liberation of the country. It also deals with the effects of the

British Occupation which were obviously a death-blow to the national movement.

Chapter V covers an analysis of the development of nationalism after the accession of Abbās II. It was during this period that the leadership of the movement was taken over by the new middle class, the lawyers and the journalists, and Egyptian nationalism took a new turn, that of a modern movement organised on European lines. Again, it was during this period that the formation of political parties took place. But in Egypt, few of the political parties had any rigid organisation, or constitution. They were, at the most, political groups centred round some important figure or some prominent newspaper. That is why, no emphasis has been laid on dealing in great deal the nature and character of these parties.

Chapter VI, the last, is a continuation of the preceding chapter and deals with the last phase of the development of nationalism in Egypt. Commencing after the death of Kāmil and the recall of Cromer, it proceeds to relate the persons, events, ideas and trends of the period immediately preceding the War. This chapter ends with the outbreak of the First World War.

CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF EGYPTIAN

NATIONALISM

The history of modern Egypt goes back to the closing years of the eighteenth century. Nominally under the Ottoman sovereignty, Egypt was reigned through a Turkish Governor appointed by the Porte. In actual practice, it was ruled by the petty Beys, the Memlukes, who had overpowered the Turkish Governor. These Beys were not very different from their kins, the feudal lords of Europe. There was no security of life and property under their rule. ^{the} Greater part of the land was in the hands of these Beys. There was no right of succession to or inheritance of property. Peasants were simple hired labourers, to whom no more was left than what barely sufficed to sustain their life. Simple bread, with raw onions and water, was their only food throughout the year. Their whole clothing consisted in a shirt and a clumsy black cloak. With naked arms, naked legs and naked breasts, suffocating with heat and smoke, they passed their life amid continual alarms of the robberies of the beduins and extortions of the Beys. Closely analogou

to the conditions of the peasantry stood the townsfolk, who were in no better circumstances regarding the universal misery and wretchedness¹.

Amidst the encircling gloom, the people of Egypt must have been desiring a change for the better in the existing state of affairs. The change came at the close of the century.

In Europe, the Industrial Age having already dawned, was now reaching its apogee. Capital was overflowing and surplus commodities required markets. The search for markets began with its inevitable consequence, the race for monopolies. Capitalism was reaching its final stage i.e. Imperialism. England had set her foot on the Indian soil. The battle of Plassey had been won over in 1757, whereafter the English influence in India was on a rapid increase. As a vast promising market, India was equally coveted by England and France, and France was ever vigilant to avail any chance.

The Directory at Paris had found an intelligent, ambitious and brave general in Napoleon Bonaparte, a young man of twenty nine, who planned to break, through force and

1. Volney, "Travels through Syria and Egypt", vol.I, pp. 187-91. The French traveller, M.C. _____ F.Volney, visited Egypt about the end of the year 1782, spent seven months there, and wrote afterwards an account of his travels in two volumes. His travel account was translated from the original French into English and was published in 1788; see also, Cameron: "Egypt in the Nineteenth Century", p.20; Gibb and Bowen, "Ottoman Society and the West", Vol. I, pp. 258-75; Poliak: "Feudalism in Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon", pp. 64, 65, 68-73; Walsh, "Expedition in Egypt", pp. 258-61. Walsh visited Egypt during the Napoleonic period of its history. His travel account was published in 1800. On Walsh see, Elgood: "Transit of Egypt", p. 43, f.n.

diplomacy, the increasing British influence in India. Egypt was a key to the East, the nearest route to India passing through its mainland, and as such, the possession of Egypt meant an easy access to India. With this long-term aim, the scheme of an Egyptian campaign was chalked out at Paris.

The decisive battle of ^{the} Pyramid was fought on July 21, 1798, and on 24th, Napoleon entered Cairo as its undisputed master¹. Being aware of the consequences and future plans of the French expeditions, England hastened to check her rival at the very outset. Her half-established Indian empire was in jeopardy². In India, Bonaparte's would be ally, Tīpū Sultān, was defeated and slain in May 1799, and in the early days of the following August, the English admiral, Nelson, destroyed the French fleet in the Egyptian waters. The landforce that still remained in Egypt, capitulated shortly, and the French Occupation came to an end in September 1801³.

This period of more than three years of the French ruled did not prove beneficial to the Occupant. But to Egypt it proved to be a mixed blessing. It caused and accelerated the renaissance that took place in Egypt in the nineteenth century.

From the very beginning, Napoleon had tried to pose his campaign, as also his administration, as something in the

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1. Shukrī, "Abdullah Chāk Minou wa khurūj al-Fransiyyīn min Misr", p. 90; Elgood, "Bonaparte's adventure in Egypt", pp. 120, 123; Ghorbal, "The beginnings of the Egyptian question and the rise of Mehemet Ali", p. 51
 2. Telleyrand, the French Foreign Secretary, to the Directory, writing on July 10, 1798: "L'expédition assure la destruction de la Puissance Britannique dans la Inde". cit., Young, "Egypt", p. 28; see also, Cameron, op.cit., p. 25
 3. Ghorbal, op.cit., p. 137; Shukrī, op.cit., pp. 539-40; Cameron op.cit., pp. 28, 29; Boustany, "The Press during the French Occupation in Egypt. 1798-1801", p. 29

interest of the Egyptians themselves. He declared that he had come to support the authority of Islam and the Sultan-Caliph. He went to the extent of convincing the Egyptian Ulema, that he and his soldiers had turned Muslims, and as such they were their brethren¹. He created a native Council at Cairo, comprising of nine grand sheikhs. This Cairo Council was to assist the Government in legislation and administration. It could discuss administrative and judicial problems of the country could receive complaints of the people and could work out economic reforms to be adopted by the Government². The council was also empowered to recommend to the Government the appointments for the posts of Controllers of the market, Superintendents of police and Superintendents of the burial ceremonies. This pattern of popular councils was also adopted in the provincial administration³.

Although these institutions were meant for advisory purposes only, yet the inclusion of the native element in the administration of the country was quite a new experience for the fellahin of Egypt. It was beyond their imagination to share the business of the Sultan or his representative. To impress upon the natives the semi-national character of the French Government, the Occupation regime did its best to democratise their administration as far as possible.

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1. Somerset de Chair (ed.), "Napoleon's memoirs", pp. 351-52; Elggod: "Bonaparte's adventure in Egypt," p.123; Cameron, op.cit., p.37; Rifa'at, "Awakening of modern Egypt", pp.9-10
 2. Shukri: op.cit., pp. 78-9
 3. The Decrees of July 25, and July 27, 1798. cit., Rafi'i, "Tarikh al-harakat al-qaumiyya", vol. I, pp. 72, 77; see also, Shukri: op.cit., pp.262-73; Blunt: "At-Tarikh as-sirri", Arabic Translation of Blunt's "Secret history of British Occupation of Egypt": translator's Introduction, p.40; Paton "A History of the Egyptian Revolution, from the period of Mamelukes to the death of Mohammad Ali", vol. I, p. 114; Rifa'at: op.cit., p. 8

With French army, a number of technicians, scientists and scholars had also landed in Egypt. Once established, they busied themselves in experimental and research work in the laboratories of the newly-founded Institut d'Egypte¹. The antiquarians began their exploratory campaigns, and incidentally they found the famous Rosetta Stone which, when deciphered, in 1822, proved a key to the ancient Egyptian studies and aroused a dignified sense of national pride in the educated Egyptians².

In the field of Press and publication, a printing press consisting of Greek, French and Arabic type was working soon after the Occupation. It was the first of its kind in the Muslim world³. Several newspapers and periodicals were published in French, and arrangements were also made even for the publication of an Arabic newspaper, but the scheme did not materialize⁴. However, with Italian and French books, books in Turkish also began to appear in Egypt⁵.

All this must have had some lasting impressions on the minds of the Egyptian people. For the first time, they were being introduced to the blessings of the new dynamic culture of the West.

The brief period of French Occupation had brought to Egypt some important elements of Western culture, which were responsible for creating a vague feeling of quasi-nationalism among a people who had had been breathing, hitherto, in a pu

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1. Rafi'i: op.cit., pp. 89-93; Shukri, op.cit., pp. 615-18, 622-28
 2. Rifa'at: op.cit., p. 15
 3. Boustany, op.cit., pp. 10, 12; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 89-122; Shukri, op.cit., pp. 656-57
 4. Boustany: op.cit., p. 27; Shukri, op.cit., pp. 658-65; ad-Dasuqi: "Fil-Adab al-Hadith", p. 35
 5. Boustany, op.cit., pp. 4, 14. Boustany has given a partial list of these publications. see p. 14

Oriental atmosphere. Incidentally, however, it had brought to Egypt and Albanian adventurer who was destined to play the role of the founder of modern Egypt.

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Muhammad Ali, a young Albanian of thirty and odd years headed the Albanian regiment of Turkish force which was sent to fight against the French Occupation in Egypt¹. In March 1803, English forces that had come to expel the French and had fought besides the Turkish army had to leave the country into Turkish hands². Amidst the anarchical conditions that followed the English retirement, Muhammad Ali saw his chance. In a continuous game of counterpoising, playing the Memluke against the Turk and the Turk against the Memluke, he weakened both of his rival groups and rose to the eminence of being the only powerful man to be reckoned with³. He was loved by his soldiers and was popular among the inhabitants of Egypt⁴. In May 1805 he was chosen and proclaimed by the Sheikhs the pasha of Egypt. The Sultan, at last, had to give his consent to the popular choice.⁵

The signal victory over the English expedition, sent to Egypt in 1807, gave Muhammad Ali full command over the land and the people⁶. He, then, consolidated his authority by wholesale massacre of the Memluke remnants⁷, by his wars lau

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 311,313

2. Ibid., p. 351

3. Elgood, op.cit., p. 46; Ghorbal, op.cit., pp. 207-27; Cameron, op.cit., pp. 58-67; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 332-66

4. Cameron, op.cit., p. 63; Rafi'i, "Asr Muhammad Ali", p.103,1

5. Elgood, op.cit., p. 46; Rafi'i, "Tarikh al-Harakat al-Qaumiyya", vol. II, pp. 369-70; Ghorbal, op.cit., pp. 227-228; Cameron, op.cit., pp. 67-8

6. Elgood, op.cit., p. 47

7. Ibid., p.48. The date was March 1,1811; Cameron, op.cit., pp.

in the support of the Sultan against the Wahabis and the Greek rebels¹, and by annexing the Sudan into his pashadom². The invasion and annexation of the province of Syria³ was the last act of the drama that Muhammad Ali ventured to play in the name of Arab Empire⁴. His dream was never realised. Towards the close of the year 1840, the battle of Syria was finally lost, and after the conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and the Great European Powers on the one hand, and Muhammad Ali on the other, Egyptian forces evacuated the newly-conquered dominion of Syria as well as Candia and Arabia⁵.

1. Elgood, op.cit., p. 52. Wars with the Wahabis continued from 1811 to 1818

2. Ibid., p.52. The campaign to annex the Sudan began in the twenties

3. In November 1831, the armies of Mehemt Ali ... invaded Syria; the Turks were defeated ... on 21st December, 1832, and Constantinople would have been attacked but for the assistance rendered to the Porte by Russia. By the convention signed on 14th May, 1833, it was agreed that Mehemet Ali should receive the Governorship of Egypt, Candia and Syria, and his son, Ibrahim the Collectorship of Adana. see Holland: "The European Concert in the Eastern question", p. 89

4. The British Consul at Alexandria wrote in January 1832 about Muhammad Ali as follows:

"His immediate object is to establish his authority firmly over the pashliks of Acre and Damascus; after which to extend his dominions to Aleppo and Baghdad, throughout the provinces where Arabic is the language of the people, which he calls the Arabian part of the Empire." cit. Antonius, "The Arab Awakening", p.25, f.n. Palmerston anticipated the same danger when he observed about Muhammad Ali as follows: "His real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom ...; but as it would imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we would not agree to it. Besides Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be". cit. Antonius, op.cit. p.31 quoting from Sir Henry Bulwar's "Life of Palmerston", vol. II; Evidence goes as far as to prove Muhammad Ali's ambition to proclaim himself the Sultan-Caliph of the Islam Empire. see Scott, "Travels through Candia and Egypt", Addendum No. I, pp.352-56; Ali's despatch to England and France begged them that he was afraid of the increasing Russian influence on the Porte, and hence was requested by the Ulema and the people of so many Muslim countries to replace himself for Sultan Mahmud. Again: "The Moniteur Ottoman spoke of a plot of the Pasha to claim the Khilafat in collusion with the Shareef of Mecca", see, The Cambridge Modern History, vol. 1 p. 549.

5. Holland, op.cit., pp. 98, 101, 89

The 'active Arabian sovereign' had lost his Arab Empire, but he had achieved at least one thing, that is a semi-independent status for his dominions of Egypt and the Sudan. There is ample evidence that Muhammad Ali's highest ambition, besides creating an Arab Empire, was to make Egypt virtually as well as legally an independent state¹. It was his sheer misfortune that he could not win over Britain in opposition to the Sultan, and he himself was never in a position to challenge the combined forces of Turkey and Britain, it was preferable to maintain a weak friend, the Sultan, than a powerful independent 'Arab' Emperor in possession of the 'road to India'. The entire Eastern Question, in fact, revolved round this maxim, and Europe had adopted almost a parallel policy in the case of Muhammad Ali. In the end, Muhammad Ali had to be content on his achievement of a semi-independent status, exercising with complete administrative autonomy a sovereignty limited only by some nominal checks. The Firman of June 1841, recognised for him an hereditary right to the pashalik of Egypt within its ancient boundaries; the succession was to be in his direct line of descent, the eldest male member of the family being nominated as the Pasha of Egypt. Muhammad Ali had failed to found an Arab Empire. But Egypt was independent of the Turkish control. Its administration was managed separately with complete autonomy, and this privilege was guaranteed by

1. Dodwell, "The founder of modern Egypt", pp. 85, 105, 116, 17 see also: Cameron, op.cit., p. 121; de Leon, "The Khedive's Egypt", p. 66.

by the consent of the Great European Powers¹. He had failed in his larger schemes, but he had laid down the foundations of a modern Egyptian state.

Muhammad Ali found himself in possession of a country which was economically in a deplorable condition. His principal task, therefore, was the financial restoration of Egypt, and this he accomplished through his system of state-monopoly of trade and agriculture. He was well aware of the fact that the basis of the Egyptian economy was the land and its output. Hence, in the name of the state, he confiscated all the estates of the landed aristocracy of the country. This was not an unprecedented step. Even in Memluke period, there was no personal property in the real sense of the word. All rights were reserved for the Multazim, the chief Supervisor. The peasantry worked in the capacity of mere serfs. That tradition of the Memluke period was revived with the marked difference that the intermediaries, the Multazims, were removed.

1. For full text of the Firman issued on June, 1, 1841, see: Holland, op.cit., pp. 110-14. The limitations referred to in the text were: the specification of the number of the armed forces; some fixed amount of tribute to be paid to the Sultan; appointments of higher ranks than the colonels to be made with the permission of the Sultan; ban on building the vessels of war; sending the customary provisions to the Holy cities; and the prevalence of the Ottoman law, in principle, in Egypt. See also, Wilson, "Modern Egypt and Thebes", p. 511; de Freycinet, "The Egyptian Question", pp. 95, 97.

and the state itself became the chief Multazim¹.

Muhammad Ali, then, proceeded one step forward. He had introduced in Egypt the culture of Sugar-cane, Indian Indigo, American cotton plant and opium². The tiller of the soil was, hitherto, free to exercise his will to cultivate whatsoever he liked. Now, Muhammad Ali forced him to grow what he liked and what the state needed. Furthermore, realising that the produce of the country was sold at low prices to the foreign and local millionaires, he monopolised for the state the trade of the country as well³. Besides, several canals were dug in order to reclaim the desert, and a vast area of non-arable land was turned into arable one⁴. The semi-independent state of Egypt was getting a firm economic foundation.

In government and administration of the country, the Pasha delegated no authority to his agents. His was a strong centralised government. Egypt was administered efficiently. Law and order prevailed. There were few crimes, murders and robberies. "With an admirable talent for

organisation, he has managed to introduce into one of the most neglected, disorganised countries in the world the first conditions of a civilised state, order and security", remarked

1. Elgood, op.cit., p. 48; Shukri, "Bina'ul Daulat-i-Misr : Muhammad Ali", pp. 29, 30-31; Cameron, op.cit., pp. 85, 87.

2. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 38, 39.

3. Cameron, op.cit., p. 125. After a hard struggle, the foreign dealers were able in the late thirties to get the barriers removed. see, Issawi: "Egypt at the mid-century" p. 23, see also, Elgood, op.cit., p. 48; Shukri, op.cit., pp. 58 - 60.

4. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 39, 41; Dodwell, op.cit., p. 216.

a contemporary observer¹.

On the other hand, to consolidate as well as to extend his domain, Muhammad Ali organised a new-model army on European lines of discipline, organisation and control². Again he was, perhaps, the only Eastern ruler who recognised the importance of the naval power. He lost his famous fleet in 1827, and the remnants were handed over to the Porte by virtue of the agreement concluded in 1841. Still, the credit of a pioneer in this field of warfare remains with him.

Inclined to take advantage of every blessing of the West, the Pasha began to install factories after European fashion. But here he failed in his experiment. The measure was premature and was adopted in haste. Skilled labour was lacking, and practically no mineral resources were available to give these industrial undertakings a factual and strong basis³.

Muhammad Ali's programme was that of a many-sided reform. Aiming at the economic restoration of the country, he wanted to change his state into a modern country of European type. With a view to modernise Egypt and to embark upon his other far reaching plans, he found in Western education a stepping stone towards the achievement of many more reforms and his ultimate goal.

1. Muskan, "Egypt and Mehemet Ali", pp. 8-9; see also similar accounts by other contemporary observers, travellers and writers: Scott, "Rambles in Egypt and Candia", vol. II, p. 153; Murray, "A short memoir of Muhammad Ali", p. 60; and : Marshall Marmout, "Voyage du Duc Raguse", Tome III p. 126, cit. Elgood, op. cit., p. 49, f.n.

Several batches of the sons of the Fellahin were sent to Europe, to specialize in various branches of science, humanities and technology. On their return to Egypt, these accomplished scholars must have acted as stimulants to the dull and lethargic atmosphere of the country through translations of Western learning, original works, and planning and organising the native educational, academic and industrial institutions¹.

Inside Egypt itself, Muhammad Ali started schools of the Western type. Hitherto there existed only mosque schools for religious learning. Soon an organised system of modern education came into existence. In 1837, the total number of students in these schools reached to about 10715. In addition to it, there were 2000 students in private Coptic institutions and 10,000 more in religious schools. Apart from the state and native public schools there were several institutions run by the missionaries which were helped in their work by the state².

Practically all of the students were lodged, fed and clothed at the expense of the state³. The simple tillers of the soil were being transformed into an educated Western-middle class, and in this respect a change with far reaching results was overtaking Egypt.⁴

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1. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 100-101, 108-109, 337, 665-68; Scott, op.cit., vol. II, p. 238.
 2. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 637, 664, 665; Dr. Bowring, English Missionary report for the year 1837, who visited Egypt the same year. For Bowring, see, Shukri, op.cit., p. 362 and Cameron, p. 362.
 3. Scott, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 230-47, Elgood, op.cit., p. 4; Shukri, op.cit., pp. 638-39.
 4. Scott, op.cit., vol. II, p. 227; see also the remarks of Count Duhameal of Russia, Shukri, op.cit., pp. 336: "Once the ruler said to me that when he became the ruler of Egypt, there were only two hundred literates, the Copts being an exception".

Since 1822, the printing press at Bulaq was also at work¹. A Translation Bureau was set up with the help of the Western educated youths and under the direction of Frenchmen and Armenians². Important works on medicine, natural sciences, astronomy, geology, geogtaphy, history and mechanics were translated into Arabic and Turkish and were printed at Bulaq³. From 1828, the official paper al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya began to appear⁴. It was the first Arabic paper ever issued from the land of the Pharaohs.

To accelerate the speed of modernization, the Pasha invited the Europeans, mostly French, to assist him in administration of a backward country. With their help and advice, he organised his army, medical and health services, and the department of education⁵.

Borrowing another measure of the West, and to give a semi-popular character to his government, he created a Council for giving advice to the Government in the administration of the country⁶. In September 1829, a large gathering of 157, comprising of the civil and military officers, the provincial Governors, the Ulema, and a number of village sheikhs, headed by Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali, met for the first time and discussed the ways and means of improving the lot of

1. Shukri, op.cit., p.120; Rafi'i, "Asr-i-Muhammad Ali", p.569

2. St. John, "Egypt and Muhammad Ali", vol. I, p.127

3. A list of the publications, or the books still in press, upto 1837, is given by Dr. Bowring: see, Shukri, op.cit., pp.677-84; see also, Tajir, "Harakat at-Tarjema bi Misr", p.15

4. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 125, 684. The four-pages paper was published as a bi-lingual paper, in Arabic as well as in Turkish. see Tajir, op.cit., p.39. The Paper remained suspended between 1849, the death-year of Muhammad Ali, and 1863, the succession-year of Isma'il; see, Dasuqi, op.cit., p. 37

5. Paton, op.cit., pp. 71-80

6. Hamza, op.cit., p. 38; Tajir, op.cit., p. 41; Dasuqi, op.cit. p. 36; Shukri, op.cit., p. 9

the people¹. This principle of government-by-consultation was, later on, extended to the provinces as well, and provincial Assemblies were established.

There are evidences of these institutions being still in existence and in function as late as the early thirties of that century. In Cairo, a shadow-parliament was in its session when St. John, the French traveller, visited Egypt in the last months of 1832. A "merry old Turk", presided at the meeting, and the Council itself comprised of a number of individuals, public officials and government servants. The Council assembled-daily for the despatch of the business². "It is a parliament of extra ordinary kind", remarked St. John, "when the Pasha has anything agreeable to do, he does it himself without consulting this wretched council ...; but when application is made to him for money or some favour is demanded which it might be inexpedient to grant and imprudent to refuse he suddenly feigns a high authority of his council Such is the parliament of Egypt³". Nothing more, however, could be expected at that very stage in a backward Oriental country. Evidence proves that the Council was occasionally consulted in earnest in matters of wide public concern. One example is that of seeking its advice on the commencement of the Turco-Russian war of 1830's⁴.

However, these were in his phantom creations, good

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1. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 205; Shukri, op.cit., p. 11; see also Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 608.
 2. St. John, op.cit., vol. I, p. 130; see also Scott, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 116, 117, who mentions its existence in 1837 at the time of his visit to Egypt that year.
 3. St. John, op.cit., p. 130.
 4. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 613; Scott, op. cit., vol II, pp. 116-

for nothing, But they laid down, at least, a pattern which emphasised the popular basis of the administration if not of the government.

The social, political and economic changes taking place in Egypt during this period marked the beginnings of a renaissance in Egypt. However, its effect was ~~not~~ deep and it did not touch the various strata of society. All reforms and developments were introduced at the top level, or rather at the state level, only. They did not affect the masses or the peasantry as such. The state of Egypt was becoming prosperous, whereas the people of Egypt were growing more miserable. There were two main causes for the general misery, firstly, the Pasha's lust for power and his dream of carving out for himself an Arab Empire; and secondly, his system of monopolies, and his quasi-communistic attitude towards the state and the people. Contemporary travellers were struck with wonder when they witnessed the prevailing "general poverty"¹ and a sharp "contrast between rich and poor

Muhammad Ali's campaigns, which continued from the beginning of his career as the Pasha of Egypt, right upto the year 1840, took the lion's share of the annual budget of the state. Even his system of monopolies of trade and agriculture was adopted with a view to amass wealth to meet the heavy expenditure of his wars and campaigns. Again, his lust for power forced him to get recruits for his army through conscription. In the beginning he relied upon the Turks and

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1. Lady Gordon, "English woman in Egypt", vol. I, p. 17: Letter from Alexandria, dated July, 1842.
 2. Ibid., vol. II, p.12: Letter from Cairo dated April, 1843

the children of the Memlukes. In the early 1820's some forced recruitment had been possible from the Sudan. But when he failed to get sufficient 'raw material' from the Sudan, he began conscripting the Egyptian peasants. They resented, but their resentment was of no avail. They were compelled to go to the battle-fields, while their lands and crops lay deserted they maimed themselves, blinded their minors or escaped into the desert. The accounts of contemporary travellers are full of the description of miseries that befell these wretched fellahin¹.

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1. St. John, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 189-91: "In all the villages we hear execrations poured forth against the Pasha for the oppressive way in which he recruits his armies, and the practices to which the Fellahs resort to elude his despotism. They prove at once their intense love of home, and their aversion to a military life.... However as soon as the news reaches a village that a recruiting party is abroad, and it spreads over the country like wildfire, many men blind themselves with arsenic, others thrust a spear, or some other sharp instrument, into one of their eyes, or chop the fore-finger of the right hand.... Nay, mothers, forgetting that the Pasha's wars cannot last for ever, have been known to blind or maim their own children. And to such an extent has this practice been carried, that it has been at length thought necessary to make it punishable. An order was issued at Cairo, July 30th, 1832, to each of the principal persons in the city commanding them to procure a certain number of men for the army under pain of forfeiting 700 piastres for every deficiency. The consequence, says an eye-witness, was that the streets presented the desolate appearance observed during the plague; the shops were closed, business was suspended, and women wailed as for the dead; the soldiers and inspectors employed in seizing the men, soon discovered the lucrative trade of pressing invalids, and other persons unfit for service from whom menaces and their own fears extorted money for their release. "But even this tyrannic order was found to be insufficient; for men still contrived, by practicing themselves, to elude the grasp of their oppressors; and at length the Pasha, in a moment of extreme irritation, issued the following circular, dated March 12th, 1833, printed in Turkish, and addressed to the military Governors of di-

"With respect to the men whom we take for the service of our victorious armies and navies (war depots

Continued on page 17

Nor was this the end of their miseries. They were conscripted to die for the cause of the Pasha, and, at the same time, they were heavily taxed in order to pay off the expenditure incurred in the wild campaigns in Arabia, Syria, Greece and the Sudan; The total number of Ali's forces as given by the St. John in 1833, was about 1,20,000¹. The maintenance of this huge army was the source of continuous drainage from the pockets of the peasantry². The incessant wars, which lasted for more than thirty years, were the main cause of people's misery. Every war meant some new conscription and more often than not, some new tax as well. The tillers of the soil perished in thousands at the battle-fields, and there was no way out.

Continued from page 16.

on their way to us, some draw their teeth, some put out their eyes, and others break their arms, or otherwise maim themselves thus laying us under the necessity of sending back the greater part, and causing the deficiency in the report of the war department which I always perceive. Make up those deficiencies by sending immediately all the men who are wanting, _____ all fit for service, able bodied, and healthy..... And when you forward them, let them know that they must not maim themselves because I will take from the family of every such offender men in his place; and he who has maimed himself shall be sent to the galleys for life...."

Paton, who travelled through Egypt in 1839-46, made the following observations:

~~"Every- from~~

"Even before Mehemet Ali's time the fellah was degraded and brutified, but not so much so as since because small landed properties were scattered all over Egypt, and even under the Mamluke beys, the Cadis and Ulama were able to protect the proprietors...." See, Paton, op.cit., vol. II, p. 32. Similar accounts in: Briggs, "Heathen and holy lands", p. 220; Bartlett, "The Nile Boat", pp. 31, 32, 39.

1. St. John, op.cit., vol. II, p. 474.

2. Ibid., pp. 451-52

Conscription, as a matter of principle, was also adopted in the scheme of industrialization¹. The majority of workers in the experimental institutions of the Pasha, were those ill-fated fellahin who had been forced to let their lands unsown, and work instead in these factories. It was all the more regrettable that inspite of these high-handed measures, the experiment of the Pasha failed utterly, and quite a large amount of money was squandered. At any cost it did no good to the people of Egypt².

Then there was the monopoly system of the Pasha. The Egyptian peasants were ordered to cultivate a particular crop, and then at the harvest time the Government forcibly purchased, at its own prices, all the produce of the soil, even the cereals. In most of the cases, the poor peasants had to repurchase at a higher rate something to sustain their family. Since 1829, the situation became more serious. A series of complaints against this policy and desertions of the villages shocked the Pasha, and he had to reconsider his measures³.

The Egypt of Muhammad Ali had a population of more than two million people⁴. The fellah element comprised

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1. The conscripted labourers in these factories numbered about forty thousands, according to the estimate of the contemporary British Consul in Egypt. See, Shukri, op.cit., pp. 778, 779.
 2. "... they are utterly disproportionate to the wants and means of Egypt, hastily got up by foreign rather than native energy, at the expense of the hearts blood of the country, which has been rapidly depopulating and utterly draining of its vital resources, till the unhappy population have sunk to the lowest depth of misery". see Bartlett, op.cit., pp. 28-9.
 3. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 216; see also St. John, op.cit., vol. II, p. 78, where he alludes to the famine of 1829 as an artificial famine caused by the monopolistic policy of the Pasha.
 4. Shukri, op.cit., p. 789; Elgood, op.cit., p. 51.

nine-tenth of the entire population. In sharp contrast stood the Turks, only 15,000 in number, and still occupying the economy and administration of the country. They held high posts which were never given to the children of the soil, not even to the educated Copts.¹ The power and authority vested in this minority group, a small band of foreigners².

The realization of their actual position had demoralized the fellahin. They had become utterly desperate and consequently submissive and obedient. It was very rare for them to possess some money. "The old Egyptians laboured slavishly for their kings _____ the fellahs labour for their Pasha....", remarked St. John³.

There was bitter antagonism and separatist feelings between the Turks and the fellahin. The native Egyptian was always looked down ~~by~~ upon by the Turks. "The meanest man speaking Turkish was ipso facto considered as belonging to a caste high above the indigeneous inhabitants", observed Bowring⁴.

As a result of these conditions a vague class-feeling was slowly getting firm ground among the fellahin whenever they would think of their lot and the causes of their misery.

In Muhammad Ali we have a dual personality to deal%

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1. Copts are separately described as distinct from the fellahin, because, as a group, they were town dwellers.
 2. Shukri, op.cit., pp. 389-90: Bowring's report.
 3. St. John, op.cit., p. 270; see also de Leon's comment that the fellah was treated "as slave & serf", de Leon, op.cit., p. 71.
 4. cit. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 202.

with. He loved Egypt passionately¹, and in the same breath treated its people like animals. It is an anomaly to be solved with some precaution.

Most of the Western writers have appraised him as a despot par excellence, who did nothing for Egypt, worth the name. Even Egyptian writers are not one on this point. Muhammad Abduh has gone to the extent of proving that he was the sole cause of all miseries of the Egyptian people, and that he did no good to the people².

On the other hand there are several accounts of contemporary travellers and European Consuls, wherein Muhammad Ali appears as an exemplary ruler³.

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1. "Know that I will pursue the well being of this land even at the cost of my life and the lives of my kindred; I will readily sacrifice to the prosperity of my country... even one of my own kin set over three million people". (From a circular of Muhammad Ali dated 1259 A.H./1843 A.D.) cit. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 200.
 2. "Did he ever think for the reform of the Arabic Language; did he ever make efforts for a systematic training based on the Din and the Adab; did it ever occur in the soft corner of his heart to give his people a real voice in the government...; did he ever try to establish an organised Constitutional government that could guarantee Shar'a and 'Adl? No. Nothing of these expectations were realised.... "He sent groups of students to receive education in Europe; but did he ever give them freedom to study the countries where they were getting their education? No... Instead; they were used never free to exercise their own will.... They were afraid of the school as if they were encountering an army.... "He encouraged cultivation only to snatch up from the cultivators the produce of the soil.... "It is said that he founded factories in Egypt; but was it in the interest of the people to make them capable to run those factories themselves... ? "I do not think anyone would dare to contradict me, after going through the history of Muhammad Ali, that this man was a profiteering tradesman, a brave soldier, and an expert autocrat; he was a calamity for Egypt, a destroyer of its real life; and whatever we see today, which might be named Life, is the creation of others.... "
- Abduh's article, in Rashid Reza, "Tarikh al-Ustad al-Imam", vol. II, pp. 386-89
3. See Scott, op.cit., particularly, p. 110-11; Prince Pucklar Muskan, op.cit.; Reports of the Consuls and travellers in Shukri, op.cit.; Murray, op.cit.; Wallace, "The war in Egypt" p. 2

In fact, he was a military man. His ambition was to carve out for himself an Empire, as also to consolidate his authority in Egypt. To this end he planned his entire policy, and inspite of his selfish motives, his policy unintentionally produced some good results with far reaching consequences. They were to prove significant, in the period following the death of the Pasha, in creating some political consciousness at least among the town dwellers and the Westernised middle class intelligensia. At the same time, the resentment and dissatisfaction spread over the entire population of the country nourished among them a vague desire for a change and for better state of affairs.

The fact should not however be overlooked that under Muhammad Ali Egypt achieved legally a semi-independent status and virtually complete freedom and autonomy. It was his personal achievement, but it was to become a blessing for the Egyptian people as well. The following generations of the Egyptians must have felt a sense of pride over the semi-independent status of their country. "He created a new era for Egypt", remarked Murray, the Consul General in 1846. "No other Mohammadan country is now so enlightened or so well governed", he concluded¹.

1. Murray, op.cit., p. 60; see also American Consul-General's remark: "Augustus boasted that he found Rome of brick and left it of marble..... (Muhammad Ali) found all Egypt a chaos, he left it a country". "He created not only an Empire but a people.", _____ de Leon, op.cit, pp. 63 and 67.

Muhammad Ali died in August, 1849¹. His successors were devoid of his qualities of head and heart. Ibrahim, who had succeeded him in his life-time, could not survive him². Abbas (1848-1954), the second successor, was a devout Muslim having implacable hatred for the foreigners and Western institutions. He dismissed those Europeans who were serving in Egypt since long, and closed many a school and academic institution, where Western education was imparted³. Muhammad Ali had taken the men and institutions from the West in order to serve his ultimate objects. Abbas was not so much far-sighted or broadminded. But as a ruler he was, to a certain extent, a success. He abolished the monopoly system of Muhammad Ali, and introduced tithe system in the land-taxation⁴. He so managed the finances of Egypt as to keep it clear of debt. Under his reign, railroad system was inaugurated chiefly to meet the wants of the Indian transit⁵. On the other hand, to fill up the deficiency caused by the Turco-Egyptian wars, conscription for army on a large scale was revived under Abbas⁶. The people of Egypt, inspite of the change of the ruler, could not get a change in their miserable life.

1. Bartlett, op.cit., p. 29.

2. Young, "Egypt", p. 63; Rafi'i, "Asr Muhammad Ali", pp. 672-7.

3. de Leon, op.cit., p. 81; Young, op.cit., p. 64; Cameron, op.cit. p. 202.

4. St. Hillaire, "Egypt and the Suez Canal", p. 84.

5. de Leon, op.cit., pp. 89-90.

6. Bayle, "Village life in Egypt", pp. 80-81.

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Sa'id, the successor of Abbas, (1854-1863), was quite the reverse of Abbas regarding his attitude towards the West. Fond of the Western society, "speaking French like a Parisian"¹, he went to the farthest extremes in the hostage of the West, and this ultimately affected even the autonomy of the country. "It was Sa'id", says Cromer, "Who first invited European adventurers to, prey on Egypt"². For the people of Egypt, comparatively speaking, he was a generous ruler and did much for the reform of the people. In 1858, he issued a decree which recognised for the peasants the right of proprietorship, with full authority of selling, bequeathing, letting or mortgaging their lands. The measure gave a new impetus to agriculture. Sa'id also reduced the strength of the army to 9,000³, and consequently the 'time-honoured' conscription for military service ceased to exist, No less significant was the attitude of the Pasha regarding the high posts and ranks to be given to the natives, and here he openly supported them⁴.

However, beside all these reforms, it was in the reign of Sa'id that a ruinous step was taken in granting the concession for the cutting of the Suez Canal. The after-effects of the Concession were to be borne by the following generation, but even for the people of those days, it was no less than a calamity. By virtue of the Concession-Treaty, Egyptian Government was made liable to supply a fixed number of labourers without any compensation on the part of the

1. de Leon, op.cit., p. 85.

2. Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol. I, p. 21.

3. Chirol, op.cit., p. 22.

4. Arabi, "Kashf as-Sitar", vol I, p. 16; Rafi'i, op.cit.;p.3

Concession-holder. Again, the Egyptian Government had to purchase about one half of the original shares of the Project¹. In order to fulfill these obligations, conscription was resumed at the beginning of the work. Besides, taxes were increased in order to buy the shares of the Canal. As a result of these measures, Sa'id had to contract a foreign loan once in 1858, and for the second time in 1861, and again for the third time in 1862². Only his sudden accidental death in 1863 curtailed his ruinous loan-making series. Had he lived more, certainly he would have done what his successor did, following his footsteps. With such undertakings and depending on limited sources of exchequer, only foreign money could have solved the problem.

Sa'id died in January 1863, and Isma'il succeeded him at the age of thirty-three. Isma'il was known to his people as a shrewd administrator and an enlightened prince. He had visited Europe several times, and had been living at Constantinople before becoming the Pasha of Egypt. Indeed, his personal experience of Western culture and society had left deep and lasting impressions upon his mind. Determined to turn his country into a Europeanized state, he ordered for

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1. The Concession Treaty of 1856 provided that four-fifth of the labour employed (about 20,000) should be Egyptian. (Art. 2). This provision was interpreted by the Suez Canal Company as an obligation on the part of the Egyptian Government to supply it free of charge. For eight years this erroneous interpretation remained in force. At least Isma'il, quarrelled on this issue and the problem was solved through the arbitration of French Emperor. The Company abandoned its claim against a compensation of thirty-eight million francs. See, Schonfield, "The suez Canal in world affairs", pp. 40,151; Mohd. Abou Nasr, "The Suez Canal", p.4
 2. Young, op.cit., p. 67; see also: Halim, "Egypt and the Sudan", The Nineteenth Century, July 1885, p. 533.

the erection of a number of palacial buildings. Several foreign companies were invited to operate in Egypt. Railways and canals were extended. The harbour of Alexandria was extended, and after the cutting of the Canal, in 1869, the Port of Suez was adapted so as to fulfill its new role. Telegraphic lines were extended; postal service was nationalized, and sugar and cottonmills were established in large numbers¹. Every effort was made to transform Egypt into a modern Europeanized state.

Though virtually an independent country, legally speaking, Egypt was still a part of the Ottoman Empire. Isma'il tried to get still more privileged position than had been acquired by Muhammad Ali. Here, he used money instead of force². The Caliphal Firmans succeeded one after the other until the year 1873, when Egypt had achieved complete 'home rule', and its ruler all but a bare title of suzerain³. By virtue of the Firman of 1866, the descent to pashalik of Egypt was changed from the eldest surviving member of the family to the eldest son of the ruling Pasha; the strength of the army was allowed to be raised to 30,000 troops⁴. The Firman of 1867 conferred upon the Pasha, a privileged title of the Khedive; he was also authorized to frame laws and regulations and to make arrangements with other countries in the nature of conventions for non-political objects⁵. The

1. de Leon, op.cit., p. 365; Young, op.cit., p. 82.

2. Cameron, op.cit., pp. 254-55; de Leon, op.cit., p. 80.

3. Text of the Firman in: Holland, op.cit., pp. 121-25; Egypt No. 4(1879): Texts of the Firmans 1841-1873.; see also de Frecinet, op.cit., pp. 95, 97.

4. Holland, op.cit., pp. 114-16.

5. Ibid., pp. 116-18.

Firman of 1869 forbade the Khedive to raise loans without a prior sanction of the Sultan¹. But hardly three years had elapsed that a new Firman of 1872 revoked the previous one and authorized the Khedive, with full liberty, to contract loans without seeking any permission from the Porte².

To create a people befitting a modern state, Isma'il devoted himself to the spread of Western education and learning. During his reign came the "second wave of Occidentalism"³. To the budget of education he added the revenue of his personal estates and, with this £ 50,000, the annual budget for education reached to £ 150,000⁴. The Supreme Educational Council of Muhammad Ali's period was revived and European experts were put to the task of educational renaissance.⁵

The campaign of sending students abroad also got a new momentum. In Egypt, the decree of 1868 established a three stage educational system. Number of advanced schools reached forty-three⁶. In 1872, a Normal School, the first of its kind in the East, and a little later, a school for the study of foreign languages came into existence. Efforts were made to disseminate education and learning among the fellah women, and Isma'il's wife herself opened a Girls' school. The

1. Ibid., p. 119.

2. Ibid., pp. 119-20.

3. Gibb: "Contemporary Arabic Literature", Bulletin of Oriental and African studies, 1926. p. 748.

4. Rifa'at, op. cit., p. 122.

5. de Leon, op. cit., pp. 271-72, 277; Rifa'at, op. cit., p. 122.

6. Rifa'at, op. cit., p. 122.

old military and naval colleges were given high standard¹. The number of students exceeded 100,000 out of a population of 2,500,000, a proportion far in advance to even some of the European countries². In the last years of Isma'il's reign, the total number of schools had reached 5820³. Isma'il also extended his patronage to the Western missionary schools, and freely donated land and money to Missions⁴. "Fully to relate all that the Khedive has done for education would require a volume instead of a chapter", remarked the contemporary writer, de Leon⁵. A National Library and a National Museum were founded, with a view to enhance the studies in Egyptology. The printing press at Bulaq was provided with the latest machines and appliances, and a paper factory was set up near it. Publications on various subjects and journals and newspapers began to appear. The Government itself published three official papers: military, official and academic⁶.

Impressed by the parliamentary institutions of the West, whom Isma'il had an opportunity to study during his tours to European countries, he began a new experiment in the history of Egyptian government. In November, 1866, he issued a decree for the creation of an Assembly of the Delegates (Majlis Shura an-Nuwab). Article 1 of the Statute, defining the powers of the Assembly reads as follows:

" L'Assemblée aura pour mission de délibérer sur les intérêt intérieurs du pays; elle aura également à se

1. de Leon, op.cit., pp. 160-61, 277; Rifa'at, op.cit., p. 123.

2. de Leon, op.cit., p. 160; Rifa'at, op.cit., p. 124.

3. Young, op.cit., p. 77; See also, de Leon, op.cit., p. 160.

4. Rifa'at, op.cit., p. 124.

5. de Leon, op.cit., p. 271.

6. Rifa'at, op.cit., p. 123.

prononcer sur les projets que la gouvernement croire relever de ses attributions et au sujet desquels, elle donnera son opinion qui sera soumise a l'approbation de Son Altesse le vice-roi."¹

The Assembly was essentially a consultative body, and yet it had a popular basis for its inception. With indirect ballot, the popular vote chose the electors, who, in turn, elected the delegates for the Assembly. The delegate seventy-five in number, were to represent the people for a term of three years. The Khedive was authorised to convoke, to adjourn or to dissolve the Assembly. Secrecy of deliberations, nomination of the President and the vice-President of the Assembly, finality of the Khedivial authority in making the decisions and some other details of minor importance were enumerated in the Statute².

The first session of the Assembly began on November 10, 1866 and continued till January 20, 1867. Problems concerning taxes and property, education and public works were discussed. The collection of taxes at the harvest time was suggested as more suitable than that of monthly one. Certain limitations as to the powers of the collectors were proposed. Finally, in a long report of a sub-committee, the creation of some new schools was recommended³.

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1. Douin, "Histoire du regne du Khedive Ismail", Tome I, p. 298
 2. Ibid., pp. 298-301; Rafi'i, "Asr Isma'il", vol. II, pp. 93-5
 3. Ibid., p. 313; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 304-13.

During the following eleven years of the life of the Assembly, there was little novelty in its discussions. Agriculture, property and judiciary were the only targets of their interest¹.

With all its shortcomings, the Assembly was a step forward in the direction of democratization of the government. It is noteworthy that it was not done under any external pressure or in view of any popular demand; it was simply the initiative of the Khedive himself. However, a keen interest was observed on the part of the middle class intelligensia in this new experiment of their ruler. In a book appearing in Egypt in 1869, the following remarks is significant in connection with the evaluation of the Assembly:

"Isma'il became dominant over an Umma of free opinion, consulting it about the proper measures and regulations, the introduction of which proposed their benefit."

Sa'id had left his successor two legacies which bore some inherent far-reaching consequences: one was the indebtedness of Egypt of £ 3,292,000,³ and the other was the Suez Canal Project. Following Sa'id's footsteps, Isma'il went on burdening Egypt with huge debts. Money was recklessly

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1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 107-108; Landau, "Parliament and parties in Egypt", p. 16.
 2. Rifa'a Rafi', "Manahij al-Albab", cit., Landau, op.cit., p. 15.
 3. Royce, "The Egyptian campaigns," p. 7; Cromer, op.cit., vol. I, p. 11.

spent in erecting palacial buildings¹, in launching campaigns to extend the dominions of Egypt, in bribing the Sultan for obtaining more autonomous status for himself², in princely tours of Europe³, in laying hospitality of the Westerners, and not the least of all, in fulfilling the promises of his predecessor regarding the Canal Concession. This item cost him too much. Loans were contracted without the least care for the extra-ordinary high rate of interest, for which the discount was always a huge sum⁴. It was beyond the capacity of the Egyptian Treasury. As a result, taxes were increased and the courbash (kurba) was again brought into action. In despair, Isma'il contracted some new loans to pay off at least the interest of the previous ones, and thus went on increasing the indebtedness of Egypt. The result was not an unexpected one: Egypt had reached the stage of insolvency as early as 1871, when Isma'il decreed his famous " Law of Muqabala ", which clearly divulged the weak position of the Egyptian economy⁵. Finally, when he was forced to leave Egypt in 1879, he left it burdened with a public debt of near about ninety million pounds. With foreign capital and foreign indebtedness, foreign hold was destined to increase.

The Canal issue was in itself a sufficient pretext for an active political interest of Europe in the affairs of

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 53-4.
2. Cameron, op.cit., pp. 250-51, 254-55.
3. Sutherland Menzies, "Turkey old and new", p. 218; Newman: " Great Britain in Egypt ", p. 7.
4. Cameron, op.cit., pp. 250-52
5. Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. II, p. 44
6. Boyle, op.cit., p.7; Cromer, op.cit., vol. I, p. 11

Egypt. The project to cut a maritime canal through the Isthmus of Suez, and thus to join the two seas and the three continents, was cherished since the French sojourn in 1798-1801. France was interested in the Project in order to destroy the British power in India¹. The idea of linking up the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, present since the dawn of the Egyptian history², took a new turn in the Industrial Age. Now the Project meant an easy means to extend the circle of Imperialist influence. Muhammad Ali, when he was approached with the request of cutting such a Canal, had refused to sanction the scheme³. Sa'id was, however, persuaded by de Lesseps⁴ who was an intimate friend of the Pasha. Thus the long-cherished scheme came to realization. Sa'id was not as precocious as his predecessors used to be. In 1854, he

1. On the basis of material provided by the French Consul-General in Egypt, Talleyrand informed the Directory in March 1798:

"The event of establishing the French in Egypt will bring about a revolution in European commerce which will strike particularly at England. It will destroy her power in India, the only basis for her grandeur in Europe. The revival of the Suez route will have an effect upon her... as fatal as the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope to the Genoese and Venetians in the sixteenth century. The result of this revolution will be wholly to the advantage of the Republic, because it is by its geographical position, population, genius and activity... the one of all Powers which can derive most from it." cit., Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 10-11

2. Schonfield, op.cit., p. 1

3. Ibid., p. 19

4. "Born at Versailles on November 19, 1805, he came of a family of diplomats.... Ferdinand (de Lesseps) was destined for the family career, and after holding various Vice-Consulships and Consulships-General he was appointed Minister at Madrid. One of his early posts was the Vice-Consulate at Alexandria.... After remaining as Consul in Cairo until 1837 he was transposed to Rotterdam, and it was many days before he saw Egypt again". See Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 21-22.

granted the concession for the cutting of the Suez Canal¹.

Having friendly relations with France, in those days of Cremean War, England could not oppose the granting of the Concession so strongly, persistently, and openly as it would have been possible otherwise. However, the Project was inimical to her Imperialistic interest, and diplomatic efforts continued to get it cancelled, postponed or delayed the action upon the award of the Concession. The Sultan was persistently persuaded to withhold his sanction, which at last he had to give in March 1866². Palmerston led a campaign in the House of Commons against the realization of the Project, as it was totally inimical to British interests³.

In the meantime, the digging of the Canal had begun in April, 1859. England had refused to purchase any share in the Project. However, inspite of strong opposition, de Lesseps' dream was realized with the generous help of Sa'id. The Pasha purchased 177,642 shares, about one half of the original, and extended to his friend, de Lesseps, every

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1. Originally granted in November 1854, the Concession Treaty was replaced by a new Firman issued in January, 1856. It was to remain in force for 99 years from the date of the date of ~~the~~ cutting of the Canal. (Art. 16), The Egyptian Government was to get 15% of the net profit of the Company (Art. 19). It was also stipulated that four-fifth of the labour employed should be Egyptian. (Art. 2). See Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 150-56
 2. Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. I, p. 101; Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 32, 33.
 3. In July, 1857, Palmerston, in a speech in the House of Commons, described the Canal Project as inimical to British interest, opposed to Britain's traditional policy and planned as a menace to British supremacy in India. See Elgood, op.cit., p. 59, f.n.; see also, Schonfield, pp. 31-

possible help that he required¹.

Apart from the actual material help given in this connection,² the opening of the Canal proved a permanent loss to the Egyptian exchequer: The transit that once filled the coffers of its custom-house and gave employment to thousands of Egyptians, now completely ceased. Unfortunately, even the shares of the Canal could not prove advantageous to Egypt, as they were forfeited before long. In this Project, Egypt gained nothing and ultimately had to lose even its own entity.

1. Schonfield, op.cit., pp. 35-36

2. Muḥall estimated that the Canal took about £ 16,700,000 from the Egyptian treasury. Elgood, op.cit., p. 58, f.n.; estimate of de Leon is £ 17,423,178. see de Leon, op.cit., p. 417. Appendix, A; see also Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. I, p. 106: He gives £ 16,800,000, quoting from "Histoire financiere de l'Egypte", a contemporary book published in 1878.

CHAPTER II

ON THE EVE OF THE NATIONAL REVOLT

" If Isma'il Pasha died during the first ten years of his reign, his record of an Oriental Ruler would have been very distinguished one. He was a man of very wide, if not lofty, ambition; and was gifted with indefatigable, though misdirected, energy."

———— Dicey

("England and Egypt",p. 2)

" ... it is true that the Canal has proved highly remunerative to the company which exploits it; but Egypt has never obtained the smallest advantage; on the contrary the Canal has been the principal cause of Egypt's miseries."

———— Abbas II

(A few words on
Anglo-Egyptian Settlement,
p. 33)

The opening of the Suez Canal was a turning point in the history of European diplomacy. Now, the centre of

gravity shifted from Constantinople to Cairo¹. The opening of the Canal had also amended the directive principles of British policy, particularly its policy towards Egypt. It took a turn from negative to a positive interest, "from a desire to keep other Powers off Egypt to a desire to secure control over Egypt"². The ascendancy of any other Power was a source of peril to Britain as the Mistress of India. Khedive Isma'il helped Britain, through his extravagance and indebtedness, to adopt a more definite policy, and thus paved the way for a positive British intervention.

The series of loans that began in the days of Sa'id caused the ruin of the Egyptians. Since 1864, the year following his accession, Isma'il began to contract loans and did not stop until he was forced to³. Even as early as 1871, the Egyptian Treasury seemed to have emptied. It was in August that year that the Egyptian Government had to promulgate the Law of Muqabala, which revealed the weak and hollow basis of the Egyptian economy. By virtue of this law, the land-owner could be redeemed of one half of their land-tax for ever, provided they made extra-advance payment of six years' dues in one sum or in instalments spread over a period not exceeding six years⁴. The Law was of a voluntary nature, but was

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1. In his answer to the Academy Speech of de Lesseps, Renan averred : "The Isthmus cut becomes a strait, a battlefield. A single Bosphorus has hitherto sufficed for the troubles of the world: You have created a second and much more important one." cit.^{W.H.} Silva, "The Expansion of Egypt", p. 320
 2. Issawi, "Egypt at mid-Century", p. 19
 3. Rafi'i, "'Asr Isma'il", vol. II, pp. 28-9:- detail of loans
 4. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 44; Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol. I, pp. 29-30; de Frecinet, "La question d'Egypte", p. 149

enforced as obligatory and the money was realised through courbash¹. Several taxes were increased and some new ones were introduced². However, the economy of Egypt went on deteriorating. The creditors demanded the interest upon their money which had to be paid somehow. Isma'il had to pledge his last asset i.e. his founder's shares of the Suez Canal. The Britain Premier, Disraeli, availed the opportunity and purchased all the shares, British policy took a positive turn of direct intervention in the affairs of a country lying midway between England and her Empire. This action was tantamount to a declaration on the part of England that she would permit no other Power to intervene in the Egyptian affairs so far as that intervention might have a political bearing³.

In England, the issue was criticized as an aspiration to establish a protectorate over Egypt⁴. Moscow Gazette, voicing the official Russian viewpoint, made violent attacks on the British Government for sharing the spoils of the Ottoman Empire and having changed the policy of guarding the 'sickman of Europe'⁵. France was bitterly critical of the 'sudden change

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1. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 45. The Law ceased to be on January 6, 1880, when a decree of the successor of Isma'il cancelled it. See Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 46.
 2. Cromer, op.cit., pp. 30, 49, 53
 3. Annual Register, 1875, pp. 119, 122.
Lord Derby said that the transaction was done in order to prevent "a larger foreign influence from preponderating in a matter so important to us",: cit., Annual Register, 1875, p. 122
 4. Ibid., p. 125
 5. It is a "coup de main, veiled under a commercial transaction the Gazette wrote. It further criticized that it was for the first time that a government became a shareholder in a stock, which was all the more regrettable. Annual Register 1875, pp. 291-92

in the British policy¹.

To Isma'il, even the sale of the Canal shares could not bring any economic relief. The condition had become too desperate to avoid a collapse. Early in 1876, the British Government, at the request of Isma'il, appointed a finance-expert, Cave, to inquire into the financial situation in Egypt. What actually motivated England to send her special mission of Inquiry is not quite clear. As far as the inner history and evidences are concerned, Dicey who was present in Cairo at this time may rightfully be regarded as an authority to speak on the subject². According to his information, the mission was sent out "with the view of bringing about an arrangement under which England, on condition of her assuming the financial liabilities of the Khedivial Government, should take upon herself the Protectorate of Egypt"³. Isma'il, according to Dicey, was eager to get the arrangement finalized, and it would have been done but for the opposition of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby, whose antipathy, Lord Salisbury, the then Prime Minister, could not neglect⁴. Cave

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1. Mazade writing in *Revue des deux Mondes*, No.1, Dec., 1875, said that "the transaction was a pure political one... and although it was not in itself a British occupation of Egypt yet it was the first step towards that goal". cit., Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 65
 2. Edward Dicey, an Imperialist at par and the author of some valuable books and articles on Egypt of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, visited Egypt for the first time on the occasion of the cutting of Suez Canal. Afterwards, he was a frequent visitor, and was regarded as authority on, modern Egyptian studies. See Prefaces to Dicey's monographs: "The story of the Khedivate"; and "The Egypt of the future".
 3. Dicey, "The story of the Khedivate", p. 135. Dicey's view also supported by the Cave's report itself, where he recommended a control of Egyptian economy by a controller sent by the British Government, and that the Khedive should obey that Controller. See Egypt No. 7, (1876) p.9
 4. Dicey, op.cit., pp. 136-37

was recalled in haste. What he had inquired within a few weeks' sojourn, he presented it before the British Prime Minister in the form of a report¹. He declared that the economy of Egypt was in a deteriorating condition, but it could be restored provided its credit was reestablished and its expenditure curtailed. Summing up the situation, Cave concluded that Egypt was suffering from "the ignorance and dishonesty, waste and extravagance of the East, such as have brought her Suzerain to the verge of ruin and at the same time from the vast expense caused by the hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilization of the West"². At another place he remarked: "The Khedive has evidently attempted to carry out with a limited revenue in the course of a few years works which ought to be spread over a far longer period and which would tax the resources of much richer exchequers"².

Concluding his review, Cave suggested that only the intervention of some foreign Power in the financial affairs of the country could guarantee the economic restoration of Egypt².

Cave's Mission was a positive step towards an active British intervention in Egypt³. His report was quite exposing and as such embarrassing to Isma'il. In despair, he took an arbitrary step: On April 8, 1876, he suspended the payment of the interest due to the bondholders. A decree, issued in May 1876, consolidated the various debts into one unified debt of £ 91,000,000 bearing a rate of 7% interest⁴.

1. Annual Register, 1876, p. 9

2. Egypt No.7 (1876) pp.1-12; Annual Register, 1876, pp.9-10; de Freinet, op.cit., p. 157; Dicey, op.cit., p. 140

3. de Freinet, op.cit., p. 157

4. Cromer, op.cit., p.7; Dicey, op.cit., p. 145

The new Khedivial arrangement was vehemently attacked in Europe. To appease the European bondholders, the Khedive proposed to the Powers to appoint a Commission of the Public Debt in order to assist and advise the Egyptian Government on financial matters. France, Austria and Italy nominated their representatives, while England abstained. Isma'il himself selected Lord Cromer (then Sir Evelyn Baring) to represent England. The Commission was instituted by a decree issued in May, 1876. It was not empowered with any initiating or administrative authority. But once it came into existence, it began to assert itself and insisted that it was also its duty to find out whether the taxes were being collected legally or otherwise. Isma'il began to oppose the activities of the Commission and, consequently, the bondholders became uneasy. At the instance of these bondholders, in October, 1876, came another Commission of Inquiry, the Goschen-Joubert Commission, representing British and French creditors respectively. After making investigations, the Commissioners presented their report recommending that "the funded debt of Egypt ought to be fixed at £ 50,000,000, and that the interest on this debt be reduced from 7% to 6%"¹. The debts were to be guaranteed by the securities of the Da'ira lands and the State Railways receipts, while the dues of the port of Alexandria were to be put under a separate arrangement¹. The settlement was to be supplemented by another arrangement on the part of the Khedive to Europeanize the State under the supervision of two controllers nominated by the Governments of France and England, and to entrust the

1. Dicey, op.cit., p. 153

State Railways Administration to an Anglo-French Board. This arrangement was decreed on November 18, 1876¹.

The new arrangement dealt with the funded debt only, the problem of floating debts remained untouched. When the creditors were informed of the settlement, they filed suit for their £ 50,000,000 in the International Tribunals of Egypt. Judgement was given in their favour and the State was declared liable to pay these unfunded debts as well².

The Goschen-Joubert recommendations also ensured the reorganisation of the Egyptian finances, and the administrative measures that were adopted according to these recommendations were far more important in affecting the autonomy of Egypt. Two Controllers-General were appointed to control the Revenue and the Expenditure of the State: one of them was French, the other British. Thus, an Anglo-French control was established and the era of the veiled Protectorate began. Egypt became virtually dependent on the will of the two powers.

In the meantime, the Commission of the Public debt, feeling its work not running smoothly, recommended for another International Commission of Inquiry. Their view was supported by the bondholders and was approved by the Governments of France and England³.

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1. de Frecinet, op.cit., p. 162-64; Dicey, op.cit., p.153. de Frecinet names this Arrangement as Anglo-French Condominium. see de Frecinet, op.cit., p. 161
 2. Dicey, op.cit., p. 98
 3. Dicey's remark in: "The Egyptian Crisis", (Nineteenth Century April, 1879), p. 670: "With the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry. . . England finally abandoned the attitude of non-intervention".

In January 1878, a decree was issued to the same effect and an International Commission of Inquiry, the third in the series, came into being. A supplementary decree extended the powers of the Commission and authorized it to investigate thoroughly into the financial condition of Egypt¹.

In view of the liabilities, the interest on the debt, the tribute to the Porte, and carrying out the current State Expenditure, the Commission, after making thorough inquiries for about four months, proposed to the Khedive to surrender his private estates and to accept Civil List. The Commission also recommended that reforms should be introduced in the working of the government and that the principle of Ministerial Responsibility be accepted. The Khedive, afraid of the other alternative i.e. the International intervention, had no other choice. He yielded and approved the Commission's recommendation. He renounced his personal rule and became a constitutional head of the State². On August 28, 1878, addressing Nubar Pasha in a letter, Ismail authorized him to form a new government. Nubar formed the Ministry with Riaz Pasha as the Minister of Interior. As a result of the changed state of affairs, the Dual Control of Britain and France lost its importance or rather its *raison d'être*. It was, therefore, decided that it should now adopt a more viold form: that the Anglo-French Control be abolished and the Controllers be absorbed as full-fledged ministers in the new Responsible Ministry. Wilson, the

1. Dicey, op.cit., pp. 174-76; Ibid: "The Egyptian Crisis", op.cit., p. 670

2. Cromer, op.cit., pp. 59-61; Dicey, "The Story", p. 186

British Controller, was nominated as the Minister of Finance and the French Controller, de Blignieres, was made the Minister of Public Works.¹

With these new measures, the Anglo-French hold came in closer and direct contact with the people of the country. The European Ministers were not the nominees of their Governments. They were the nominees of the representatives of the bondholders. Still it seemed that it was simply a veiled form of the actual intervention at the Government level. The Khedivial authority was gradually slipping away into the hands of the foreigners and the Khedive was a helpless spectator².

The Responsible Ministry under the presidency of Nubar proved to be too independent and, at last, Isma'il was annoyed. He had accepted a Civil List; he had accepted the principle of Ministerial Responsibility; and finally, he had allowed the Europeans to share in the Government of Egypt. Now the same Responsible Ministry, with two European Ministers, was, step by step, going completely out of his control. He began to wait for his chance.

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1. Cromer, op.cit.p. 63. At the time of execution of the new changes, provision was made for the revival of the Dual Control in the event of removal of the European Ministers from their posts. See, Letter of Salisbury to Vivian, the Consul-General in Egypt; (Egypt No. 3, 1879, pp.1-2).
 2. The Economist, May 29, 1879; see also, de Leon's remark: "The shadow of the stranger projected over Egypt hides both the throne and the native administration".
----- de Leon: "The Khedive's Egypt" p. 387

Isma'il had ascended the viceregal throne amidst the 'fortunate' days of the American Civil War, American Cotton Industry being destroyed, Egyptian cotton had filled the gap. The valley of the Nile, it was beleived, was in future ^{to} supply the looms of Lancashire with shaple of their trade. The area of cotton cultivation was increased. Egypt was becoming more and more prosperous, and there were greater expectations. But, then, the American Civil War ended and with it came the collapse of the cotton boom. As a result, the economic conditions of the peasant class began to deteriorate¹. In 1864, Isma'il's loan-deal began which had its effects upon the masses. New taxes were imposed. The land tax was raised from forty piastres to one hundred and sixty². Besides, Isma'il managed to get the possession of about one-fifth of the whole area land of the country³. Here, he was robbed by his agents through whom he cultivated these lands, and was unable to gather even a fraction of the revenue they had brought in taxation when not in his possession⁴.

The beginning of the financial difficulties, coincided with the fall in the cotton prices and set in an era of

1. Cameron: op.cit., pp. 249-50
2. Blunt: op.cit., p. 16
3. Ibid., p. 17; de Leon. op.cit., p. 236,410
4. Blunt, op.cit., op. 18

of continuous oppression and over-taxation. Isma'il Siddique¹ was Isma'il's chief Agent in this disastrous policy. When the required money was not available, the people were compelled to borrow from Greek Money-lenders at high rates of interest. When they seemed to be totally exhausted and could pay or borrow no more, their lands were confiscated and sold at nominal prices². The other alternative for the Fellah was imprisonment on some "trumped-up charge, compulsory enlistment in the Egyptian army or the cutting of the water from their lands"³. The big land owners could not be treated in so summary a fashion. They were, however, called upon to raise forced labour to meet the unceasing demands of the Government. In return, they were allowed to extort from the Fellahin whatever they still possessed after the visits of the tax-gatherers⁴.

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1. Isma'il Siddique, the notorious Mufettish, an Algerian by birth, of fellah origin, coming in Court contact probably in the time of Abbas I, he became Finance Minister in his last days. He died at the hands of his master on November 15, 1876. See: de Leon, op.cit., pp. 183-89
 2. Dicey, op.cit., p. 90
 3. Ibid, p. 91
 4. Ibid, pp. 91- ; de Leon, op.cit., pp. 219, 230-31, 237, 327.
" In fact it is going hard with the fellahen, beasts produce, goats, hareem, jewellery where it existed, and even the land itself are being sold to meet their debts". see de Leon, op.cit., p. 219; " Everything is cheaper than the last year, but there is no money to buy it with, and the taxes have grown from Egypt beyond bearing". Lady Duff Gordon: "Last letters from Egypt", letter dated November 21, 1866. p. 86. "Every day some fresh tax. Every beast, camel, cow, sheep, donkey and horse is made to pay. The fellahin can no longer eat bread: they are living on barley, meal mixed with water and raw green stuff . . . etc. The taxation makes life impossible: a tax on every crop and on every man, on charcoal, on butter, on salt".
Ibid., p. 65 f.n. Letter dated 1867.

The usual procedure of the usurers was to have a constant watch over the conditions of the peasants. They were constantly in touch with the varying conditions of the peasantry through their agents. Upon receiving information, they offered their 'services' on the security of the growing crops. The rate of interest varied from twelve to twenty per cent. According to the needs of the borrower, while payment had to be made either in money or in kind at the option of the lender. When the harvest was ready, the usurer sent an agent to squat on the ground mortgaged for the loan, and to supervise the crop. It was the money-lender who determined what amount he had the right to seize. As a rule, he contrived to leave the borrower still in debt even after he had paid a sum more than sufficient to cover the original loan¹. This dark period of the history of modern Egypt is called by Dicey as the "era of Mufettish", i.e. the era of Isma'il Siddique².

In 1869, the Canal was cut. Since the day when the Project was started until its opening in November 1869, poor submissive peasants were flocked in thousands to work there with no return. The Egyptian ruler, under the terms of the Concession Treaty, was bound to supply a certain number of forced labourers; and this he did. Twenty-five thousand workers were made to work on meagre ration, bad food, and poor clothing. In the heat of the day and the cold of the night, amidst their misery and over-work, they died like animals and were

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1. Dicey, op.cit., pp. 91,92; de Leon, op.cit.,pp. 219, 230-31,237,327; Lady Duff Gordon,op.cit.,pp. 65,86.
 2. Dicey, op.cit., p. 92

immediately replaced by others. The protests of the British Premier and the prohibitory orders issued by the Porte could hardly bring a change in the 'time-honoured' tradition of *corvée*. Similarly, the 1876 Egyptian campaign against Abyssinia, which ended in a disastrous failure, necessitated mass scale conscription for recruitment. It engaged sixteen thousand Egyptians¹. In order to make up the expenditure incurred by this campaign, the fellah^hin were once again forced to fill up the empty Treasury. Blunt visited Egyptian country side in the beginning of the year 1876. He was terribly shocked by witnessing the results of the inconsiderate policy of the Khedive. "It was rare in those days to see a man in the fields with a turban on his head, or with more than a shirt on his back The country Sheykhs themselves had few of them a cloak to wear The provincial towns, on market days, were full of women selling their clothes and their silver ornaments to the Greek usurers, because the tax collectors were in their villages whip in hand."² Indifferent towards politics, and ready to obey anyone who would allow them to be free in their fields, the fellahin had not the least of a patriotic feelings: They were ready even to welcome the British intervention if it could bring them some relief³.

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1. Annual Register, 1876, p. 300
 2. Blunt, op.cit., p. 11
 3. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 12,13

Every year brought some new miseries to the poor fellahin. Besides the land tax, a number of miscellaneous taxes were levied on one excuse or the other. Cromer, while making Inquiry into the financial situation in Egypt, reported to the British Consul-General that there were thirty-seven such taxes and still he was doubtful if the list was complete. The taxes were fixed arbitrarily and were uncertain in amount with no reference to the time and manner of realization.

A general discontentment prevailed. Lord Vivian, the British Consul-General in Egypt, reported on January, 1877: "The Government employees are many months in arrears of pay, so much so that the cashiers of the Caisse are actually being paid out of the private means of the Commissioners"². "I hear reports", he continues "that the peasantry are cruelly treated to extract the taxes from them"³. The Khedive himself admitted that "in order to pay the coupons, the taxes were collected for nine months, in some places for a year in advance"³.

The conditions of the fellahin further deteriorated in 1878, as the full effects of the bad Nile of 1877 were felt only this year. In Upper Egypt there was a famine. Alexander Baird, a frequent visitor of Egypt, said in his report: "It is almost incredible the distances travelled by

1. Cromer, op.cit., p. 30

2. Ibid, p. 33

3. Ibid., p. 34

women and children begging from village to village. . . . The poor were in some instances reduced to such extremities of hunger that they were driven to satisfy their cravings with the refuse and garbage of the streets"¹.

In May, 1878, a sum of about £ 2,000,000 was due to be paid to the interest of the Public Debt. In March, only about £ 50,000 were in the hands of the Commissioners. The balance amounting to £ 1,500,000 had therefore to be collected in the course of one month. The money was, however, collected and the dues were paid².

1. cit., Cromer, op.cit., p. 35

2. Ibid., p. 35; It was the darkest period for the fellahin says Wallace, on the evidence of a blind native of Egypt see Wallace, "Egypt and the Egyptian question", pp.278-7 see also Cromer, p. 38: "Steps were taken to collect the money. . . . Two of the most iron-fisted Pashas were sent into the provinces. They were accompanied by a staff of money-lenders who were prepared to buy in advance the crops of the cultivators."

Ibid., p. 38, citing Baird: "In some cases, perfectly authenticated, corn was sold to the merchants for 50 piastres an ardab, which was delivered in one month's time when it was worth 120 piastres. . . ."; see also Royle, op.cit., p. 6; Henry Pansa, "L'Egypte et la Soudan Egyptien", pp. 11-14

Chirol visited Egypt for the first time in 1876. During the Egyptian Revolt of 1881-82, he acted as one of the Standard War Correspondent at Alexandria. His monograph "The Egyptian Problem", and the collection of his articles entitled "Fifty years in a changing world", are valuable documents as contemporary accounts of an eye-witness. Chirol remarks:

". . . the half-starved fellaheen dragged away from their own fields to work on the huge estates which the Khedive and his favoured pashas had filched from them; the forced labour of the corvée, under the ever-present menace of the whip, to keep the perennial canals running for the benefit of others; the press gangs employed to drive into the depots the army recruits who were too poor to buy exemption from what they regarded, as an irrevocable sentence of death in the far-away Sudan; the miserable mud-villages frequently deserted because even the kurbash applied to the soles of the fellaheens' feet could no longer wring a piastre out of them to meet taxes often levied three or four times over and so even their land had been taken away from them in

On August 6, 1878, Cromer and Kramer summarised in their report, as the members of the International Commission of Inquiry, the condition of the people of Egypt in the following words: "Le cheikh exécute les ordres du moudir, et le moudir ceux de l'Inspecteur général qui lui-même agit par ordre supérieur . . ., C'est la loi. Les agents du Gouvernement s'y conforment, fut-il verbal, et il ne vient à l'esprit des contribuables ni d'en contester l'existence, ni de protester contre sa teneur. Pour les impôts le fellah ne peut se plaindre; il sait qu'on agit par ordre supérieur. C'est le gouvernement lui-même qui les réclame; à qui voulez-vous qu'il se plaigne?"¹

(Contd. from page 48)

payment; the crowds of wailing women and emaciated children begging for a husk of maize; misery and despair up and down that incomparable valley of the Nile whilst Isma'il held his court in Cairo...." _____ Chirol, "The Egyptian Problem" pp. 28-29

"The Khedive's private estates were cultivated by forced labour. The corvée not only imposed fearful hardships on hundreds of thousands of fellaheen who were commandeered for it. It was used also as a pretext for extorting money from those who were not actually liable to do corvée work."

Ibid., p. 32

"Never was kurbash applied more persistently to the sole of the wretched peasants' feet, to make him disgorge his last remaining piastre. I had not to go many miles out of Cairo, to see whole gangs of the fellaheen torn from their own villages and marched, some of them in chains, under an escort of armed police or soldiers; to work on the Khedive's 'domains' which Isma'il had created. . . more than a quarter of the richest lands in the fertile valley of the Nile. The peasants' own exiguous fields had then to be left uncultivated and his family to starve if they had not already fled to avoid this worst form of conscription. Ruin was universal and all the evils followed it which in an agricultural country are more to be dreaded. Starvation, sickness and murrain stalked a land of plenty, where the sun-scorched desert can be made to blossom up to the extreme limits of irrigation and on the drawn faces of an easy going and mirth-loving people were written such misery and dull despair as I have seldom seen elsewhere."

_____ Chirol, "Fifty years in a changing world", p.

1. Henry Pensa, op.cit., p. 11

The conditions of the cities were somewhat better, but not to the extent of being satisfactory. The spread of Western education and learning, the 'import' of the parliamentary institutions, and the resentment against the pro-Turk policy of the Government had turned the people conscious of their plight. The increasing foreign hold was a new factor forcing them to think about the problems of their country. But, still, they did not have a clear conception of the line of action they should follow.

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In March 1871, as-Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani came to Egypt and settled in Cairo¹. Mohammad Abduh has

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1. "According to his own account . . . Sayyid Muhammad Jamaluddin was born in a village of Asadabad near Kabul, in the year A.H. 1254 (A.D. 1838-39). His father was Sayyid Safdar. . . . At the age of eighteen he visited India, where he remained for a year and some months, during which time he learned something of the European sciences and their methods. From India he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. . . . He then returned to his own country and entered the service of Dust Muhammad Khan. . . . Then Civil War broke out in Afghanistan, and at last al-Afghani had to leave his country. He "set out for Mecca by way of India in A.H. 1285 (A.D. 1869). There he was received by the Indian government, which, however, prevented him from meeting the leaders of Muslim opinion save under its supervision, and a month later after his arrival, sent him in one of its ships to Suez. Thence he visited Cairo for the first time, and remained there forty days, frequenting the great University of Al-Azhar, holding conversation with many of its teachers and students, and lecturing to a chosen few in his own lodging.

Instead of proceeding to Mecca, Sayyid Jamaluddin decided to visit Constantinople, where he was well

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described in detail the prevailing conditions in Egypt on the eve of the arrival of al-Afghani. According to Abduh, the Egyptians had been accustomed to think in terms of object submissiveness. To them, the Khedive was all in all the fortunes of the country, they thought, depended upon his integrity and sense of justice. They could not think in terms of the privileges of a people, nor they saw any right of theirs to share the affairs of the government which, they said, was the exclusive affair of the Pasha. Even the Assembly of the Delegates was not bold enough to denounce any measure initiated by the Pasha¹.

(Continued from page 50).

received by Ali Pasha, the Grand Wazir, and other notables of the Ottoman Capital. . . . Unhappily the Shikhul-Islam.. was jealous of the Sayyid, whose influence he was eager to destroy, and when the latter delivered his address to a large distinguished audience. . . he was watching carefully for some expression on account of which he might be able to impugn the speaker's orthodoxy." The Shaikhul-Islam was successful in seizing upon some words, "and accused Sayyid Jamaluddin of describing the prophetic office as an 'art' or 'craft', and the Prophet as an 'artificial' or 'craftsman'. The matter was taken upon the pulpit and the press, and warmly debated on both sides. . . until finally, for the sake of peace and quietude, the Turkish government ordered him to leave Constantinople for a time. Thereupon he again returned to Egypt, where he arrived on March 22, 1871.

Sayyid Jamaluddin's original intention was to remain in Egypt only for a short while, but Riaz Pasha met him, was greatly impressed by his abilities, and obtained for him a government allowance of a thousand piastres a month, 'not for any specific services, but to do honour to an illustrious visitor'. Students and others whom his fame had reached flocked to him and persuaded him to give lectures in his house, and he expounded to enthusiastic audiences some of the most advanced text-books on various branches of Muhammadan theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, astronomy and mysticism. His influence and fame continued to increase in Egypt, and he began to direct his attention to teaching his students the art of literary expression, encouraging them to write essays and articles on various subjects, literary, philosophical, religious and political. Hitherto, there had been but few able writers in Egypt, the most eminent at the time being Abdullah Pasha Fikri, Khayri Pasha, and a few others. But now, thanks to the Sayyid's efforts, the number of able young writers increased rapidly.

Brown, "Persian Revolution", pp.4-8

1. Rashid Reza, "Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam", vol.I, p. 36

With the arrival of al-Afghani, a new era began in the intellectual and political history of modern Egypt. He had already visited the country about a year earlier, and within a brief sojourn of forty days in Cairo, he had attracted the Egyptian intelligensia towards his personality. Now, a group of young enthusiasts gathered around him. Prominent among these were Muhammad Abduh, Adib Ishaq, Ibrahim al-Aghani, Ibrahim al-Halbavi and Mahmud Sami al-Barudi².

According to Rashid Reza, al-Afghani had two aims of his life. One of these was academic: He desired to reform and give a new orientation to the religion of Islam and to awaken the Muslims of the world. The other aim was socio-political. Here again, says Rashid Reza, he kept in view the renaissance of the glory of Islam³. Being well informed in the political affairs of his time and having a strong urge for freedom⁴, he preached liberalism in religion, republicanism in statecraft, and unity of the Muslim world. Freedom of press and platform was freely discussed during his talks, and the audience were imbued with the spirit of revolt against absolute monarchy and maladministration⁵.

Al-Afghani was neither a systematic writer nor even a professional journalist. However, he created a new

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1. Brown, "Persian Revolution", pp. 7,8
 2. Ahmad Amin: "Zu'ama al-Islah fi 'Asr al-Hadith", p. 67
 3. Rashid Reza, op.cit., pp.40,73; Zaidan, "Mashahir ash-Sharq", vol., II, p. 56
 4. Rashid Reza, op.cit., p. 40
 5. Young, op.cit., pp. 101,102; Blunt, op.cit., pp. 103-10
Rashid Reza, op.cit., p. 55

generation of writers and journalists. But he was well aware of the importance and role of journalism¹. He encouraged his disciples to write on literary, religious and political subjects. He encouraged some of them to start their own papers and journals; James Samua, (Abu Naddara), Adib Ishaq and Abdullah Nadim were some of the leading journalists of the period². The Egyptian press, thus, received momentum and a number of literary and political journals began to appear. Journalistic activities had already been there even before the arrival of al-Afghani. Al-Afghani accelerated the speed of such activities, and gave a new turn to the thinking minds of the country, a turn of being critical of every untoward measure in the field of politics, social behaviour and statecraft. Since al-Afghani's arrival, political activities of the Egyptian people also acquired a new impetus. In this case also, al-Afghani was not the prime mover or in any sense, the originator of such activities. His main contribution was to precipitate the discontent^t already prevalent in the country.

General increase in education, development of the press, existence of a quasi-parliamentary institution, general discontent among all sections of the Egyptian people and, not the least of all, a suspicion against the foreigners and the realization that a better state of

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1. You see in evidence thereof, al-Afghani's article written in Persian and published in the monthly Mu'allim Shafiq of Hyderabad in 1880, when al-Afghani was staying at Hyderabad. The title of the article is "the merits and advantages of journalism". See Mubarizuddin Rif'at's translation of al-Afghani's articles: "Maqalat-i-Afghan" pp. 65-74; see also, "Sab-ras", monthly, Hyderabad, July-August 1958: "Maulana Muhibb-i-Husain", pp. 20-40
 2. Rashid Reza, op.cit., p. 38

affairs was possible _____ all these factors^{must} have created a strong urge and desire on the part of the Egyptian people for a change for the better. Al-Afghani helped in crystalizing and systematizing the vague and dispersed desires¹. His talks and lectures must have had some lasting impressions upon the minds of his unrestive and dissatisfied audiences².

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1. See Smith's appraisal of al-Afghani, "Islam in the modern world", p. 20:

"He was neither a profound thinker nor a creative personality. Many movements stemmed from his activity, and yet he was not great enough to be credited with having brought them into being. As I see it, Jamaluddin was the catalyst of Islamic revolution rather than its creator. His rhetoric and passionate eloquence called forth from his audiences explosive responses; but it did so because those responses were already latent in his hearers. His contribution was to crystalize and organise them".

The opposite view is adhered to by Stoddard ("The world of Islam"), Browne ("The Persian Revolution") and most of the writers on this topic. They hold that al-Afghani was the father of every shade of Egyptian nationalism; and they seem to infer as if there would have been no such movement, had al-Afghani not been there. See Stoddard, "The world of Islam", p. 148; Browne, "Persian revolution", pp. 4-8

2. Ahmad Amin quoting Salim Bey al-Ankhuri, "Zu'ama al-Islah fi 'Asr al-Hadith", pp. 72-73: "During the year 1878, his residence in Egypt became dangerous as he entered in politics and the masses came in closer contact with him; During his conversation, he said to them: 'O Ye, the Egyptian people! You have been brought up in an atmosphere of slavery and despotic rule. For a long time you have been governed under the yoke of autocrats and you have been the targets of their tyrannical measures. . . . Your Governors showered upon you oppression, treacheries and tyrannies and you tolerated them; rather you were content of your lot and remained losing the essences of your life. . . . Look at the Pyramids. . . . (etc.) They are the proofs of the greatness of your forefathers. Awake from the slumber and be like the nations of the world, free and prosperous. See also Preface to Zia'uddin Barni's "Jamaluddin Afghani" (in Urdu), by Abdurrahman Siddiqui. Siddiqui has cited the following from the book "Mukalimat-i-Khushiar Qub", published in Majlis in 1340 H: "He descends from the presidential chair after the two third audience became 'senseless', and the remaining one-third is also out of bounds."

During this period, intellectual Egypt was undergoing¹ a revolutionary change. An intelligensia^t which could match the Western people was coming into existence. The movement for the revival of Islam, its reorientation and adaptation to the new circumstances, started under the guidance of al-Afghani and taken up by his worthy disciples had had its own effects. On the other hand, the inconsiderate measures of Isma'il were creating hatred and indignation against the Turco-Circassian hegemony. At the same time the Egyptians were smelling the danger of increasing hold of the Western Powers.

As a result of these pessimistic and gloomy conditions, a group of political journals and newspapers came into existence. Many of these were critical of the Government, while some were very bitter about the whole state of affairs. Abdullah Abu's-Sa'ud's Wadi an-Nil, started in 1866, was closed down by the order of the Khediv in 1872¹. Perhaps the bi-weekly was becoming too outspoken. In 1869, Ibrahim al-Mouelhi and Uthman Jalal started a weekly, Nuzhat al-Afkar, which was also closed down by the Government after its second issue². In 1875, Salim Taqla and Bashara Taqla issued al-Ahram³. The same year, Muhammad Unsi, the son of the editor of Wadi an-Nil, started Rauzat

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. I, p. 262

2. Ibid., p. 263

3. Ibid., p. 263

al-Akhbar, the political portions of which were written by his father¹. On al-Afghani's instance, Adib Ishaq and Salim an-Naqqash started two papers, the weekly Misr in 1878 and the daily at-Tijarah in 1878². The Egyptian Government could not tolerate Adib's plain and blunt criticism. The papers were closed down in 1880 and Adib was expelled from Egypt. He settled down in Paris, from where he started a new paper al-Qahira². He could not return to Egypt till late in the year 1881 when nationalist came to power³. James Sanua, another disciple of al-Afghan issued Abu Mazzara early in 1877. The satirical paper made fun of the ways and means of the Khedivial Government. It was closed down in the following year⁴. In April, 1879, Ibrahim al-Laqrani, one of the prominent disciples of al-Afghani, issued a paper, Mir'at ash-Sharq⁵. Towards the

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1. Ali Mubarak: "Al-Khitat at-Taufiqiyya", vol. XI, p. 69
 2. Hafi'i, op.cit., p. 203; Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p. 69; Zaidan, op.cit., vol., II, p. 71
 3. Tajir, op.cit., p. 81; Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p. 69
 4. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p. 70; Lardau, op.cit., p. 95; Blunt, "Gordon at Khartoum", p. 46; Gibb: B.S.O.S., V, IV, p. 755; Abu Mazzara continued in Paris during the Arabi Revolt. It was a weekly paper from August 1878 to March 1879. (Lardau, op.cit., p. 95; Amin, op.cit., p. 70) At first in MS., and then lithographed, it was distributed by hand in Cairo and Alexandria. It continued for three years. In Paris, it was monthly. (Blunt, op.cit., p. 46)

The Shaikh with Blue Spectacles presented thirtytwo dramas when he began his career. They were all on social subjects. From the very beginning he was with al-Afghani and Abdun, and with their cooperation he issued his satirical paper in 1877. This was a peculiar paper of its kind and became a model for colloquial Arabi Offensive in character as it was, it was closed down by the Government and its editor was exiled. Then he began the same paper from Paris and its circulation became in the entire Islamic world. He had a direct concern in the Arabi Revolt, in the Mahdist uprising and in the Turkish revolt.

5. Hamza, "al-Adab wa's-Sihafat fi Misr", p. 67

end of the year 1879, the Young Egypt Party started its organ by the same name, the Young Egypt. Abdullah an-Nadim was one of its regular contributors. The Ministry of Riaz prohibited its publication in the beginning of 1880.

Abdullah an-Nadim started his own paper at-Tankit wa't-Tabkhit in 1881, and after its closure he issued another, at-Ta'if. In 1877, Michael Abdus Sayyid issued al-Watan which criticized the government quite openly and boldly and presented a patriotic point of view¹. In 1879 al-Watan was suspended by the Government for fifteen days. Perhaps, some thing more bitter had appeared against the corrupt government².

These political papers represented the growing political consciousness of the people. They were the symptoms of the general unrest and discontentment. They attacked the government and its administration, and criticized the increasing foreign influence³. James Samua, in his satirical language, disclosed the discrepancies and shortcomings of Ismail's administration and policy⁴. Abid Ishaq and Salim an-Naqqash introduced French social and political ideas in their writings. Adib wrote on the topics of freedom and independence, patriotism and constitutionalism and on the duty of the government towards the citizens⁵.

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 263

2. Ibid., vol. II, p. 198

3. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p. 70

4. Blunt, op.cit., p. 46

5. Hamza, op.cit., p. 117

The part played by the Egyptian press in shaping and moulding the ideas of patriotism and, consequently, in crystalising the rise of nationalist feelings can hardly be over-estimated.

The same resentment as voiced through the press, manifested itself in the proceedings of the Assembly of the Delegates. Submissive as it was in its early stages, it turned more and more critical and assertive. In the 1876-session of the Assembly, Uthman al-Harmil, a delegate, protested against the continuation of the Law of Muqabala without disclosing to the Assembly the actual financial position of the country. The Khedivial statement, that the continuation of the Law depended upon the confirmation by the Assembly indicated that the Assembly had some share, at least in name, in administering the affairs of the country. The delegates discussed the financial matters and expressed their desire to supervise the expenditure of the State¹.

The third session of the 1876-Assembly, continued from January to July 6, 1879, was remarkable. After the speech-from-the-throne and its bold reply, people's right to freedom and the delegates' right to participate in the formulation of the decisions concerning the future of their country were discussed². They asked the Government to place its financial plans before the Assembly and to declare its

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 180-81

2. Ibid., pp. 190-91

financial policy. It was also urged that a reduction in various taxes be made¹. The delegates protested against a decree issued in January 1879, without the prior consultation of the Assembly. In any public matter, they insisted, the delegates must be consulted². It is significant that many of the bolder and outspoken delegates of the Assembly were from amongst the disciples of al-Afghani³.

At this stage, feeling that the Consultative body was changing itself into a true representative Assembly and hence might prove a source of trouble to the Khedive, it was decided to prorogue the Assembly. But the Delegates refused to disperse. They demanded that without an inspection of the financial policy of the Government, they would not disperse⁴. On March 29, the Delegates, in a written protest, forwarded to the Khedive, requested that such encroachment upon the rights of the Assembly may be reconsidered by the Khedive⁵. The Assembly, however, remained in session inspite of the opposition of the authorities.

The symptoms of liberty and freedom were easily discernible in the activities of the Assembly. It failed to achieve any laurels, but it had begun to assert itself and was destined to play an important role during the height of the national movement.

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1. Ibid., pp. 192-94
 2. Ibid., p. 195
 3. Ibid., p. 184
 4. Ibid., pp. 210-11
 5. Ibid., pp. 211-13

In the early seventies, Dickey makes allusion to the appearance of a Mahdi in a village not far away from the banks of the Nile in the neighbourhood of Kenah; he was a pious man who gained considerable following. This Mahdi of the Sudan of later years, was nothing more than an expression of dissatisfaction and resentment against the existing state of affairs invoking religious sentiments in order to change the prevailing conditions. This Mahdi encouraged his adherents to refuse to pay the taxes to a ruler who, as he alleged, consorted with the Christians and hence was himself no better than an unbeliever. Next time, when the tax-collectors came to that village, "they were driven away with stones and returned penniless."¹ The uprising was, however, crushed down in its early stages, but it was an evidence, first of its kind², of popular unrest and reaction as early as the beginning of the seventies. What is still more significant is the character of the uprising which was anti-Christian. Obviously, by Christians, the Mahdi and his followers meant not the Egyptian Copts but the Europeans, particularly the British and the French who were busy increasing their hold on the gateway of India.

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1. Dickey, "The Story of the Khedivate", p. 318
 2. Zaidan refers to another uprising in the province of Fayyum during the reign of Sa'id Pasha, details of which are not available except the fact that it was quelled very soon. (Zaidan, "Mashahir", vol. I, p. 28)

There is yet another anecdote of the same period, told by Dicey. Passing through a street of Cairo, Dicey saw a Darvish addressing a moh and reminding them of the glory of the old days "when Egypt was the greatest nation amidst the people of the world."¹ The petty anecdote, though in itself not very significant, is implicitly a crude expression of national consciousness.

Since 1871, al-Afghani was there in Egypt. His anti-European, or in its narrower sense, anti-Christian, bent of mind was not a secret, and under his guidance came into existence, a team of staunch fighters against any kind of foreign bondage. They hated the despotic rule of Isma'il and resented equally the ever increasing European hold. They held Isma'il responsible for this growing influence of Western Powers as also for the deplorable conditions of the common people. Al-Afghani had gone to the extent of suggesting to Muhammad Abduh even to murder the Khedive as he was the main source of misery of the Egyptians².

A moderate Constitutional movement was led by Sherif Pasha with a considerable following among the educated upper class. Sherif, a veteran statesman, serving the Egyptian Government for twenty and odd years, and believing in constitutional means, was hopeful with Isma'il's decree of 1866 and very much satisfied with the new measures of extending the powers of the Assembly and the Council of

1. Dicey, "The Egypt of the Future", p. 25
2. Abduh in Blunt, "Secret History", p. 489

Ministers. He was hopeful that a Constitution will, ultimately be sanctioned for the country¹.

Besides, another element was that of the Egyptian army. Sa'id Pasha had given to the natives, the sons of the Fellahin, much encouragement and had been taking them into the higher services of the army². When Isma'il Pasha reversed the policy of his predecessor, the Fellah soldiers naturally resented. The policy of Sa'id had emboldened them so much that they could not easily tolerate any change that would affect them adversely. The Abyssinian disaster of 1876 had already destroyed the prestige of the Khedive as well as of the high-ranking officers who were mostly of Turkish descent. The Turkish-speaking Circassians held almost exclusively the higher posts, while the ordinary soldiers and the subordinate officers were drawn from amongst the Arabic-speaking Fellahin³. Thus a class feeling between the two sections grew stronger and more bitter.

1. Blunt, pp. 125-127

2. Rafi's, "Asr Ismail", vol. I, pp. 30-31 citing from Arabi "Kashf as-Sitar", p. 16 a speech of Sa'id Pasha addressing the Egyptians in a banquet in Qasr an-Nil: as follows:

"Brethren! I have peeped into the conditions of this Egyptian Nation through its entire history, and I found it oppressed and ruled by alien nations. . . . As I count myself an Egyptian, it becomes incumbent upon me to raise up the children of the soil and make them civilized so much so that they become in a position to serve their country well and feel themselves independent of foreigners" Rafi'i continues: "Commenting on this speech, Arabi Pasha says, that when Sa'id finished his address, the Notables and elites among the listeners came out of it furious and embarrassed, while the faces of the Egyptians were bright with delight and happy news. He further says that he counts this speech as the first stone of foundation of the movement, 'Egypt for the Egyptians!'"

3. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 129-30

As early as 1876, the British Consul at Alexandria had pointed out the extent of animosity that was prevalent in Egypt both with the foreigners and with the corrupt Government¹. Since 1876, the finances of Egypt had come under the direct dual control of France and Britain and the European Commissions of Inquiry intervened in the internal affairs of the country since 1875. Finally when the principle of Ministerial Responsibility was decreed in 1878, the European Controllers were taken into the Government as full-fledged Ministers. These developments simply resulted in adding fuel to fire. The deposition of Sultan Abdul Aziz of Turkey, and the subsequent promulgation of a Constitution in December, 1876 might have had their repercussions in Egypt a province of Turkey, and the Egyptian Constitutionalists might have taken the creation of Parliament in Turkey as a precursor to their own². The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78 might have been one of the factors in creating still more bitterness against the Christian Europe as also an awakening to their insecurity amidst such international developments.

The first Responsible Government headed by Nubar Pasha opened the line of action to be adopted by the discontented class, when in order to decrease the expenditure

1. London, op.cit., p. 84; See also Chircl, op.cit., p. 75
2. For the promulgation of the Constitution and creating a Parliament, see Pears, "Life of Abdul Hamid", pp. 48-52. Later in 1879, evidence proves that secret meetings were held and there it was agreed upon that demand should be made for a constitution on the model of Turkish one. (Egypt. No. 5, (1879) p. 65)

of the State, Nubar dismissed 2500 officers and soldiers without clearing off their dues. Isma'il, now working to overthrow the Nubar-Wilson Ministry, managed a plot of army demonstration against the Ministry. On February 8, 1879, about 600 students of the Military College, led by Latif Salim the Director of the College, marched towards the Ministry of Finance. They were joined by the dismissed soldiers and even some of the Delegates of the Assembly. In all, about two thousand persons demonstrated in front of the office of the Ministry of Finance. When they saw Nubar, they caught hold of him, assaulted him pulled his moustache and boxed his ears. Wilson, the Finance Minister, who came to his rescue, was also treated likewise. These demonstrations continued until the Khedive, on the request of the British Consul-General, intervened personally. He came and addressed the demonstrators and assured the unpaid soldiers for the payment of their dues, and then ordered them to disperse. Accordingly, the demonstrators retired and the matter came to an end. Isma'il thus succeeded in making the Europeans realize that without his assistance they were helpless and could not get on single-handed. Nubar, however, had to leave the Presidship of the Council of Ministers¹. But the discontentment of the people

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1. Introduction to the Arabic Translation of Blunt's "Secret History", p. 33; Rafi'i, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 202-203, 205; Cromer, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 74-76; 79-80; Arabi cited in Blunt, op.cit., p. 483.

Rafi'i says that in these demonstrations the Khedive was not privy in any sense. Cromer hesitates to give any verdict, but he suspects Isma'il's conspiracy. But Arabi openly declares that Isma'il through Shahin Pasha and Shahin through his brother-in-law, Latif Salim, managed and planned it. This much, however, is certain that a discontentment was already prevalent and it could be easily

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continued as before, and few were satisfied with the insignificant change of the hands¹.

Popular unrest, at last, expressed itself in the formation of various political societies. The most important of these was the secret society of the army officers, founded sometimes in 1876 by Ali ar-Roubi the Commander of the cavalry². Later, in 1879, these Officers coordinated their activities with the Civilian Constitutionalists and other prominent patriots, and formed an association which they called al-Jam'iyyat al-Wataniyya. This name was later changed into al-Hizb al-Watani, i.e. the National Party³. This party was to combat the increasing foreign influence or rather the Christian influence⁴.

On April 12, 1879, the leading members of the Party, having drafted a 'National Programme' presented it to the Khedive. The Programme was signed by more than three hundred

Continued from page 64:

exploited. What is more significant is the anti-Christian character of the demonstration. "Death to the Christians", and "Down with the Christian dogs", were some of their slogans. (Young, op.cit., p. 201).

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1. Egypt No. 5 (1879), pp. 65, 162
2. Zakhoura, op.cit., pp. 99-100; Landau, op.cit., p. 76
Another society, not strictly speaking a political one, the Freemasons, headed by al-Afghani, 1876-79, is described by Landau as one of the important secret societies. But, actually it played little role in the development of Egyptian nationalism. Among its members, there were some of the leading political figures of the day, e-g. Prince Taufiq, Asib Is'haq, James Samu'a, Abdus Salam al-Mouvelhi, Muhammad Abduh, Sherif Pasha, Butrus Ghali, Salim an-Nagqash, S'ad Zaghlul and Sulaiman Abaza. But Abduh himself confesses that it was never a power in Egypt. See Blunt, "Secret History", p. 491.
3. Rafi'i, vol. II, p. 215 citing the news from the Daily at-Tijarah dated April 7, 1879 No. 214 and No. 216.

Continued.....

Notables, Ulema, Officials and the army Officers. Among the signatories, there were 93 army Officers, 72 Government Officials, 60 Delegates of the Assembly, 60 Ulema and representatives of other religions, and 42 Notables and merchants¹. Wilson, the Finance Minister, had planned out a project for the solution of the financial difficulties confronting the country². The National Programme was prepared in opposition to Wilson's project, which had declared Egypt bankrupt. The Programme put forward a positive plan. It demanded an increase in the powers of the Assembly of the Delegates. It further demanded that the Assembly should be modelled on European Parliamentary lines with a Responsible Egyptian Ministry³. It is believed, though doubtfully, that Isma'il's consent had already been given to the draft-Programme. That is why, he so easily agreed to accept. He addressed to the diplomatic Corps that in accordance with the will of the Nation, he intended to form a full-fledged Responsible Egyptian Ministry. It was understood that for the fulfilment of this objective the European Ministers should go, and consequently they were released of their duties⁴. Taufiq Pasha, who had

1. Rafi'i., op.cit., p. 218

2. Text of Wilson's Project in Egypt No. 5 (1879) pp. 97-138

3. Cromer, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 100-102; Egypt No. 5, (1879), pp. 72-23; Rafi'i., vol. II, pp. 215-16; Landau, pp. 87, 88.

4. De Freycinet, op.cit., p. 175

Continued from page No. 65.

4. Lascelles, the British Consul-General, writing to Lord Salisbury, his chief, on April 1, 1879, says: "Considerable agitation exists here at the present moment. It appears that the Sheikh El-Bakri holds meetings at his house with the object of exciting religious animosity against the European Ministers. . ." (Egypt No. 5, 1879, p. 65)

temporarily succeeded Rubar as the President of the Council of Ministers, resigned and Sherif was entrusted with the task of forming a full-fledged Egyptian Ministry "in obedience to the positive wishes of the nation."¹ He was also authorized to draft a Constitution enumerating the powers of the Assembly of the Delegates. The new President of the Council of Ministers informed the Commissioners of the Public Debt that they might resume their duties as Controllers-General of Expenditure and Receipts, which offer they, however, refused to accept². Sherif had also declared that even if the Khedive was prepared to get back the European Ministers, his Government would not³.

In the meanwhile, British and French Government were unhappy at the dismissal of their men⁴. Wilson, the dismissed Finance Minister, persuaded Rothschilds to act in order to save their investments in Egypt, which, Wilson~~s~~ convinced them, were jeopardized by the new Egyptian Financial Plan, the Rothschilds requested the Government of Germany to intervene on their behalf. Bismarck, accusing Isma'il for an open violation of an international agreement, forced the Government of Britain and France to step in and solve the problem⁵. In the

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1. Letter of Isma'il to the European Ministers, cit. Cromer, vol. I, p. 103
 2. Cromer, p. 103; This provision of revival of the Control was agreed upon between the Powers and Egypt (Egypt No. 3, '79: pp. 1-2)
 3. Egypt, No. 3, '79: Vivian's letter: p. 5
 4. On April 25, 1879, Salisbury wrote to British Agent in Egypt that the step taken by the Khedive was not only against the Reforms of 1878; it was also a discourtesy to the Powers. (Egypt, No. 3, 1879, p. 2)
 5. On May 11, Count Münster of Germany wrote to Salisbury that arbitrary action of the Vice-Roy of Egypt, taken on April 22, was not desirable; that he had made encroachment upon the rights of the creditors without any previous agreement and that in future he might proceed further on the same lines; and therefore action was necessary. (Egypt, No. 3, 1879, p. 3)

words of Salisbury, "the geographical situation of Egypt"¹ forced his Government to intervene. The Governments of Britain and France approached the Porte and suggested the dismissal of the Khedive. The Sultan, not strong enough to reject the the Anglo-French suggestion, and at the same time being envious of the rising power of Isma'il, who was after all one of his vassals, readily submitted to the will of the Powers. He was quite anxious to assert his authority, and here was an opportunity when the Powers had come with the overtures to depose the Khedive. Perhaps, he also feared that if he did not accede to the desire of the Powers, they might act on their own initiative. On June 26, a telegram from His Majesty the Sultan deposed Isma'il and nominated Prince Taufiq as the Khedive of Egypt in his place. The matter was settled without any resistance on the part of the Khedive or the Egyptian people. It is not surprising that not a single voice was heard in the country protesting against this deposition². The people were tired of Isma'ilian politics, and although in his last days he posed as a protagonist of Constitutionalists and supporter of the national will, no one really believed in his sincerity and honesty of purpose.

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1. Ibid. p. 4: Letter of Salisbury to Lascelles, dated June 18, 1879: "The geographical situation of Egypt as well as the responsibility which the English Government have in past times incurred for the actual conditions under which it exists as a State, make it impossible for them to leave it to its fate."
 2. In his last moment of despair, Isma'il issued a decree on June 25, increasing the army to 150,000 troops; but none would believe it and the next day, the hour of doom was struck. (Cromer, vol. I, p. 140; Young, p. 94)

Moreover the prestige of the Caliphal decree was still high in Egypt and no one dared challenge it. A Programme of the National Party published in November 1879, disclosed that Isma'il had asked the help of the Party, but it was too late¹.

According to the expectations of the Constitutiona-
lists, Taufiq announced after his accession that he would
welcome a Constitution; but two months had hardly elapsed
than he betrayed the cause and withdrew his words. Sherif
had already submitted, in May-June, 1879, his draft-Constitutio
It was discussed and approved by the Assembly. Continuing in
office, even after the accession of Taufiq, Sherif presented
the Constitution to the new Khedive for his final approval.
But the Khedive had, in the meanwhile, completely changed.

The Sherif-Constitution consisting of 49 articles,
laid down that the Ministers shall be responsible to the
Assembly for all their decisions and actions, and that the
Assembly shall discuss, examine and approve or reject all
laws as well as it shall control the State Finances². The
Agents of the foreign Powers, who had in the meantime,
overpowered the new Khedive, advised him to reject the proposa
and he acted faithfully upon their advice. Sherif resigned
on the point of his honour³.

Thus the question of the Constitution withered away. These
events created despair and bitter feeling amongst the
Moderates, who now tended to align themselves with the
Extremists. The foreign Agents were afraid of another source

1. Landau: op.cit., p. 90

2. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 227-29

3. The Powers had so much influenced the new Khedive, that in
Europe, Egypt was considered to have come under the co-
sovereignty of Britain and France; see The Economist, May
29, 1879.

of danger; on August 24, 1879 they advised the Khedive to take measures against al-Afghani. Al-Afghani was accordingly ordered to leave Egypt at once¹. With him Abduh was also asked to leave Egypt and remained in detention in his village². The Powers had completely overshadowed the Khedive.

In September of the same year, however, the secret political society, Young Egypt, run by Muhammad Amin, Mahmud Wasif, Abdullah an-Nadim, Adib Is'haq and Salim an-Naqqash published a "Project of Reforms presented to His Highness Taufiq I, Khedive of Egypt". Describing in detail the sufferings and the causes of sufferings of the people, it enumerated the required reforms and the necessity of their immediate realization. It laid emphasis on the principles of separation of powers, complete Ministerial Responsibility, equality before law and creation of an independent and powerful Assembly of the Delegates³. In December 1879, the Young Egypt published another booklet which was devoted to the problem of freedom of Press⁴.

On November 4, of the same year, the National Party published its manifesto. According to information given by the Swiss contemporary, Ninet, besides the prominent army officers, ar-Roubi, Ali Fehai, Arabi, and Abd al Al al-Hilmi,

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1. Rashid Reza, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 33; Ahmad Amin, p. 76
 2. Rashid Reza, vol. I, p. 561
 3. Jerrold, "Belgium of the East", p. 116; Cf. The Times, September 30, 1879; Landau, op.cit., p. 102
 4. Landau, p. 103

there were some prominent civilians such as al-Baroudi, Sh^erēif and Muhammad Sultan, who were responsible for the drafting of the manifesto¹. Besides making public the financial and educational schemes of its own, the National Party declared its existence as a Party that had come into being in order to counteract the interference of the officials of the foreign Powers in the affairs of their country. It was signed by "Aali", and the authors were prepared to come out openly, should a diplomatic protection be guaranteed².

These gradual developments in the national movement of Egypt did not produce any immediate results. Foreign hold over the country was increasing its grip day by day. Taufiq had proved less resistant even than Isma'il. The Dual Control had been revived with much more powers to intervene. Nationalists' hopes and aspirations were still unrealized.

1. Ibid., p. 105

2. Ibid., p. 106

CHAPTER III

A NATION IS BORN : THE REVOLT

" ... temporary obstructions in the Canal could be easily removed, but the question is not the removal of an occasional obstacle, but what precautions ~~would~~ would be necessary to counteract a hostile power who would, if able to place one obstruction, be able to place many more and render the traffic unsafe, and impossible. The only security would be to deny all access to the Canal to such a source of danger."

_____ Report: Confidential

(on the eve of military operations, July, '82.) p. 214

With the accession of Taufiq to the Khedivial throne, a new era had begun. A new system of government, in concert between Cairo, Paris and London, was being established. In place of Anglo-French Ministry, a system of supervision was adopted in which British and French Controllers-General, nominated by their own respective Governments, were to supervise the Egyptian Ministry¹. Thus with the revival of the Dual Control, 'pulling of the strings' was again resumed in its

1. Dicey, "England and Egypt", p. 23

older form. The Khedive had very little power and had completely submitted to the will of the Control¹. As Gladstone described it, a "political control"² had been established over Egypt.

On October 16, 1879, British Foreign Office communicated to Malet, the new Consul-General, some basic instructions defining British policy towards Egypt. It is a remarkable piece in the history of British diplomacy. For the first time, British Government openly came out with a declaration of their vested interests in Egypt and making arrangements for their safeguards. The instructions emphasised the maintenance of Egypt's neutrality as well as the continuance of status quo in Turco-Egyptian relations and the autonomy of Egypt. At the same time it was made clear that as a last resort, British intervention in Egypt was not altogether out of question.³ As a matter of fact, Britain as a nation felt bound, by her Imperial interests, not to let the Suez route slip away into the hands of any other power, and possess it whenever a chance arose⁴. But, hitherto, the presence of France as an equally

1. Chirol, "Fifty years in a changing world", p. 31; Malet, op.cit., p. 55; De Frecinet, op.cit., p. 183

2. cit. Cromer, op.cit., vol., I, p. 161

3. Appendix I.

4. Dicey was one of the sincerest spokesmen of Imperialism. He launched an undefatigable campaign to occupy Egypt. The logic of his co-thinkers was quite close to the argument put forward by himself as follows:

"In order ... to secure our freedom of uninterrupted access to India across the Isthmus, it is essential that we should not only have an unrestricted right of employing its waters for war purposes but that the course from sea to sea as well as its ports of ingress and egress should be under our protection. No strategical knowledge is required to appreciate the importance of control of the Canal to England.... The command of the Suez Canal involves of necessity the virtual occupation of Lower Egypt...."

Dicey: Our Route to India

(an article published in: The Nineteenth Century, June, 1877; Cf. "England and Egypt", p. 305)

interested Power in Egypt, was a permanent source of anxiety to Britain, and, inspite of their coordination of policies, each ⁶doubted the sincerity of the other; and here in this mutual suspicion lay the only hope of Egypt's survival.

The situation was becoming almost intolerable for the Natioalists. On the one hand, European influence was rapidly increasing. On the other hand, the common people of the country were being exploited by the native upper class, namely the Turco-Circassian minority group.

The Egyptian army, while asserting itself against the Nubat regime, had already tested its own strength. Besides with the deposition of Isma'il, the dignity of the Khedivial throne had vanished away. The man-in-the-street had been realising that even the Khedive was under a superior authority and liable to be removed whenever it pleased his superiors. The Assembly of the Delegates had become more assertive, outspoken and bold. The Delegates were firm in their demand for the Constitution which Taufiq had finally rejected. The Constitutionalists, led by Sherif, were thus thrown out of the picture. With the exile of al-Afghani, the liberal reform movement had also reached an early end just after the accession of Taufiq. We find, therefore, that the entire forces of the nationalists were concentrating round one single but daring symbol of Egyptian nationalism, namely, the Egyptian army. The discontented elements among the moderate civilian Constitutionalists were also rallying round this new and vigorous movement led by the native army officers. " If the

popular movement has expressed itself", remarked a contemporar
"it is because, in the first place, the army is a national one
and in the second place, it is the only force that is in
sympathy with the native population"¹.

Early in 1880, Riaz, the President of the Council
of Minister, decreased the number of the troops in order to
make up the deficit of the State budget. Most of the victims
were of native origin. Of the remaining, the fellah officers
were kept on half pay, while their Circassian colleagues were
still getting full pay. On May 20, 1880, the fellah officers,
Ahmad Arabi being ~~ex~~ ^{among} one of them, presented to the
Khedive a petition for the redress of their grievances
regarding pay and promotion. The petition was well received
and was supported by the French Consul General².

In January 1881, after Malet got the abolition of the
slavery sanctioned by the Khedive, a paper appeared with
caricatures of Riaz, Taufiq and Malet; Riaz was shown dancing
before the Khedive and saying, "I liberate your black slaves
to please the English, but I give you white ones...."³ Now
a situation had reached when even good actions were suspected
and not welcomed, if done by, or with the help of, the
foreigners.

1. Jerrold, "The Belgium of the East", p. 31

2. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 134; Rafi'i, "Arabi", p. 75;
Young, op.cit., p. 106; Elgood, op.cit., p. 106

3. Malet, "Egypt", p. 93

The Riaz Ministry, supported by the Anglo-French Consuls and supporting them in turn, was unable to solve the various problems¹. They all looked after finance alone and nothing else. The Fellahin were still being governed by Kurbash and their indebtedness increased rapidly. In the new circumstances, the time-honoured pro-Circassian policy was too bitter a pill to be swallowed easily. In the Riaz Ministry, the War department was entrusted to a staunch Turkish Pasha, Usman Rifqi whose attitude towards the Fellah officers was that of open hostility². Allusion has already been made to a petition of the Fellah officers complaining the preferential treatment of the Government. Resentment against the Turkish speaking Circassian class became more acute with the accumulating bitterness against the increasing foreign hold.

On May 26, 1880, Malet had reported to his Government the numerous intrigues afoot to upset the Egyptian Government and the European influence. It became so embarrassing that Malet and de Ring made representations, on behalf of their respective Governments, and requested the Khedive to look into the matter.³

1. "A man of old regime", believing in the "most absolute forms of government... by espionage, police rule, arrests and deportations"; and yet he was a patriot according to his own conception, and served the Dual Control "to recover Egypt from its financial misfortunes... and so get rid of the foreign intervention." (Blunt, on Riaz; op.cit., p. 128)

Wallace describes him as of no broad views or political insight; that he was used as instrument by the Dual Control; and that he believed in enlightened despotism. (Wallace: "Egypt and the Egyptian question", pp. 157-58)

2. Malet, op.cit., p. 64; Blunt, op.cit., p. 483

3. Malet, op.cit., p. 64

In order to curb down these 'subversive' activities, the European-Circassian regime resumed its repressive measures. Some trouble-makers were exiled, and several others were sent behind the bars¹. Hasan Mousa al-Aqqad, a friend of Ahmad Arabi was exiled to the White Nile for signing a petition on the abrupt discontinuation of the Muqabala arrangements. Another person Ahmad Fehmi, was also treated likewise for a similar petition. Many others ^{one for} ~~rid off~~ on some pretext or the other². These strong measures had their natural repercussions as well as reactions.

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It was the dawn of the new year 1881 that saw the storm of the national insurgence burst. Ahmad Arabi, one of the leading Fellah Officers, learned through a friend that he, along with his fellow Fellah colonel, Abd al-Al Hilmi, was soon to be dismissed. The two Fellah Officers accompanied by Colonel Ali Fahmi, the chief of the Palace Bodyguard, went to Riaz to launch a complaint against and to demand a dismissal of the Minister of War. Riaz promised to enquire into the situation³.

To avail his last chance, Usman Rifqui sent for the leading Colonels to partake in the arrangements in connection with a royal wedding. They were to come to Qasr an-Nil where

1. Ibid., p. 65

2. Arabi cit, Blunt, op.cit., p.484

3. Rafi'i, op.cit., p.84; Malet, op.cit., pp.97-99; Blunt, op.cit. pp. 135-36, 485

arrangements had already been made for their arrest. But the Officers got an indication of the real objective beforehand and gave instructions to their troops for the timely intervention. They called on the Minister of War. They were arrested and disarmed, but immediately the rescue-regiment rushed in and released them¹. Rifqui took flight and the Colonels "marched back at the head of their troops and with drums beating, to their barracks."² Then they approached the Khedive and demanded the dismissal of Rifqui. The Khedive acceded to their demand and replaced him by Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi who was on friendly terms with the Colonels and henceforward became one of them.

A Circassian by descent, the son of a wealthy father, Hasan Hushi al-Baroudi, Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi was well educated proficient in Turkish and Persian languages and a highly cultured person. He had served for a long time in the Foreign Ministry at the Porte. When, just after his accession, Isma'il visited the Porte, Sami returned with him to Egypt and became a *Qa'imagan*. In the first Ministry under Isma'il's successor, he became Minister of *Awqaf*³. Now in February 1881, he also became Minister of War.

1. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 137-38

2. Ibid., p. 138

3. Sami was a Constitutionalist of the Sherifian group. What he had always intoded from the beginning of the movement was an Egyptian Republic on the model of Switzerland. (Malet, pp. 150-51). He is held as the pioneer nationalist poet as also the father of modern Arabic poetry. From him stemmed out the style and diction of modern Egyptian verse. He is quoted at length wherein he manifests himself in the form of an ardent Nationalist poet. His *Divan* is amongst the classics of modern Arabic literature (Dasuqi: "Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi", pp. 47-49; al-Aqqad, op.cit., pp. 12, 121; See also, Blunt, op.cit., p. 492)

One of the pioneer Constitutionalists, dating back from the days of Ismail, Sami was a close friend of Shefif and belonged to the same school of thought¹. He did not come in personal contact with the insurgent Colonels until late in February 1881, since when he became the guiding spirit of the rising national movement². Summarising the aspirations of Sami, Elgood says: "He mediated the overthrow of the Khedive, the ejection of the foreign Controllers and the establishment of an Egyptian republic with himself as president."³

It was from February 1st 1881 onwards that the authority of the ruling class remained no more unquestioned.⁴ From that day onward the natives became more conscious of their power. Ahmad Arabi emerged as a public figure and, within a short period, obtained an unprecedented popularity among the backward and downtrodden peasantry, whom he represented so truly in person as well as in his new role⁵.

Born in 1840, the son of a village Sheikh, Ahmad Arabi studied for two years at al-Azhar. When fourteen, he was taken into the army service. This was the period of Sa'id who "wanted to have as many as possible of the sons of the village sheykhs, and train them to be Officers."⁶ The young Fellah soldier was given a rapid promotion: At eighteen, he was captain and at

1. Abduh to Blunt: in Blunt, op.cit.,p.492, also, p.328

2. Ibid., p. 486

3. Elgood,op.cit.,p. 70; see also, Blunt, op.cit.,pp.343-44

4. Malet, p. 103

5. Blunt, op.cit., p. 154-55

6. Autobiography of Ahmad Arabi cit. Blunt, op.cit.,p. 481

twenty he became Lt. Colonel. A year before his death, the Pasha made him A.D.C., and Arabi accompanied the Pasha on his journey to Medina¹.

Isma'il's policy was quite the reverse of his predecessor. He always favoured the Turco-Circassians and hence no native officer, Arabi being no exception, could get any promotion. Dissatisfied and discontented with the Abyssinian disaster and its after-effects, Arabi began to take interest in active politics so as to save his countrymen from ruin¹. He came in close contact with some of the distinguished disciples of al-Afghani and prominent members of Shefif group. Soon he began to emerge as one of the important figures in the national liberation movement; with him the other army officer were Ali ar-Rubi, Ali Fehmi and Abd al-Al Hilmi.

As compared to other officers, Arabi was better educated, was courageous in action and eloquent in speech, and his qualities had impressed his colleagues. As early as 1862, when he had accompanied Sa'id to Medina, he had acquired a glimpse of politico-national consciousness. Reading the account of the French victory over Egypt in the "Life of Bonaparte" by Col. Louis, Sa'id passed a remark about the cowardice of the Egyptians who were overcome by thirty thousand Frenchmen only. Arabi studied the said book overnight and then argued with the Pasha that the French victory was simply due to their better organisation and that the Egyptians could match them if only organised².

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1. Ibid., p.484; see also, Zakhoura, "Kitab Mir'at al'Asr fi Tarikh wa-Rusum wa Akabir Rijal bi Misr", p. 103
 2. Autobiography of Arabi: Blunt, op.cit., p. 482

When in 1880, the army officer made a petition, Arabi was in the forefront. Again, in the demonstration of February 1881, he led the agitation. The next few months that followed the Qasr an-Nil incident were full of political activities on the part of the nationalists. As has already been said, Arabi and the Constitutionalist or the member of the National Party had come very close; Muhammad Sultan, Sulaiman Abaza, Hasan Shere'i and Muhammad Abduh were prominent among them¹. Abduh had been working in the staff of al-Waqa'i al-Misriyya since October 1880, and before the end of that year he was made the sole incharge of the Paper as well as the Director of the Egyptian Press². Though he criticised the Egyptian government, he was not in favour of a revolution which the army Officers had been aspiring for. To him, a Constitution granted by the Khedive within five years (i.e. not immediately) was enough to satisfy the aspirations of the people. He disapproved the overthrow of the Riaz Ministry lest some foreign occupation might follow the internal disturbances.³

The fear of European intervention was not an improbability. The take-over of Cyprus by Britain, the French invasion of Tunis in April 1881 and the declaration of its protectorate over the western occupied portion, had left little faith in European morality. This invasion of Tunis, moreover, had awakened the religious sentiments of the Egyptians⁴. But the

1. Abduh's letter in Blunt, op.cit., p. 490

2. Ibid., p.493. When al-Afghani was exiled, Abduh was also detained in his village until his appointment at this post in 1880. (Blunt, op.cit., p. 492)

3. Blunt, op.cit., p. 493

4. Ibid., p. 123

rulers of Egypt were still isolated from the masses.

In July 1881, two incidents precipitated the accumulating popular discontentment. An Egyptian soldier was accidentally run over and died. His comrades took his body to the royal palace and demanded punishments for the criminals. Taufiq took it as an encroachment upon his authority and ordered for the arrest of the ringleaders themselves who were sentenced to imprisonment. In sharp contrast stood another incident when nineteen Circassian Officers charged baselessly their chief, the Fellaah Colonel Abd al-Al al-Hilmi, with the neglect of his duties. The charge made against al-Hilmi was proved manufactured and entirely baseless, and yet no action was taken against them. In spite of representations by Arabi and his colleagues, nothing was done to relieve the natives or to punish the Circassians¹. There were two extremes of severity and leniency. In the month of August, the same year, the Times' Correspondent frequently reported the existence of a feeling of dissatisfaction and insubordination in the army².

Then, all of a sudden, Mahmud Sami was asked to resign and to quit Cairo immediately. He was replaced by Da'ud Yeghen as the Minister of War. The Khedive and Riaz both disliked the increasing contact of Sami and the Fellaah Officers³. Sami had already made known to the Officers that his retirement from the Ministry would mean an active animosity of the Khedive towards them⁴. Now, the new Minister of War ordered the Fellaah

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 108-10, 113-14; Royle: "The Egyptian Campaigns", pp. 17-18; Malet's letter to Granville in Malet, op.cit. pp. 155-56

2. The Times, August 17, 1881

3. Blunt, op.cit., p. 492

4. Ibid., p. 141

Officers to be transferred from Cairo; Riaz had turned a personal enemy of Arabi and everything dangerous that could be expected was in the store¹.

Indignant and enraged, the Officers decided to overthrow the Riaz Ministry and to enact reforms in the government. On September 9, on a notice of a few hours to the foreign Consulates, the Egyptian Ministry, and the Khedive, Arabi marched with a considerable number of soldiers, towards the royal residence, Abidin, and waited on the Khedive. He demanded a change of the Ministry, an increase in the army up to the permitted (permitted by the Porte) limit of 18,000 troops and the convocation of the Assembly of the Delegates as a Constituent Assembly to draw up a Constitution.² There is some evidence that the Khedive had the previous knowledge of the demonstration, but he did not seem to have any inkling of the demands put forward. He hesitated, groaned, and looked in vain for foreign help, and at last acceded to the demands. A compromise was reached to the effect that the demands were to be realised gradually and in stages³.

Riaz was dismissed and Sherif was replaced as the nominee of Arabi. His Ministry was to include the expelled Sami as the Minister of War. Sherif accepted the post on the condition that the army should no more interfere in the affairs of the government and that Arabi should leave Cairo with his insurgent troops and be posted elsewhere⁴. Arabi consented to

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 121-22

2. Usman Amin, "Muhammad Abduh", p. 40; Blunt, p. 146

3. The Times, September 10, 1881; The Aligarh Institute Gazette, September 13, 1881; Blunt, op.cit., p. 145; Young, op.cit., p. 109. See also, Halim Pasha's remark in: The Nineteenth Century, July 1885: "So Tewfik made his compact with Arabi and the Riaz Ministry was upset." (The Nineteenth Century, July 1885, p. 736)

4. Malet, op.cit., pp. 160-66

this. In a farewell speech which he addressed to the people, he explained the aims of the Coup, namely getting rid of despotism and the defence of the country and its freedom.¹

The entire population of Egypt hailed Arabi as their Savior. Even the Khedive was happy with the changed situation as in addition to all the changes, he had got rid of Riaz and the active Dual Control. "Throughout Egypt a cry of jubilation arose such as for hundreds of years had not been heard upon the Nile, and it is literally true that in the streets of Cairo men stopped each other, though strangers, to embrace, and rejoice together at the astonishing new reign of liberty which had suddenly begun for them"² The news of a new era reached villages from mouth to mouth and from press and platform, and the people began to talk freely and jubilantly.³ Arabi's influence was on the increase⁴.

111

From its very inception, the Fellah movement led by Arabi had a dual character of being anti-European as well as

1. "We stood with you and for you, demanding freedom of the country and the end of the despotic rule, and we would not turn back until the country and its people get a new life; we did not intend to spread anarchy and disturbance, but when we observed that we had been encircled by slavery and degradation..., our patriotic zeal and the Arab pride awoke to defend the country and its independence and the rights of the nation. God Almighty helped us and our lord and sovereign, the Khedive, accepted our demands for the dismissal of the unpatriotic despotic Ministry and we were given the benefit of the Assembly of the Delegates so that the Nation might see into its affairs and feel its rights like other civilized nations of the world."

(Arabi's Address in Introduction to the Arabic Translation of Blunt's " Secret History", p. 153

2. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 153

3. Ibid., pp. 153-54

(4). Ibid., p. 153

anti-Turco-Circassian. Now, the Tunisian tragedy completed by the beginning of October, '81, had made them quite vigilant. Even while demanding the dismissal of Riaz, one of the charges made by Arabi against him was that he "had sold Egypt to England."² Now, perceiving the signs of storm, the native Press carried a campaign against the European exploitation. "All our revenues are absorbed by foreigners,"³ wrote a paper. "All our merchants, all our high officials of the State are foreigners; they are the lords and we are the donkey-boys. They live happily and we live a life of degradation. They are paid well and we are paid badly."³

In Britain, the programme of the Nationalists was not seen with disfavour, as far as it can be judged from the reports of the Times.⁴ The probability of an intervention was however being discussed in the lobbies and journalists' circle but the dominant opinion was that of a Turkish intervention if it becomes unavoidable⁵. As late as December 26, '81, British Consul-General sympathised with the cause of the Nationalists and interpreted it as asking guidance from Britain.

1. The Times, October 6, 1881

2. The Times, September 12, 1881

3. The Times, November 16, 1881, quoting the Arabic Press of Egypt.

4. The Times, of the month of November '81, particularly of November 1.

5. The Times, September, 12-14, 1881

6. Malet, op.cit., pp. 211-12 f.n. : Despatch to Foreign Office dated December 26, 1881.

In a Despatch of British Foreign Office dated November 4, '81, it was made clear that Britain was in favour of status quo, and that the Powers should protect the development of existing Egyptian institutions provided Egypt fulfills her international engagements. The Despatch concluded with the declaration that "the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it had obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan...."¹ Sherif had it translated into Arabic and given it a wide publicity².

Apart from this, there was another important factor which influenced the formulation of Western policies towards Egypt: it was France. Since the advent of the staunch Imperialist Gambetta to power, the French influence further increased. Now the probability was that of an European intervention and not a Turkish one; Gambetta, at least, was uncompromising on this point.

Indifferent of what Europe thought of their actions, the Nationalists marched ahead on the road to reform and uplift of the country. Even the Moderates like Muhammad Abdul had 'plunged into the battery-smoke': Al-Waga'i al-Misriyya was rapidly changing into a political paper under his editorship; later on it turned quite openly into an organ of the new

1. Malet, op.cit., p. 191

2. Ibid., pp. 134-85

militant Nationalism¹. With the help of al-Waqa'i, Abduh inculcated a spirit of patriotism among the common men, taught the people to love their country and roused their feelings of nationalism².

Among other public educators, there were the leading journalists, Adib Ishaq and as-Sayyid Abdullah an-Nadim. Adib,

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1. Ibrahim Abduh: "Tatawwur Sihafat al-Misriyya", p. 177
 2. "Linguistically, Watan means, without exception, the place where the person lives; it is synonymous with the word Sakan: to say Istautana al-qaum hadhihi al-ard wa tawattanuha is the same as saying 'they have made it their abode'. The word as used by those who study politics means the place after which you are called, where your right is safeguarded, and the claim of which on you is known, where you are secure in yourself, your kin and your possessions. It has been said: 'There is no Watan without freedom'. La Bruyere, the French philosopher said: 'There is no Watan properly speaking, compatible with tyranny, but only private interests, personal glorification and exalted places. Watan was defined by the ancient Romans as the place where the person has rights and political duties.

This later Roman definition does not contradict the saying that there is no Watan without freedom. They are indeed identical. Freedom is the right to fulfil the known duty, and if it does not exist there can be no Watan, since there are no rights. When political duties exist, then they imply the existence of both right and duty, which are the motto of all the Watans to which lives and possessions are sacrificed, and which are put before kin and friends; in generous souls, the love of Watan reaches the height of adoration and passion.

But the abode where the dweller has no rights, and where he is secure neither in his life nor in his possessions, is, in short, the resort of the powerless, and the abode of him who can find no way to another; if it grows bigger, there is no ease, and if smaller, then life in it cannot become worse.... It has been (justly) said that the relational ending⁸¹ in Misri, Inglizi, Fransawi, is of a kind which inspires regard and jealousy in the heart of the Egyptian for Egypt, of the Frenchman for France and of the Englishman for England...."

(Abduh's article "al-Hayat as-Siyasiya" appeared in "al-Waqa'i" of November 1881. Cit. Rashid Reza, vol. II, pp. 194-95)

(1856-1884) a Damascene by birth and Christian by religion, came to Egypt in 1875 and immediately entered into al-Afghani's circle. With his friend Salim an-Naqqash, he started his papers Misr and at-Tijarah. He was exiled by Isma'il and in his exile he issued another paper al-Qahira from Paris. From there he proceeded to Beirut and, after the success of the Nationalists, returned to Egypt towards the close of the year 1881. He was then appointed Nazir in the Ministry of Education and was allowed to reissue his Misr, which he forthwith began to publish. Later, when he was elected Secretary to the Constituent Assembly, he had to relinquish the responsibilities of editing the paper and handed it over to his brother. He was among the pioneer political thinkers who were responsible for the political ^{awakening} of Egypt through the press; and his paper, quite popular in the country contributed much towards educating public opinion and inculcating a general political consciousness.¹

Abdullah an-Nadim (1845-1896) was the foremost leading journalist and the spokesman of the Nationalists. His was a significant role in the Nationalist revolt itself. He was born in Alexandria and came from a poor family. Fond of knowledge and learning from his boyhood, he came to Cairo where he made acquaintance with Abdullah Fikri, Mahmud Sami

1. Adib Ishaq: "Ad-Durar" (edited by 'Auni Ishaq, Beirut, 1909, pp. 453-54)., pp. 200-201; 453-54: Adib's statements on Wataniyya, a literal ditto to Abduh's ideas.

al-Baroudi and other eminent poets and authors. In 1879, he returned to Alexandria where his friends Muhammad Amin and Mahmud Wasif had organised a secret political party, Misr al-Fatat (the Young Egypt) by name. He joined the Party and began to write on political issues. Tired of the secrecy of the Party, he soon left it and founded a socio-educational organisation, al-Jamiyyat al-Khairiyyat al-Islamiyya. He also founded a public school for which he got subsidy from the Khedive. But his uneasy nature forced him out of it as well¹.

Now he began to write in al-Mahrousa and al-'Asr al-Jadid which were being edited by Salim an-Naqqash after the closure of Misr and at-Tijarah. Since January 1881, he began to publish his own weekly, at Tankit wa't- Tabkit, which, from its very start, began attacking violently the 'Tadakhkhul al-Ajnabi' (foreign influence) and the Westernised Egyptians who blindly imitated European culture.² Later, on the advice of Ahmad Arabi, he started a new paper at-Ta'if from Cairo, which^{which} was held by the nationalist leaders as their spokesman. Through at-Ta'if, an-Nadim disseminated the ideas of constitutional government and educated public mind in the art of self-government.³ However he performed his more important role during

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1. Zaidan: "Mashhir ash-sharq", vol. II, pp. 95-96; Rafi'i, pp. 513-20; Ahmad Amin: "Zu'ama al-Islah fi 'Asr al-Hadith" pp. 211-13
 2. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., pp. 213-15; Zaidan, op.cit., vol. II, p. 97; Bustani, "Da'irat al-Ma'arif", vol XI, p. 534; Hamza, "As-Sihafat wa'l Adab", p. 32
 3. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., pp. 222-23; Blunt, p. 164

the Anglo-Egyptian clash that took place in May-July 1882¹.

As for Arabi, the movement led by him had now become a mass-movement. It aimed at "the liberation of Egypt from European Control, and a Constitution."² A recent visit of the two-men Commission from the Porte in October 1881 had given to the Sultan a good impression of Arabi and his Movement.³

On December 11, 1881, Wilfred Scawen Blunt, the English poet, author, and adventurer,⁴ met Arabi. In his very

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1. As a speaker, an-Nadim had no rival, and since the declaration of the Constitution, he spoke off and on about the Constitution, despotism and democracy, and explained the ways and means of retaining independence. In the crisis period of May-July, '82, his emotionalism knew no bounds. An-Nadim was heard everywhere, among students, common people, Ulema and the people of the upper class, speaking on the burning question of the day and making them alive to the approaching danger. Till the last moment, he continued his struggle. He was at Tel al-Kabir under the command of Sami. After the defeat of the Nationalists, he was the only prominent figure who did not surrender, and paid a high price for his patriotism. Remaining underground for quite a long time, he was, at last, arrested, but was soon released by the Khedivial order. He tried in vain to renew his nationalist activities even after the British occupation, and, finally, seeing no scope, left Egypt for the Porte, where he got a Government job. He died there in 1896. (Zaidan, vol. II, pp. 97-99; Ahmad Amin, pp. 224-26)
 2. Malet's letter dated October 10, '81 in Malet, op.cit., p. 170
 3. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 155, 496
 4. Blunt (d. 1924), the author of various valuable books on Modern Egypt and other Near and Middle Eastern Countries and allied subjects, served in the British Agency since his 18th year of age, and for 13 years he remained attached to diplomatic services whence he retired in 1859. After his retirement, travel became his hobby. During 1873-78, he travelled through Turkey, Algeria, Iraq, Arabia, Syria, India, Aden and Egypt. At the close of the year 1881, he reached Egypt with an intention to leave it soon, but, he had to prolong his stay for several months as he indulged into Egyptian politics on behalf of the Nationalists. He witnessed the nationalist drama and was himself an important actor of the whole performance. During the bad days of the Movement, he did all in his power to help it to the last moment. He went to London to represent the entire situation.

Contd.....

first meeting he was captivated by his personality and saw in his movement a real national upsurge. Henceforth, Blunt made the Egyptian national cause his own.

On December 18, Blunt drew up a draft in the form of a Programme of the National Party, thus presenting the aims and objectives of the simple movement in European terminology. This Programme was based on the ideas expressed by Arabi, and in its final form, it was approved by Mahmud Sami, Muhammad Abduh and Arabi. On 20th December, it was sent to British Premier, Gladstone, and a copy of the same was sent to the Times for publication. The six-point Programme covered the acceptance of the existing Turco-Egyptian relations; allegiance to the Khedivial Government, but not to despotism; acceptance of the Egyptian indebtedness to foreign bondholders; confession of advantages derived from European Financial Control, and yet desiring for an early replacement of foreigners by the Egyptians themselves who could shoulder the same responsibilities even more efficiently than those foreigners. It was made clear that the National Party was a political and in no sense a religious party, and that it comprised the representatives of all creeds. The Programme insisted upon the increase of the Egyptian army upto the agreed limit of

Continued from page 90.

truthfully and in its real perspective to the British authorities, and sent Sabunji, his Secretary, to Egypt to continue his work and keep him in touch with the day to day developments. At last the battle was lost and he was also a silent spectator like other helpless nationalists.

(Introduction to the Arabic Translation
of Blunt's "Secret History", pp. 3-7).

18,000 men. Lastly, it was declared that the general end of the National Party was the intellectual and moral regeneration of the country¹.

As regards the European financial Control, Arabi's viewpoint was that it must not come in the way of national reforms "by supporting the Khedive's absolute rule."² Towards the Porte, the Nationalists looked with suspicion and contempt. But the immediate danger of European intervention had made them cautious, and they paid at least their liphomage to the person and sovereignty of the Sultan. "We are all children of the Sultan", said Arabi, "and live together like family in one house. But, just as in families, we have each of us provinces of the empire, our separate room which is our own to arrange as we will and where even the sovereign must not want only intrude."³

iv

On the whole the national movement led by Arabi and his colleagues should have been appreciated from humanistic point of view. But the age of Imperialism weighed everything

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1. The Times, January 3, 1882; Jerrold, "The Belgium of the East: Appendix V;
 2. Blunt, p. 173 quoting Arabi
 3. Jerrold, p. 113

in terms of increase or decrease of the area of influence. Slowly the British papers changed their attitude and launched a violent propaganda against the Movement. It was represented as a mere creation of an "ambitious soldier."¹ At the same time letters from Cairo appearing in those papers confessed that the Movement was not the least fanatical, that it had in its fold leaders like Arabi from the army, Sami from the Ministry, and the Ulema from al-Azhar, and that it treated the question of European Control quite separately from the demand for a Constitution.² The Movement had spread from village to village with its slogans 'Egypt for the Egyptians.'³ In spite of all its genuineness, the Imperialists were, however, not in a mood to tolerate a Movement which was a source of peril to their own ultimate aims.

As for the increase in the army of 18000 troops pressed by the Minister of War, there were objections raised by the Controllers on financial grounds. A compromise was, however, reached through the mediation of Blunt, by virtue of which the army budget was reduced from the proposed £ 600,000 to £ 520,000. It was accepted by Arabi and his Party and the problem was thus solved.⁴

In the meanwhile, Gambetta, the French Premier, was dreaming a North African Empire, and towards this aim, he persuaded British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville for a

1. Pall Mall Gazette of London December 1881, cit., Jerrold, pp. 120-24

2. Ibid., p. 131

3. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 177

4. Ibid., pp. 159-61, 183

joint intervention in Egypt. Throughout the month of December, he strived for the same and at last he succeeded to the extent that the two Governments should address a Joint Note to their respective Agents, in Egypt, the draft of which was prepared by Gambetta himself. In a threatening language to the Egyptian Government, the Joint Note said, "The English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans..., as alone able to guarantee... the good order and the development of general prosperity.... The two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complications, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly give for their formal intention in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find France and England united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and its people."¹ This Note was published in the Egyptian papers on January 8, 1882.

While the Powers were busy devising means to strike at the National Movement, the proposed Assembly of the Delegates had come into existence, the Delegates being elected

1. Malet, op.cit., pp. 217-218

under the Electoral Law of 1866. The Assembly was to meet on December 26, 1881. The session began, and the Assembly started drawing up the Constitution, the demand for which had already been accepted by the Khedive in principle. Sherif presented to the Assembly the draft-Constitution drawn up by a committee of the Delegates and revised by Sherif himself. It was a liberal Constitution and yet it did not enumerate the powers of the Assembly. The Delegates, however, pressed their rights to discuss and vote the budget, at least that half of the budget which did not pertain to any international obligation. Sherif, afraid of some foreign intervention on this point, declined to go to that extent and resigned on February 2, 1882¹.

In the meanwhile the Joint Note had come early in January and it constituted an open challenge to the popular forces. When published in Arabic, it created a wide-spread indignation against Europe. "The person chiefly blamed is the Khedive", reported the British Agent, "who, it is alleged, requested me to obtain a declaration from my Government of the nature contained in the message."² One of the immediate effects it produced was a complete union of all the nationalist forces hitherto working in different directions. The army, the Assembly, the Ulama, all were united to face the

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 186-209

2. Malet, op.cit., p. 227; letter dated January 10, '82

approaching danger. Everyone had the suspicion that preparations were being made to stage the Tunisian drama once again in Egypt¹. The Movement, started as a simple liberation struggle, was forced to change into an anti-European and finally into an anti-Christian movement².

In the Assembly, the heated discussion on the Sherif-Constitution was in its full swing when the Joint Note came only to add fuel to fire. The Note had completely neglected the existence of a representative Constituent Assembly. It was received with bitter feelings and in reaction the Assembly demanded control of the State budget and a full-fledged Ministerial responsibility³.

The Powers were perturbed as there was no clear-cut line of action. British Agent in Egypt was not against the demand of the Assembly i.e. to discuss the unmortgaged part of the budget. Granville himself was not yet in favour of any European intervention. Moreover, on January 31, Gambetta had resigned and was succeeded by de Freycinet who, like Granville, was equally opposed to any intervention, whether European or Turkish⁴. But they could not let the things slip away from their grip, nor did they have any solution of the problem they faced⁵.

1. Halim, op.cit., p. 736

2. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 189-90; Malet, op.cit., pp. 226, 228-33

3. Malet, op.cit., p. 240

4. Malet, op.cit., pp. 257-58

5. "The question to be considered is whether it is most detrimental to our interests to lose influence and see Customs, Posts, Telegraphs, etc., revert by degrees to native hands, or to favour a violent solution based on the status quo; both are bad enough...." (Malet, op.cit., p. 260; A Despatch to the Foreign Office).

Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi succeeded Sherif as the President of the Council of Ministers, and Arabi was appointed the new Minister of War¹. On February 7, Sami presented to the Khedive the new draft-Constitution as approved by the Assembly which the Khedive reluctantly sanctioned. For the first time in their history, the people of Egypt were given a liberal Constitution which gave them full share in the administration and the government of their country. It enumerated the following principles in particular: The Assembly's right to discuss and vote the legislation (Arts. 25,30); right to discuss, examine and vote the annual budget, with the exception of the Tribute to the Porte, the service of the Public Debt and the obligations resulting out of the Conventions and Arrangements with foreign Powers. (Arts. 32, 34 and 35); right to vote every international Treaty or Contract. (Art. 38); and lastly, the principle of Ministerial responsibility. (Arts. 19-22²).

In March, '82, the Electoral Law was enacted : Membership of the Assembly was raised to 125. Every hundred voters were to elect an Elector-delegate, and in turn these Elector-delegates were to elect the members of the Assembly; they were to serve a term of five years; they were to elect

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1. Other Ministers were: Mahmud Fehmi, Mustafa Fehmi, Shure' Sadiq and Abdullah Fikri. See Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 274-75; also: Malet, op.cit., p. 258
 2. Appendix III; see also: Edwin Pears: Life of Abdul Hamid, pp. 48-52; p. 38, the power to ratify the treaties and contracts was not granted to the Chamber.
According to Landau, "Parliaments and Parties",

their own President, for which they had to submit a list of three candidates out of whom the Khedive should nominate anyone¹.

On the whole, the 1882-Constitution was more that of the Assembly than that of the Government of Egypt; at its best, it enumerated the powers of the Assembly. It did not analyse the structure of the government, and the position and powers of its various agencies, specially the Khedive. The Constitution presumed a preknowledge of the Khedivial authority. What is more significant is the fact that nowhere in the constitution, the name of the country i.e. Egypt, was mentioned. The makers of the Constitution lacked perhaps the perception of the division of authority among the three well-known branches of government, i.e., the executive, the legislature and the judiciary; or perhaps they dared not encroach so much upon the Khedivial authority, specially in the prevailing peculiar situation of the ever-present European menace. Perhaps they could not go farther in their ambiguous position of complete autonomy under a nominal Ottoman sovereignty. Anyhow, inspite of its limitations, shortcomings and drawbacks, as the first Constitution promulgated by the representatives of the Egyptian people themselves, it deserves its due place in the development of nationalism in Egypt.

1. Rafi'i, pp. 254-55; Appendix III.

V

The Movement had received a setback by some important dissensions: Sherif, after his resignation, was working with the British Agent, against the Sami Government¹. Muhammad Sultan, President of the Assembly of the Delegates, had turned antagonistic because he had not been given any Ministerial post in the Nationalist Government. But these desertions were insignificant as compared to the joint front of the Egyptians to save their country. The army which, after the convocation of the Assembly of the Delegates, had gone into the background, again came in the forefront and revived its activities; Arabi, once again took the leadership of the Movement in his own hands². The entire movement was speedily acquiring a definite anti-European character, enlisting within its fold members of every class and section of the people. On February 13, a correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette attended a political meeting wherein prominent personalities like Sami, Tulba Ismat, Ali Fehmi, Abduh, Arabi and an-Nadim were present. An-Nadim presided at the meeting. Warning the large audience of fifteen hundred he said: "Tell me, my friend did you ever read of another nation which won its liberties by reason and not by sword?"³ Then, a fourteen years old boy made a speech pouring out abuses against the Europeans and charging how they exploited and looted Egypt like Spain, Algeria and India.²

1. Blunt, op.cit., page 486

2. Malet, op.cit., pp. 226, 228-31

3. Cit., Jerrold, op.cit., pp. 167-72

The last speaker was Muhammad Abduh. He spoke on 'freedom and the Constitution'. Such meetings were organised every now and then.

The Government of Sami was running quite smoothly.¹ A series of reforms were being contemplated e.g. the abolition of corvee, protection from Greek usurers, and establishment of Agricultural Banks². The Ministers had presented to the Assembly a list of such reforms that could be put into actual practice³. A Fetwa in favour of the abolition of slavery was soon to be passed⁴. On April 6, Arabi wrote to Blunt: "We have made up our mind to do all we can to give our nation a position among civilized nations, by spreading knowledge through the country, maintaining union and good order, and administering justice to everyone."⁵

In Britain, a section of the Press and public opinion was in favour of the Egyptian National Movement⁶. Prior to the advent of Sami to power, the Economist wrote: "Our best hope for future would seem to lie in gaining the friendship of the better elements in the Nationalist party, which may in time, provide, the nucleus of a healthy and independent Government."

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1. Introduction to Arabic Translation of Blunt, op.cit., p. 108, f.n., quoting de Freycinet.
 2. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 233
 3. Ibid., pp. 232-33
 4. Ibid., pp. 254
 5. Ibid., p. 247
 6. The Times, January-February 1882
 7. The Economist, January 14, 1882, p. 35

Regarding the Sami Government the same paper wrote on March 18: "The National party are on their trial. It is by their acts they must be judged. The interests this country has in Egypt are comprised mainly in the right of way to our Eastern provinces, for the maintenance of which the existence of a Good government, with all that is involv~~ing~~ed in that word, are included. If these objects are secured, the national independence of Egypt is not a point which we ought to oppose.

As a matter of fact, nothing was insecure. On the other hand the opportunity was ripe to make Egypt a colony for the Imperialistic gains, and all their uneasiness was simply because the emergence of a Nationalist government had jeop~~ard~~ized this opportunity.

vi

The long-awaited opportunity came from a strange quarter. In April 1882, some Fellah officers were given promotions which embittered their Circassian colleagues. A few days afterwards, a plot was disclosed to Arabi, which was designed against the leaders of the National Movement. Isma'il Raghîb, the son-in-law of Sherif, was the main figure and Sherif and the deposed Isma'il were supposed to be privy to

1. The Economist, March 18, 1882, p. 318

the plot. A pretext was sought in a decree for the transfer of nine Circassian officers to the Sudan who refused to proceed without promotions. Eighty-one Circassian officers were taking part in this move. The entire plot was, however, betrayed to Arabi by one of the Circassians. The plotters were tried and forty of them were exiled to the White Nile; Usman Rifqui, the former Minister of War was one of them.¹

To exploit the situation, the issue was given a serious colour. Malet, the British Agent, advised the Khedive to withhold his sanction to the sentence for exilement. Accordingly, the Khedive declined to sign the decree. His refusal was unconstitutional. It enraged the Nationalists, specially because the step was taken on European advice.² Sami convoked the Assembly, and the Delegates, seventy-five in number, met informally and resolved by forty-five to thirty votes that in case of Khedive's persistence in withholding his sanction to the punishment decree, he should be impeached and deposed. Muhammad Sultan, the President of the Assembly, wavered and finally broke away from the Nationalists; he had been won over by the Khedive.³

On the part of the Powers, arrangements were made to send their joint Anglo-French fleets to the Egyptian waters in order to protect the Europeans, to safeguard the position of the Khedive and to maintain a status quo in the event of

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1. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 252-53
 2. Ibid., p. 268
 3. Ibid., pp. 268-69

'anarchy.' The fleets reached Alexendria on May 20. However in the midst of the threats, punishments to the Circassian plotters were carried out.¹

On May 25, at last, an Anglo-French Note was communicated to the President of the Council of Ministers demanding the resignation of the Ministry, Arabi's temporary retirement from Egypt and the retirement of two other leading colonels, Afi Fehmi and Abd al-Al into the interior of the country². The Note caused a bitter resentment and the Nationalists took an oath in a formal meeting that they would remain united in the event of national crisis. Replying the Note, the Egyptian Ministry refused to comply with any of the requests. The Khedive, however, announced the acceptance of the Note, and, in protest thereof, the Sami Ministry resigned. The Khedive was compelled from all quarters of the country to reinstate the Ministry. The Egyptian troops at Alexendria declared that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi; that they gave twelve hours' time to the Khedive to reply to their demand; and that after this they would not hold themselves responsible for public peace and tranquillity³.

On May 29, the Khedive made an announcement to reinstate Arabi as the Minister of War; other ministeries remained vacant for some time and were run by the under-Secretaries⁴. Raghib, a Constitutionalist belonging to the

1. Malet, op.cit., pp. 326-27, 335

2. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 271; Malet, op.cit., p. 358; Malet has given the name of 'Abdollah Pasha' in place of Abd al-Al.

3. Malet, op.cit., p. 365; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 271, 274

4. Malet, op.cit., p. 371

Shefif's group, headed the Ministry. The reinstatement of Arabi gave the people courage and confidence and they took it as "a sign that Christians are to be expelled from Egypt."¹ The National Movement was taking a serious religious turn, almost fanatical, with high hopes and aspirations in the countryside. There was a constant danger of collision between the Muslims and the Christians.² In the whole set-up, Arabi was the master of the situation.

At this juncture, at the British-sponsored request of the Khedive, the Sultan consented to send a two-men Commission to inquire into the affairs of the 'military insubordination'.³ The Commissioners, Dervish Pasha and Muhammad Asad, landed in Egypt on June 8, and were hailed with the slogans of "Allah Yansur Sultan" (May God help the Sultan), "El-Lehya, marfudha, marfudha" (The Note, rejected, rejected) and "send away the fleet."⁴ The Chief Commissioner, Dervish, conferred with the Nationalist leaders, Sami and Arabi, and persuaded Arabi to leave Egypt and ~~to~~^{to} to the Porte on a subsidy of £ 250 a month. Arabi declined ^{to accept} the suggestion flatly. A Khedivial purse of £ 75,000 had turned the Chief

1. Ibid., p. 375 Letter dated May 30

2. Ibid, pp. 375-76; It may be gauged by the planned riot of Alexandria, how much combustible this animosity had become. See also, Rae, "Egypt today", p. 31

3. Malet, op.cit., pp. 378, 394

4. Blunt, op.cit., p. 306 (The text of Arabic citations has been given in its correct form instead of Romanised form of Blunt); see also, Rafi'i, p. 285

Commissioner completely pro-Khedive. The demonstrations of al-Azhar students and the stir caused by an-Nadim's speeches against the pro-Khedive policy of the Commission, indicated which way the wind was blowing.¹ Dervish, realizing the seriousness of the situation, took precautions, and retired to Alexendria. The British-sponsored mission had failed.

In the army circles, there was a deep indignation towards the Khedive, who, for his petty selfish motives, was prepared to crush down the national aspirations. Malet reports that the army officers were considering the deposition of the Khedive. The head of al-Azhar, Sheikh Alysh, issued a Fetwa that the Khedive was intent to sell his country to the foreigners and hence was no more suited to rule over the Muslims of Egypt.²

On June 11, an anti-European riot broke out in Alexendria, which as later proved by evidence, was preplanned by the Khedive with the help of Umar Lutfi, the Governor of Alexendria.³ The main objective of the plot was to defame the Arabi administration⁴. Fourteen hundred lives, most of them Europeans, were lost in the riot. Loot and arsen followed in the wake of the riots. The Khedivial party seized the opportunity to join with the Powers in abusing the Arabi regim

1. Blunt, op.cit., p. 307-308

2. Ibid., p. 326

3. Ibid., pp. 309-313

4. Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", pp. 552-53

The riot began on a small issue. In a street quarrel a donkey-boy was killed by a Maltese, and the natives, avenging the death, mobbed upon him. This incident, however, soon changed, or rather manipulated into a Muslim-Christian riot of the worst type. The city was in the hands of the mob and the beduins who plundered it. Even such a staunch Imperialist as Cromer has remarked that the responsibility of the riot did not lie with Arabi, and that the circumstances resulted in the riot.¹ However, as was desired and planned beforehand, Arabi was exclusively held responsible for the situation, and on July 10, British Admiral Seymore handed over an ultimatum to him².

In the meantime, on the initiative of Britain and France an International Conference of European Powers was meeting at Constantinople since June 23, with its main object of maintaining the status quo in the Ottoman Empire. On June 27, it was agreed that "so long as the Conference lasted, the Powers should abstain from isolated action in Egypt."³ The Sultan remained hesitating to send his troops to Egypt until Alexandria was bombarded on July 11. However, on July 15, he agreed to participate in the International Conference, and on the 20th, to send his troops to Egypt. He was now told by the Powers that not until he issued a proclamation denouncing Arabi as a rebel, he would be allowed to send his forces. On August

1. Cromer, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 287-88

2. Royle, "The Egyptian Campaigns", p. 22

3. Ibid., p, 63

9, a draft of such proclamation was handed over to the British Ambassador at the Porte, and negotiations were still continued when on August 15, General Wolseley arrived at Alexendria to complete the work of Admiral Seymore¹.

France, however, could not join hands with Britain in this Egyptian expedition De Freinet, the French Premier, who had asked the Assembly to maintain a large naval force in the Canal waters to enable him to land, 8,000 marines in the event of necessity, met with signal defeat. The leader of the Opposition asked him pointedly how could he assure that the occupation of the Canal would not drag France into further action². De Freinet could not answer the question and was left helpless. Thus Britain proceeded alone with her action.

The nationalists were united under Arabi and almost the entire population rallied round him. The Ultimatum of Admiral Seymore had awakened them and created unity among the people. Everyone was ready to defend the country and its prestige. The Ultimatum was, however, rejected and the British fleet bombarded the Alexendrian forts. The city caught fire and the nationalists retreated to the interior in Tel-al-Kahir. Taufiq, hitherto watched by Arabi's men, slipped away and with him carried away Dervish and the Egyptian Ministers as well. They all went to the British Admiral and took refuge at sea. On July 14, from the British camp, the Khedive called upon Arabi to see him for peace negotiation; he also ridiculed upon Arabi for answering the British bombardment. In view of the serious situation, Arabi declined to see him, whereupon the Khedive announced that he had

1. Ibid., pp. 130-31

2. Elgood, op.cit., pp. 77-78

dismissed Arabi for disobeying his supreme orders¹.

Inspite of the desertion of the Khedive, there was calm and quiet in the Egyptian mainland and administration was running smoothly. A General Council, consisting of prominent citizens and representatives of all religious communities, took over the charge of the Government as the supreme authority in the absence of the Khedive. The Khedive was won over by the 'infidels' and hence his decree of the dismissal of Arabi was ruled out by the General Council. Confirming the position of Arabi, the Council appointed a Committee of Defence under the Presidentship of Yaqub Sami to assist Arabi in the operation of War. Arabi was practically head of the State².

General Wolseley landed in Egypt with his forces on August 21, and on September 13, at Tel al-Kabir, the British forces met the Nationalist army. The affair lasted for an hour; the entire plan of the nationalists had already been betrayed to the enemy by a traitor, Ali Yusuf Khunsif.³ Further more, de Lesseps' promise to maintain the neutrality of the Suez Canal had forced the Nationalists to give up their original scheme of explosion of the Canal; while de Lesseps and his country, France, watched silently, Wolseley's forces crossed the Canal and landed the shore. After their entry,

1. Blunt, "Secret History", pp. 382, 388, 392; Royle: p. 108

2. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 382-83, 420-21

3. Autobiography of Arabi in Blunt, op.cit., p. 488

the invaders were again helped by the traitors; among them were Khedive's men, President of the Assembly of the Delegates the bribed beduins and even some of the army officers¹. "We were taken by surprize", wrote Arabi. "The cavalry Commanders were all seduced by Abou Sultan's promises². They occupied a position in advance of the line, and it was their duty to give the warning of any advance by the English. But they moved aside and gave no warning. There was also one traitor, Alé Bey Yusuf Khunsif. He lit lamps to direct the enemy, and then withdrew his men leaving a wide space open for them to pass through."³ The nationalists lost their heart. They had lost the battle.

Even if the treachery had not occurred, the results would have been more or less the same. At the most, it might have taken some days instead of minutes to defeat the Nationalist forces. Arabi's soldiers, according to his own statement, were simple untrained peasants who escaped when the shells started falling. The final touch to the treachery was given by the tribal chief, Sa'ud at-Tahawi, who with other beduins, sided with the British army and accelerated the speed of horrifying the untrained soldiers who were fighting to save

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1. In the army itself, the Khedive had spread dissention⁵ through his Agent Usman Rif'at. (Blunt: "My Diaries", vol. 1, pp. 412-13)
 2. Abou Sultan, that is Muhammad Sultan, the President of the Assembly of the Delegates, who wrote letters to the Civilian chiefs to the effect that Britain had intervened temporarily and that Arabi had lost the confidence of the Sultan, and hence no assistance be given to Arabi against Britain. (Blunt: op.cit., p. 414)
 3. cit. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 488

the honour of their country and did not know how to fight¹.

Lastly, Mahmud Fehmi was arrested before the actual war-fight began. Mahmud was the ablest general and the engineer of the entire plan of the war. He was arrested by the British soldiers during his lonely sojourn in the night. Ali Fehmi and Rashid, the bravest of the Officers, fell wounded and Muhammad Ubaid, another soldier of the same calibre, was killed. Abd al-Al Hilmi was posted far away from Tel-al-Kabir and was thus rendered useless for the battle. Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi was misguided by at-Tahawi's beduins and could not reach the place where he was most needed. Finally, as has already been pointed out, the soldiers, that comprised the greater part of the Nationalist army, mainly consisted the newly recruited volunteers or regulars drawn from the simple peasantry, and who experienced for the first time the falling of the shells². Even Arabi, the leader of the entire Movement and the supreme commander of the Nationalist forces, had hitherto no experience of the actual warfare³.

Two thousand Egyptians were killed in the battle. Arabi and Ali-ar-Rubi, retired and saved their life by flying away in the interior. When British army captured Cairo and occupied the Administration, Arabi surrendered in person before the British General on September 14.⁴

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1. At-Tahawi himself confessed later in 1887 that the Khedive had managed to bribe him: See Blunt, "My Diaries", p.411; Lord Northbrook sent a mission to win over the tribes in the East and West of the Canal. It involved about £ 20,000. Palmer, the famous Orientalist, lost his life while serving the Mission. See Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p. 22 and "Secret History", p. 419 411
 2. The Egyptian army comprised of about 20,000 inexperienced

Continued.....

Now the leaders of the nation were to be tried by the Occupation court. Blunt's 'hero' had lost the battle. He, with other English friends and sympathisers of the Egyptian national cause, engaged a prominent advocate, Broadlay, at a fee of £ 800, to plead the case of Arabi and his colleagues¹. Meanwhile, Blunt managed to publish a statement in the Times, that the execution will not be done without the consent of English Government and that the prisoners were to be defended by efficient counsel². There was not the slightest official authority behind this announcement; but once it was published in the Times, it was difficult for the British Premier, Gladstone, to go back upon humane decision publicly attributed to his Government. Sherif, Riaz and the Khedive were pressing for capital punishment.³ In principle, however, the right of fair trial was recognised.

During the trial, it became evident that the normal procedure would disclose many treacheries of the Khedive and his party. Therefore, with the help of Lord Dufferin, a compromise was reached at. Dufferin, the British Ambassador

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1. Prominent among these sympathisers were Sir Willaim Gregor Lord de la Warr, F. Harrison, and Lord Randolph Churchill. See Blunt, op.cit., pp. 322, 432
 2. Blunt, op.cit., p. 433; The Times, September 19, '82
 3. Blunt, op.cit., p. 448

Continued from page..... 110.

fresh volunteers, while the regulars numbered only nine or ten thousands; See Blunt, "Secret History", p. 419

3. Ibid., pp. 419-22
4. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 423-24

at the Porte, was deputed to settle the affairs in Egypt and to reorganise the administration of the country. The trial of the Nationalists was summarily ended on December 3, and according to the Compromise, Arabi, Sami, Abd al-Al, Tulba Ismat, Mahmud Fehmi, Yaqub Sami and Ali Fehmi were sentenced with deportation to Ceylon. They left Suez for their destination on December 26¹.

vii

Although the Arabi Movement was popular in character it failed due to some obvious reasons; Firstly, the Sami-Arabi Government, though established with high ideas, had totally neglected the economic factor, namely, the reorganisation of the economy of the country. While the leaders were busy in attacks, counterattacks and defence of the country, the conditions of the masses deteriorated. Europeans who purchased the agricultural products of the natives had left the country. Banks would no longer lend large sums, while the petty usurers loaned money on extremely high rates of interest. "Land is everywhere losing its value."², Malet reported. This deterioration reached its culminating point at a time when the

1. Blunt, op.cit., pp. 455-57, 472; Cromer, vol. I, pp. 336-37
2. Malet, op.cit., p. 301, see also, pp. 300, 395

campaign had entered into actual operations. In July-September 1882, it served as a severe blow to the Movement from the rear

The announcement of the dismissal of Arabi by the Khedive had also its own repercussions. It disheartened the unlettered Fellahin who knew no more than the simple truth that their ruler was against any fight with Britain, and that he had dismissed their General, the Minister of War.

The Conference at Constantinople also served in yet another way in assisting the cause of the enemy. Britain was able to get the Sultan to issue a proclamation which declared Arabi a rebel. This was done prior to the battle of Tel-al-Kabir. The proclamation read: "The acts which Orabi Pasha has dared to commit, with reference to His Highness constitute a flagrant violation of the supreme will of His Majesty the Sultan.... Consequently Orabi Pasha is considered a rebel in the eyes of the Imperial Government."¹

In Egypt itself, after the bombardment of Alexandria the Khedivial party, consisting of many of the prominent figures of the upper class, carried on an intensive campaign against Arabi, in which they alleged that Arabi had joined hands with the British forces. This campaign, the main purpose of which was to defame the leader of the Movement, continued even after the final defeat at Tel al-Kabir, when Arabi was openly accused of treachery: that he had been won over by the English secretly, or else the Egyptian forces would

1. cit. Rifa'at: "The Awakening of Modern Egypt", p. 210; See also, Cromer, pp.cit., p. 318

not have suffered the defeat so easily.¹

The leader of the Movement, was, however, in no way mainly responsible for the failure and defeat of the movement. He had no previous experience of the battlefield, much less, leading and commanding a force in the battle. Inexperienced as he was, he relied upon the promises of de Lesseps, and in spite of the pressure from his colleagues, he abstained from blocking or blowing up the Canal. De Lesseps had given him his word that under no circumstances would the Canal be used for landing the British forces on the Egyptian soil. But it was obvious that de Lesseps had no power, while his Government was not ready to protect his claim. The Canal was used and strategically served Britain to proceed with the entire war planning that solely depended upon the landing, of the forces.

The lack of planning of the strategy of war, the betrayal of the Nationalists' original scheme and the treachery of the Egyptians themselves were the other added causes to the main loopholes².

That it was a popular and genuine national movement and that Arabi was its 'legitimate exponent' is not debatable.³ Had it not been a mass movement, Arabi's pleader, Broadlay,

1. De Frecinet, op.cit., p. 316

2. Summing up the causes of the failure of Arabi Movement, in an article in al-Urwat al-Wuthqa, the editor of al-Urwah says, :

argued, it would have been impossible for the army Officers to enlist thousands of volunteers and to muster immense supplies. The streets of the country echoed with the slogans, "May God help thou, Arabi (Allahu Yansuruka Ya Arabi¹)" and with the chanting of :

"Ya Tawfiq ya wajh an-namala
Man qalaka t'amal hadhal-amala?
(Oh Tawfiq, thou ant-faced one,
Who on earth told you to do what you have done"))

Arabi was worshipped almost like a 'hero'. He had proved himself the man of the hour. His distinction as also his defect seemed to lie in the fact that he was one of the masses,

Continued from p. 114.

"When the Arabi Movement started, there were two kinds of people inhabiting the country. There were those who preferred the old regime; they were content with the Constitution that Tawfiq was ready to bestow upon them. On the other hand, there were those who adhered to Arabi Pasha, but at the same time they were afraid of the Khedive and thus wavered between the two: This second group remained ever in doubt to select its line of action; and it is obvious that doubt and wavering are just opposite to a determined clear-cut thinking. The first group had already reached the farthest extent of cowardice and timidity. That is why the English could occupy Egypt so easily. They entered Egypt without the least resistance on the part of the people. Threat, bribery, deceptions, and treacheries, such were their weapons.... Even then no Egyptian was prepared to believe that the English had an idea to occupy the country. They knew only this much that they had come to the rescue of the Khedive, Tawfiq Pasha, to save him from the clutches of the rebels.... On the one hand was this wishful opinion about the English; while on the other hand, they got a strong plea that the legal head of the country was not reluctant to the English intervention. So they, the people of Egypt remained idle in their national fight, and the English established themselves in Egypt." (Al-Urwah, September 25, '84, pp. 20-21)

3. Arabi's letter to Broadley in: Broadley, "How we defended Arabi and his Friends", p. 501

1. Broadley, op.cit., pp. 502-503 (The Roman text given by Broadley has been correctly transliterated).

a true son of the Egyptian soil and hence a genuine representative of the Fellahin. In spite of his eloquence in speech, his basic education at al-Azhar, and his courage to take initiative and face the consequences, he lacked those qualities of farsightedness, wide knowledge of men and things around, and the capability of diplomatic dealing that are necessary for a man who leads his nation in critical moments. As the leader of the Movement, he proved completely unsuccessful, and still he was one of the pioneers of national movement if not "the first nationalist in modern Egypt"¹.

- 5/ a) l.c. 1. The phrase was used by Beaman. Beaman began his life as a student interpreter. Then in June 1882 he was appointed as Assistant Consul at Cairo Consulate of Britain. He sympathised with the cause of the Nationalist, and regarded their movement as genuine national movement. Hence, after the Bombardment of Alexandria, he more than once ridiculed the official British attitude. He represented the British Consul-General at the trial of Arabi, and there he became still more impressed with the lost movement and its leaders. After the proceedings of the Court of trial had been completed, he in protest, resigned, from the post he held at British Consulate. He then succeeded Sir Valentine Chirol, as the correspondent of the Times in Egypt, and by the special request of the 'rebels', he also took charge of the properties of the 'rebels' as their legal Trustee. (See Beaman, "Twenty Years", pp. 41, 54, 71 and 73). Beaman's appraisal of the Arabi Movement, in summary, is as follows: "Upto the bombardment he (Arabi) had been moving both with the Khedive and the Sultan. After that, I believe, he always had the approval of Yeldiz and the whole country at his back, as against a nominal Khedive in the hands of the Infidels. He simply could not act otherwise. Having throughout been treated as a belligerent, it was absurd afterwards to talk of him as a rebel. The first test of a rebellion is success, and as far as his rebellion went, if he ever rebelled, against the Khedive, he was victorious along the whole line. He could not rebel against Europe, or England, to whom he owed no allegiance. As a dictator, his conduct was blameless, and after having been for long in complete authority over the land of Egypt, which before and since had always enriched every individual, from the highest officials down to the shadiest adventurers, who have ever had approach to its coffers, he went out of it a beggar, and Arabi's legal adviser had to buy bread and dates to keep his family from starving". (Beaman: "Twenty years in the Near East", p. 70); see also, Chirol, "Fifty years in a changing world", p. 32: His remarks, "The first leader of his people who spoke to them in their own Arabic tongue".

He was neither a born leader nor the fittest person for a movement launched in such a critical period; circumstances dragged him onwards. That^t is why, he was forgotten from the memory of his people so soon¹.

Inspite of all his limitations, Arabi contributed, at least one thing, to the history of Egyptian nationalism: He gave to the people a new slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians", and infused in these 'Egyptians' a feeling of 'Egyptianism' with a sense of pride for their motherland. If there had been no Arabi, perhaps there would have been no Kamil within thirteen years that followed Arabi's Revol^t and there would have been no general political awakening in the country either which manifested itself in the early years of the twentieth century. As for Arabi, General Gordon appraised, whatever may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the people; they will never be 'your obedient servants' again."² Indeed Arabi was singly responsible for kindling the fire of armed resistance among the ever-submissive Egyptians; he was the first true Egyptian who took up arms to save the honour of his country. He had lost the battle; yet he was so much revered by his people that for many days people would not believe that he was or rather, could be actually defeated³. Even after his trial and exilement, there

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1. "The memory of Arabi was soon forgotten, and when after a long exile, he was permitted to return to Egypt, his presence was hardly noticed.... He lived in a little house on the edge of the desert of Helouan, and I had to ask several people, before I could find one to direct me to the home of the former dictator and idolized hero of the masses." (Beaman, op.cit., p. 30)
 2. Gordon to Blunt, in a letter, dated August 3, 1882. See Blunt, "Gordon at Khartūm," p.9,
 3. Blunt, "My Diaries", vol. I, p.14; *"Gordon at Khartoum", pp.577-78*

was a general belief that he would come back to the rescue of his people. But he could not come back before 1901, when few remained to hail him¹. In 1911, he died the death of an insignificant person. It is only recently that, in recognition of his services to the nation, the first national Government, of Gamal Abdel Nasser has presented £ 20,000 to Arabi's descendants.²

Among other prominent figures of the Movement, those who took leading part were: Ali ar-Rubi, the founder of the secret Society of army Officers; Mahmud Fehmi, who worked out, on the part of the nationalists, the whole strategy of the battle, Tulba Ismat, Abd al-Al Hilmi and Ali Fehmi. Sami had also entered the battle field when the necessity of defence arose; but he is better judged as a Civilian leader. Mahmud Fehmi (b. 1839) had joined the Sami Ministry as the Minister of War. He was among those top-leaders who were exiled to Ceylon, where he wrote a book called, "al-Bahr az-Zakhir fi Tarikh al-Alam wa Akhbar al-Awa'il wa'l-Awakhir." He died in Ceylon in July, 1894. Tulba Ismat, who was also exiled to Ceylon, died in February 1900, two months after coming back to Egypt. Ali ar-Roubi was exiled to the Sudan, where he lost his sight and health

1. Beaman, op.cit., p. 30

2. Gunther, "Inside Africa", p. 193, f.n.

and died there in 1891. Ali Fehmi was the most trusted friend of Arabi, and he did not leave him alone even in his exile. Among the exiled, there was Yaqub Sami also who was not originally so prominent a figure; but when the actual war broke out, he headed the Committee of Defence and organised the campaign. He died there in Ceylon, in 1900¹.

Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi, the ex-President of the Council of Ministers was also on the battle field, and at last had to retire with other comrades-in-arms. After the trial, he was also exiled to Ceylon. He returned to Egypt in the middle of 1899, and died in December 1904².

Among other important figures, an outstanding name is that of Sulaiman Sami. Among the top-leaders, he was the only exception who was hanged; he was the bravest of all³.

Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) had also joined the Movement in its last phase. While still in his early twenties, he had come under the influence of the dynamic personality of al-Afghani, and ever since he was against despotism and corruption just as the Officers were. But he took an exception and supported the Enlightened Despotism, such as that of Ri'az Pasha. With other sincere Civilian

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 503-10, 529; 511-12, 491; 590; 497; 530; 528

2. Royle, op.cit., p. 208, f.n.; Landau : op.cit., p. 97

3. Blunt, "Secret History", p. 465; "Gordon at Khartum", pp. 24-25.

nationalists, he had at last joined the Arabi Movement; but actually he never adhered to it whole-heartedly, as is evident by his curses which during his imprisonment, he showered upon the Leader of the Movement¹. Muhammad Abduh was also punished with a simple exile for three years. While serving the sentence, he praised the Khedive, and was able to revive the 'old spirit' only after meeting al-Afghani once again in Paris. Soon afterwards, he again changed and fell back, when in 1889, ~~the~~ he was allowed to come back to Egypt and was appointed the Grand Mufti of the country².

Prince Halim is considered by some of the writers on Modern Egypt, as the moving spirit of the Arabi Revolt. Halim was the last surviving son of Muhammad Ali and was a year younger than the Khedive, Isma'il³. He is said to have had "the voice of all the Egyptians"⁴ to hail him. To add to his right, Arabi puts forward his case, he had "for a long time undergone trials of a very grave nature, having been subjected to tyranny."⁴ Halim seemed to have been revered by the Fellah Officers, or at any rate, by Arabi. But it would be incorrect to describe him as the man who

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1. Rashid Reza: op.cit., vol. I, pp. 150-56 Abduh's "Qasidah fi'th-thaurat al- 'Arabiyya"
 2. Rafi'i, pp. 520-26
 3. de Leon, "The Khedive's Egypt", pp. 253, 261; See also Halim's own remarks introducing himself as: "the last surviving son of Mehemed Ali", "an Egyptian not without honour", amongst his people, "who know that my understanding of them is as true as my sympathy." See Halim, op.cit., p. 733.
 4. Arabi's letter, in Blunt, op.cit., p. 548

directed or sponsored the Revolt led by the Fellah Officers¹. Allusions have been made to his continuous intrigues and plots in 1877 and the following year². In addition, some more concrete evidences might be supplemented, as given by some contemporary writers: Describing the causes of the Arabi Revolt, Malet has referred to Halim as one of the main force working from behind. He also hints at Taufiq's fear of being replaced by Halim during the crisis of May 1882³. De Leon has made allusion to a visit of Halim to London, in the last days of Isma'il, perhaps in connection with the question of succession⁴. Again, Arabi himself was an ardent

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1. To the author of "Parliaments and Parties in Egypt", it is unimaginable to think that the National Movement must have devoid of some highly-placed well-educated person to lead it; and that man was Prince Halim himself. To make his argument strong, Landau details the charges of conspiring against Isma'il, though he also lays down that Halim always denied the charges. Again, he argues that this was the *raison d'etre* of his exilement by the order of Isma'il. Actually it seems to be quite a simple case of family-feud, and the frustration after the change of Law of Succession in favour of the son of Isma'il as against Halim, was the simple reason of such activities. After all, no movement with personal motives, with little following in the country, should be described as a National Movement, and Halim as its sponsor. Moreover, most of his concrete subversive activities belong to the period not later than 1869. Even the most important document discovered by Landau, belongs to the year 1868. (i.e. Letter of Col. Hasan Pasha to Halim detailing a list of ammunition necessary for a projected revolt against Isma'il). Again even that document does not go beyond proving Halim's alleged conspiracy against Isma'il, and that also in his personal capacity, and not as the leader of any mass movement. See Landau, pp. 77-80
 2. Landau, op.cit., p. 77
 3. Malet, op. cit., p. 286
 4. de Leon, op.cit., p. 253: writing in 1877, de Leon says, that Halim "was in London recently for about a short time."

admirer of the Prince¹, and Dufferin's accusation that the Fellah Leader had indirect relations with the Prince through al-Aqqad might have had some basis². But inspite of all these facts, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that Halim was the ~~man~~ who initiated, sponsored, or led the Movement. The Fellah Movement was the simple natural outcome of the conditions that prevailed in the country. If Halim also appeared at the stage, it was simply due to his personal motives, apparent in his struggle against the Khedives. In this^y perspective, his activities become definite and clear. The sponsorers of the Movement, if this 'pre-requisite' is essential to presume, were the down-trodden masses themselves who wanted to become free from the native as well as from the foreign yoke and exploitation. It was the army, led by the Fellah Officers, which was the sole spirit behind the movement. Nothing was preplanned or chalked out beforehand. There is no evidence of any direct relation with some secret society or organised political group. They, all, joined the movement, while it began as a natural product of the development of the affairs, and in the full sway of the Movement, they created for supporting the movement a nominal political party, National Party by name, which was anything but a political Party in the sense the word implies. The entire movement should be studied^d in this perspective.

1. Blunt: "Gordon at Khartum", pp. 547-48: Arabi's letter
2. Ibid., p. 571

CHAPTER IV

OCCUPATION AND REACTION

" We are the descendants of the empire-builders, and hold, in trust for posterity, a sacred cause: Our Pax Britannia may claim its martyrs..... "Loyalty to our Queen and Constitution, faith in our pacific mission and pride of race are our highest traditions."

_____ White: "The Expansion of Egypt", pp. 443, 444

" A few hundred English officials laid down the law to the Egyptian people, although every Government Act bore the signature of an Egyptian Minister acting in the name of the Khedive.... (It) resulted in demoralisation of the Egyptian nation, though Egyptian finances were put on a sound basis."

_____ Felix Valyi: "The Revolutions in Islam", pp. 189-19

The year 1883 commenced with an ambiguous British policy in Egypt. Egypt had come to them not as a preplanned share in the spoil of war, but only accidentally when circumstances led them in the direction of the occupation of that country. It is for this reason that they were not quite clear with regard to their attitude and policy towards this new part of their Empire. The Foreign Office Despatch of November 3, 1882, was a hesitating, ambiguous and vague document which spoke at length and still said nothing.

" ... Her Majesty's Government while desiring that British occupation should last for as short a time as possible, feel bound not to withdraw from the task thus imposed on them, until the administration of affairs has been reconstructed on a basis which afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, for the stability of the Khedive's authority, for the judicious development of self-government, and for the fulfilment of obligations towards foreign Powers...."¹

Much could easily be read between the lines of these directive principles. It implied a veiled possession of the country for an indefinite period. The principles were reiterated in the Despatch of January 3, 1883, with a diplomatic explanation of their position in Egypt.

" In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty Government are placed towards His Highness (the Khedive) imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall, be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress."²

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1. cit. Colvin, "The making of Modern Egypt", pp. 29-30; see also despatch of Lord Dufferin to the Foreign Office dated February 6, '83. Cited by Roswell in the Nineteenth Century, June, '83, in his article "The English in Egypt", p. 1064
 2. Appendix IIX

Henceforward, the system of the duty of giving advice to the Khedivial Government was elaborated to its fullest extent. Lord Dufferin, who was sent to reorganise the government and administration of Egypt, stayed there for about six months (November 7, 1882- May 1, 1883) and after a study of the situation on the spot, prepared an extensive report in the form of recommendations to be adopted by the Khedivial Government, in the new set-up of the country. These recommendations were decreed by the Khedive on May 1, '83 as the new Organic Law of Egypt. The Law created a Council of States, a Legislative Council, a General Assembly, and the Provincial Councils. (Art. 1). The Legislative Council was to be composed of thirty members of whom fourteen permanent members, including one vice-President of the Council, were to be the nominees of the Khedive and his Government. (Arts. 30, 31); of the remaining sixteen, fourteen were to be elected by fourteen Provincial Councils from amongst their own members and one each from Cairo, Alexandria and some other less important constituencies. (Art. 32). The duration of this Council was for a period of six years; it was authorized to discuss that part of the budget which was not concerned with the Tribute to the Porte or international obligations. (Arts. 18, 22, 23 and 32). The Government, however, had the right to reject any of its suggestions, explaining the reasons thereof. Normally, the

Council was to meet each alternative month and was to be convened and prorogued by the Khedive. (Art. 26)¹.

The Legislative Assembly of eighty-two members consisted of the Legislative Council, the six Ministers and forty-two directly elected Delegates, for a term of six years. (Arts. 40-42). The President of the Legislative Council was also to preside over the session of the Assembly. (Art. 43). No new taxes could be imposed without the approval of the Assembly. (Art. 34). In other matters, it could only express its opinion, if so required by the Government. (Art. 36). This Assembly was to meet every two years.¹

The Provincial Councils consisting of three to eight members, elected by universal suffrage and presided over by the Governors of the respective Provinces, enjoyed advisory rights in local affairs. (Arts. 2-6).¹

The Council of States was dropped at the instance of Lord Cromer and the initiation of all legislation was assumed by the British Advisor.²

The Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly were endowed with nominal powers. Besides, the number of the nominated members was very large; the peoples were backward, consequently the elected members were to belong to the rich

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1. Rafi'i, "Misr wa's-Sudan" : Full Text of the Law, pp. 191-200; see also Colvin, op.cit., pp. 33-34; Cromer, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 271-73; Milner, "England and Egypt", pp. 379-84; Browne, "Bonaparte in Egypt and Egyptians of today", pp. 126-30; Kohn, op.cit., p. 185
 2. Young, op.cit., p. 151

class, who as a rule, supported the ruling *alique*. Moreover, the Government was not bound to accept any suggestion put forth by the Assembly or the Council. The Khedivial Government consisting of the Khedive and his eight Ministers, was to remain in the name the supreme authority, which in actual practice was to be directed and guided by the British Agent, their chief Advisor, as was implied in the Despatches of the Foreign Office.

In June, 1883, the list of the voters was complete and the total number reached 903,395 ~~ie.~~ 13.28 % of the total population of the country¹. The elections were held under the guarded police supervision inside the police stations, and in most cases, the Governors or the Prefects of the police were the elected candidates. "It could not have been otherwise", remarked an eye-witness².

The new era of British control^Y had dawned upon Egypt. The system of Dual Control ceased by a decree of January 18, 1883. A new post of Financial Advisor was created for the British Controller³, while his French counterpart disappeared from the scene. But France still enjoyed, with other Powers, the extra-territorial rights of Capitulations, and thus was to remain a permanent anomaly and source of trouble to Britain for a long time to come. The British

1. Landau, op.cit., p. 45

2. Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p. 573: Letter dated September 8, 1883, addressed to Hamilton.

3. Royle, op.cit., pp. 224-25

Financial Advisor was entitled to attend Cabinet meetings, to exercise powers of inquiry and to give advice on financial questions. The British Agent and Consul-General was to exercise the duty of the Chief Advisor to the Khedive in the advisory system to be evolved during the coming years.

Concluding his report, Lord Dufferin had written: " Had I been commissioned to place the affairs in Egypt on the footing of an ~~imperial~~ Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent every thing to his will...."¹ Lord Cromer², Sir Elveyn Baring, realized Dufferin's aspirations, perhaps even beyond Dufferin's imagination. Within a decade, the 'masterful hand of the British Resident' brought Egypt to the virtual status of an 'Indian subject State'.

1. cit., Royle, p. 228

2. Sir Elveyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, the writer of two valuable monographs on Modern Egypt, and the British Agent during the most crucial period of British occupation, joined the Royal Artillery in 1858 and began his career from that point. He became the Commissioner of Public Debt in Egypt in 1877-79, and Controller-General of the Egyptian finances in 1879-80. During the period 1880-83, he was very away from Egypt and was the Financial Member of the Council of Vice-Roy in India. Since 1883, he performed his duties as the British Agent and Consul general replacing Sir Edward Malet the ex-Consul-General in Egypt. In 1883, he was made viscount and three^{years} afterwards the Earl of Cromer. He retired from the Agency in 1907. In his retirement, he wrote "Modern Egypt" in two volumes and " Abbas II", published in 1907 and 1915 respectively. He also compiled the collection of his Essays: Literary and Political, some of which also deal with the Egyptian problems. (See Elgood, op.cit., p. 94; Cromer's own scattered narratives; Zetland: "Life of Lord Cromer"; and, Triall: "Lord Cromer: A biography").

All key posts were given to the English. The administration was completely Anglicized at the higher level¹. A British advisor was attached to every Egyptian Minister, whose advice was tantamount to an order. The British Agent was the chief Advisor in this hierarchy, and, as such, the Khedive was also bound to take and obey his advice in all matters of policy. This entire policy was not derived from any writ, decree or law. The British genius was evolving it as a convention and tradition. In name, Egypt was as yet a province of the Ottoman Empire paying annual Tribute and adhering to all time-honoured traditions. The Khedive, as the vassal of the Sultan, was in name the highest authority in Egypt who governed the country with the help of his Ministers and decreed laws with the advice of the Legislature. In reality, however, all power, vested in the British Agent.

" We do not govern Egypt; we only govern the governor of Egypt..."² summed up a British author, making observations on the system of Egyptian government. The actual procedure was that the British advisor would say: " 'I think it advisable that your Excellency should issue such and such an order'.... His Excellency does not always comply with this admonition; but if he refuses too frequently, or on sufficiently serious occasions, the 'advisor' reports the matter to his own real

1. Colvin, op.cit., p. 38; Blunt, " My Diaries ", vol. I, p. 263

2. Low, " Egypt in transition ", pp. 200-201;

chief, the prime advisor, the British Agent, who, if necessary, would carry it to the Khedive; and in that case the minister might be faced by the alternative, *se soumettre ou se demettre*.¹ This was the pattern of the government. A system of "personal rule"² of the British Agent was in evolution. Cromer argued that, incapable of governing itself, the semi-barbarous country was to learn the lessons of government and administration. A Despatch of Foreign Office dated January 4, 1884, was more clear on this point: "It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England, obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course cease to hold their offices."⁴

The British official viewpoint had now become more definite as to their object of stay in Egypt, while in Egypt itself Cromer was competent enough to fill up the gaps in the policy directed to him by the Foreign Office. In this view, inspite of the regular promises of the British Government to evacuate Egypt at their earliest, to talk of

1. Low, "Egypt in transition", pp. 200-201

2. Low: Introduction, xi

3. Cromer, vol. II, p. 383

4. Cit., Colvin, p. 49; see also, Kohn, op.cit., p. 186

evacuation was quite a remote question.¹ He believed in giving a distinctly permanent character to the Occupation."¹

Kheidve Taufiq reigned Egypt as "nominally independent sovereign under virtual British control."² He commanded no respect in his country,³ and was dependant for his maintenance upon Britain. The de facto ruler was Cromer and not Taufiq. "Under Taufiq", said Cromer, "I remained more or less hidden. I pulled the strings...."⁴

The British occupation had taken place by chance. It was simply because France had detached itself at the eleventh hour, that Britain had to proceed alone. Now there was no apparent justification for a permanent occupation as they had avowedly declared that they had come to restore the Khedivial authority. Once the Khedivial authority was restored, they were obliged to leave the Ottoman territory. The Sultan-Caliph was still, in name, the legal sovereign and the overlord of Egypt. The Occupation regime admitted it time and again. Through conventions and negotiations, the port was continuously trying to oust Britain and to vacate Egypt. Other powers were also concerned in the problem, and, as such, Britain deemed it advisable to return the spoil of war to her 'weak friend' rather than to share it with any of her rivals. Britain, however, could not vacate

1. Cromer, op.cit., vol. II, pp. 382-83

2. Dicey, "The Egypt of the future", p. 23

3. Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p. 573

4. Cit. Zealand, "Life of Lord Cromer", p. 192; see also, Pensfold, "Present-day Egypt", p. 143

Egypt without any definite solution, lest other Powers should intervene. It could not, at the same time, annex Egypt as it was also a concern of the others¹.

Speaking in the Parliament on July 24, '82, Gladstone had declared that "Great Britain is sending her troops to re-establish order and to restore to the Khedive the authority that he has lost. She will formally submit to a European Conference the regulation of the Egyptian question."² Again, on August 16, he~~x~~ reiterated the policy: "As soon as order is re-established, we shall submit the Egyptian question to Europe. The Conference of the ambassadors at Constantinople will, and should, resume its sittings."³ But nothing happened. Once the country had been occupied, it was difficult to keep up the humane words. The Question was never submitted to Europe; nor did the Constantinople Conference resume its sittings again. The Powers, specially France, were closely watching the developments and waited for a suitable opportunity to quarrel.

In order to restore the economic position of Egypt, early in 1884, Cromer proposed a loan of £ 9000,000 on the security of Britain and other European Powers. France asked

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1. Annual Register, 1883. p. 17
 2. cit. Elgood, p. 91, f.n.
 3. cit. Elgood, p. 91, f.n.

as a price a prior settlement of the Egyptian question and a definite date of Evacuation, besides an all-Powers guarantee for the maintenance of neutrality of the Suez Canal. After several conferences and continued negotiations regarding the proposed loan, France, at last, temporarily agreed to the proposal on March 18, 1885¹. The ratification of the Convention was an indirect acknowledgement and de facto recognition of British authority over Egypt.

The question of neutrality of the Canal was again raised by France, and continued to claim the attention of Britain, until the Convention of 1888 recognised the right of every nation to use the Canal both in times of peace and war².

Negotiations with the Porte were not resumed for a long time. Lord Northbrook, who was entrusted with the task of working out a solution of the Egyptian enigma, had recommended, after his six-months sojourn in Egypt (from September 1884 onwards), that no definite date of evacuation should be fixed, and that no kind of internationalisation of the Egyptian Question was advisable³. It was not until Salisbury came to power in June, that a genuine effort was made to solve the problem. Soon after he became Prime Minister,

1. Elgood, p. 104; Dicey, "The Story of the Khedivate", p. 371
2. Hurewitz, op.cit., vol. II, p. 250, Text of the Agreement.
3. Dicey, op.cit., pp. 195-202

Salisbury resumed negotiations with the Porte. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was authorized to negotiate an Agreement with the Sultan initially on the basis of securing the military cooperation of Turkey in the Sudan.¹ Afterwards, the British Commissioner was allowed to lay down a scheme of reforms to be carried out under Anglo-Turkish auspices in Egypt, and to provide for the withdrawal of the British Occupation within a term of years, subject in certain circumstances, to eventual Anglo-Turkish re-occupation.² To quote Salisbury: "It is the wish of Her Majesty's Government to recognise in its full significance the position which is secured to His Majesty the Sultan as Sovereign of Egypt by Treaties and other instruments having a force under international law. They are of opinion that the authority of the Sultan over a large portion of the Muhammadan world which exists under his rule will be much assured by a due recognition of his legitimate position in respect to Egypt."³

After many ups and downs, a Convention was signed on May 22, 1887 between the Ottoman High Commissioner, Mukhtar Pasha, and the British Commissioner Wolff. It ensued the defence and reorganisation of Egypt and the withdrawal of the Occupation army within a period of three years; the Ottoman Government was free thereafter to use its right to occupy Egypt

1. cit. Colvin, pp. 146-49

2. Ibid., pp. 146-47; Cromer, vol. II, p. 372

3. Chirol, op.cit., p. 53; Colvin, pp. 145-49

in case of certain emergency, in which case Britain was also authorized to send her troops 'to cooperate' with the Ottoman forces. (Art. 5). The Convention also stipulated that three years after the ratification of the Convention, it would be presented to the European Powers for a general mutual agreement. (Art. 6)¹.

Articles 5 of the Convention which stipulated Britain's right of re-entry was, however, opposed by France and Russia. They threatened that in the event of its ratification by the Sultan, they would occupy Syria and Armenia respectively². At last British High Commissioner returned home without getting the convention ratified by the Porte, while Britain had already given her final sanction to it.

There is no doubt that it was a genuine effort on the part of Britain to solve the Egyptian Question and to vacate the country, and that the chance was lost for many a years to come. The strong opposition front of the Powers, the trouble in the Sudan, and the continuous pledges of Britain to vacate Egypt were the obvious factors, fortunately combined at that time, which had forced Britain to yield so easily.

The Convention failed, no doubt, because its conditions were too harsh to be accepted by the Porte honourably: Circu-

X. Herzitz, vol. II, p. 375;

1. Herzitz, vol. I, pp. 201-202: Text of the Convention; see also, Cromer, vol. II, p. 375; Dicey, op.cit., pp. 413-14

2. Cromer, op.cit., p. 378; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 75; Young, p. 154

stances of re-entry of Britain were hinted out in the Agreement, but it was Britain herself who could judge and decide whether such circumstances existed at a given moment; and such a moment could arrive as and when Britain desired. Anyway, Britain had won the diplomatic battle, and could boast that inspite of her best efforts, the Question could not be solved due to the attitude of the Porte.

The role of the Porte, or rather of these negotiations, in instigating the nationalist feelings among the Egyptian people is nonetheless significant. So long as Wolff's stay in Egypt and Turkey continued, which continued for about three years, there was anxiety as well as dissatisfaction among the Egyptians and a curiosity to see the things beyond as a result of the negotiations.¹

The German Foreign and Diplomatic Papers of the following year (1889) give some information about the possibility of resumption of the Anglo-Turkish talks. In 1890 again there was a continuous exchange of letters. But now Britain insisted in stronger terms on its right of re-entry, and declined to fix any definite date of Evacuation. Germany on behalf of the Porte, made diplomatic efforts to avoid the question of fixation of a definite date of Evacuation, and emphasised on the settlement of the question

1. Wood, " Egypt under the British ", p. 62

of Turkish sovereignty. But the Porte, once again under the French influence, refused to negotiate on these lines.¹

After the break-down of these negotiations, there was a period of inactivity for a while. Cromer, under Salisbury's Government, was left without any definite policy except that of waiting and watching². But a staunch Imperialist as he was, Cromer, inspite of all difficulties, pursued his ideas. He followed his own policy of making Egypt virtually a dependency of Britain. He organised a press-campaign in favour of Occupation, and weakened the nationalist forces which could emerged again as a strong opposition.³ After the failure of the Wolff's Mission, he was in a better position to carry on his policy ahead.

As in other parts of the Empire, in Egypt also, the Empire builders tried to turn the country into a market for raw materials. Like India, it was declared as only an Agricultural country, and all efforts for development were made in that field. Factories for armament, paper, and cotton were closed down, and cottage industries were discouraged. Soon, Egypt had turned into a mere supplier of raw-cotton to Lancashire⁴. Europeans were generously encouraged to start factories and invest money in establishing companies for trade, commerce and industry. This was an additional blow to the national economy.

1. German Foreign and diplomatic documents; pp. 60, 66, 68

2. Blunt, " My Diaries ", vol. I, December, 1888, p. 15

3. Ibid., p. 54

4. Rafi'i, pp. 17, 182-88; Confession of the fact by Cromer in 1905: See Rafi'i, p. 183

As for the financial restoration of the country, as claimed by the British, it was never genuinely done for its own sake, but due to continuous danger of European Powers¹. The creditors' dues had to be cleared some/how or the other. If the British Government were unable to pay it, the Powers on behalf of their respective citizens could intervene at any time. It was thus in their own interest ~~th~~ that the British authorities improved the financial position of Egypt, and though the State Treasury was full, the lot of the masses was never improved. Their condition changed from bad to worse¹. In England, the capitalists and the manufacturers were in their best of humour. They had found a vast market with immense potentialities, which they had to retain at any cost.

11

The victory at Tel-al-Kabir brought to an abrupt end the rising national movement in Egypt. The Imperial hold had come to stay. The policy of the British Government, chalked out on the spot by the masterful hand of Lord Cromer, was so firm and definite that it did not leave any opportunity for the nationalistic tendencies to re-emerge, and at least not until the timid Khedive Taufiq occupied the throne.

1. Rafi'i, p. 184

Arbitrary arrests, confiscation of properties, and imprisonment without trial were the order of the day. The prisons were full of untried persons, and there was no liberty of the press or platform¹. The native strength of the movement had collapsed. Amidst the repeated pledges of the British Government for upholding the autonomy of Egypt and evacuating it at their earliest, new administrative arrangements had already been accomplished at the hands of Lord Dufferin.

The wealthy landowners, always wont to salute the rising sun, bowed before the British authorities, offered them presents, mixed up with them, and thus implicitly acknowledged and recognised their Occupation. Many of the leaders of the Revolt had also reconciled and had submitted their apologies².

Arabic was replaced by English; schools were filled with British teachers and many of the native educational and technical institutions were closed down³. In the first year of Occupation, only £ 99,5,549 were allotted to the budget for education, which sum decreased in the following years.⁴ The education imparted was so mutilated that the new generation became estranged to ideas of patriotism and did not form any conceptions of rights or privileges.

1. Colvin, p. 28

2. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 176; see also Blunt, op.cit., p. 47, on the situation in September, 1883: "About the actual conditions of things in Egypt Sanua told me there were two parties, the Clerical which looked to Constantinople for help, and the lay which was powerless because it had no leader".

3. Ibid., p. 179

4. Ibid., p. 181. In 1891, the budget allotted to education had decreased to £ 88,478

As for the peasantry, they had returned to their fields, and it seemed as though they had succumbed to their fate. However, they still adhered to Arabi, who, they thought, would have delivered them from the usurers and the Pashas¹. Even the reforms introduced by the new regime were looked upon as simply the initiation of the original plan of Arabi himself². There were others who regretted the failure of Arabi, whereas the Fellahin of the remoter districts cared little for politics as they still had the traditional respect ~~for~~ for the Khedive. Yet many of them beleived that Arabi would come back and deliver them. Arabi, inspite of his misfortune, was popular in Cairo and in other towns³. " I have heard ", writes Blunt, "people complain of him for his conduct in the war, for his neglet of blocking the Suez Canal, for his praying when he ought to have been fighting and for his running away at Tel al-Kabir. But they talk kindly of him, as the first fellah who ever held supreme power in Egypt...."⁴ Even as late as 1888-89, there was a strong movement in favour of the recall of Arabi, which Arabi while Cromer and the Khedive were totally opposed to any such idea⁵. Gradually, the masses " were bñing more reconciled to the state of affairs."⁵

1. Cromer, op.cit., p. 187

2. Ibid., p. 191

3. Ibid., pp. 191-92; Blunt, op.cit., pp. 577-78

4. Blunt, " My Diaries ", pp. 20,40

5. Ibid., p. 38 quoting Muhammad al-Moelhi on June 12, 1890

On the whole, there was little chance of the re-emergence of the national movement from any quarter of Egypt, as long as this state of affairs continued.

111

However, the trouble started in from unexpected quarter, namely, the Sudan, an annexee to the Khedivate of Egypt since the days of Muhammad Ali, and being governed through a Governor-General appointed by the Khedive, ³⁴ was now in revolt against the authority of Egypt, or rather against the authority of foreign Power that dominated it. "Scarcely had the Arabi revolt been suppressed ", says Royle, "than troubles which had arisen in another quarter called for attention. Towards the end of October 1882, Abdel Kader Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, telegraphed from Khartoum that the troops which he had sent against the Mahdi had been cut off, and that a force of 10,000 men should be sent as reinforcement, otherwise he would be unable to defend the town."¹

Among the main causes of uprising in the Sudan, the suppression of ~~Y~~slavery was one,² the Arabi Revolt was the second³, the fear of foreign or rather Christian Occupation was the third⁴, and misgovernment the last⁵.

1. Royle, op.cit., p. 210

2. Ibid., p. 213; Many tribes of slave-hunters were with the Mahdi. see Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 89

3. "Telegrams were actually sent them by Arabi, ordering them not to recognise the authority of the Khedive." See Royle, p. 213

Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, the leader of the rebellion, was a pious man who preached the gospel of Mahdi'ism. In August 1881, at the age of twenty-six, he had declared himself as the Mahdi¹. He soon succeeded in getting a large following². But the Sudanese Governor-General did not become aware of the significance and the consequences of the uprising until July 1881. Meanwhile, the Mahdi's following had swelled to huge numbers, and when in August 1881, the first force was sent to suppress them, it was easily defeated³. Another expedition in the following December was also an utter failure⁴. One more campaign was launched in May '82, and with no better results⁵. In January 1883, the Mahdists occupied al-Obaid and henceforward, Mahdi'ism was a political force which took about two decades to be broken up. Al-Mahdi died a natural death in June 1885⁶. Abdullah at-Ta'ayishi became his spiritual successor and Usman Digna took up the military command.⁷

It was, in fact, the landing of the British forces at Alexandria, that turned the Mahdi Movement into a fanatic one⁸. In its dual character, it was analogous to Arabi Movement

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1. Bustani, "Da'irat al-Ma'arif", vol. X, p. 177
 2. Rafi'i, pp. 92-94; Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p. 15
 3. Rafi'i, pp. 94-95; Royle, pp. 214-15; Bustani, op.cit., vol. X, p. 177
 4. Rafi'i, pp. 95-96; Royle, pp. 215-16
 5. Young, p. 133; Royle, p. 217; Rafi'i, pp. 96-97
 6. Rafi'i, p. 131; Young, p. 133; Bustani, vol. X, p. 184
 7. Rafi'i, pp. 140-51
 8. Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p. 16; see also, Halim, op.cit. p. 73. Halim explains them as parallel movements, in Egypt and Sudan

CONTINUED FROM P. 141.

4. "That the European intervention in Egypt in general and the English invasion in particular created the Mahdist movement cannot be proved, but seems probable." See Young, op.cit., p. 13
5. Young, p. 132, citing Col. Steward on Feb. 27, 1883; see also, Rafi'i, pp. 87-88

It started as "the natural rebellion of a people against long ~~against~~ misgovernment and taking later a religious complexion when Christian Europe had intervened in support of the tyrannical ruler against the people.¹ " In a way it was a counterpart of the Arabi movement.²

It is difficult to assess the influence of the Egyptian national movement on the inception of the Mahdi's uprising. The exiled al-Afghani and the defeated Arabi, both, had strong sympathies with the cause of the Mahdi.³ Arabi was among the trusted ones in the eyes of the Mahdi.⁴ As Minister of War, Arabi "had put himself into communication with the Mahdi⁵. Al-Afghani claimed that the Mahdi had confidence in him and that many of his companions and followers had been his students⁶. He gave much importance to the Movement. "The Muslims beleives in Mahdi as the saviour of Islam from non-beleivers", al-Afghani wrote in a letter, "and hence I am unable to understand as to how a peace treaty could be

1. Blunt, op.cit., p. 79

2. Halim, op.cit., p. 738

3. see al-Afghani's al-Urwah, and Arabi's letters in Blunt, op.cit., Appendix B.

4. " If you are resolved to to the Mahdi", Arabi wrote to Blunt from Ceylon, " I must most earnestly entreat you to secure beforehand some letters stamped with my seal, in order that they may serve as the proof that you are a faithful friend of the Moslem world and that you have been instrumental in saving our lives." see Blunt, "Gordon at Khattum", Appendix B, p. 448; Arabi's letter dated June 2, 1888

5. Ibid., p. 77; see also Arabi's Programme in Appendix E, of the same.

6. Ibid., p. 542. Letter of al-Afghani dated April 21, '84

concluded while the English were still in Egypt.¹ " Al-Afghani's paper, al-Urwah, was for the most part devoted to the cause of Egypt and to that of the Mahdi's Sudan. Later, in 1885, al-Afghani was so deeply impressed by the Mahdi that he prayed for his being proclaimed as Caliph at Constantinople.²

In its pure form, the Mahdi Movement was a religious movement, and since a Christian Power controlled Egypt and consequently the Sudan also, the Movement took an anti-British turn. As late as February '85, the anti-British paper, Bosphore Egyptien, published a proclamation in Arabic, reported to have been issued by the Mahdi in which he invited the Egyptians to join his cause³. Although it was alleged as being spurious, the Proclamation betrayed at least a genuine desire on the part of the Egyptian intelligensia to support the cause of the Mahdi, or else it would not have been published in vain by the Paper.

During the winter of 1888-89, the most popular figures among the Fellahin of Egypt were those of Abdullah, the successor of the Mahdi, and Usman Digna, his fighting lieutenant⁴. "The popular imagination amongst the fellahin

1. Ibid., p.545: Letter of al-Afghani dated April 28, '84.

2. Ibid., p. 492

3. Rafi'i, pp. 163-64; Milner, op.cit., p. 120

4. Blunt, op.cit., p. 16. The position was not changed till 1884 when Muhammad Abduh told in his interview to the Correspondent of Pall Mall Gazette, that the Mahdi "has the sympathy of the masses because they see in him a deliverer from Christian aggression." see Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum," p. 624

credited these with heroic qualities and it was confidently beleived that the Dervish forces would before long ^{overrun} Upper Egypt.¹

Since the political repercussions of the Mahdist Movement reacted against the British, the Porte also seemed to be in sympathy with the cause².

iv

"The English Government is attempting an impossible task", Arabi remarked while in exile in November, '83. "They wish to make Tewfik popular and they wish to introduce reforms. But Tewfik will only remain popular as long as he is supported by the English troops; and when those are withdrawn, he will fall. Personally, Tewfik is without a friend in Egypt. The Egyptians hate him for having betrayed his country and the Circassians despise him for having betrayed his religion. The better he is to the English the less chance he has of conciliating his Countrymen."³

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1. Blunt, op.cit., p.16. The position was not changed ~~in 1884~~ when Muhammad Abduh told in his interview to the Correspondent of Pall Mall Gazette, that the Mahdi "has the sympathy of the ~~Egypt~~ masses because they see in him a deliverer from Christian aggression." see Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p.624
 2. Blunt, "My Diaries," vol. I, p. 13: Evidence of a nephew of Isma'il residing at the Porte.
 3. The Times, December 13, 1883; Blunt, op.cit., p. 518; see also pp. 576, 577

Even six or seven years after the Occupation, the popular attitude towards the Khedive had not undergone any considerable change¹. They looked down upon him, hated him, but the reign of terror could not allow anyone to express his real feelings. Taufiq, who was no less an antagonist to the national movement than Lord Cromer himself, had become wiser and more thoughtful with the passage of the time. The British Agent tightened his hold more firmly day by day. Egypt was becoming Anglicized rapidly and Taufiq was helpless to check it. Once on seeing a British soldier passing by, he remarked to one of his Ministers: "Do you suppose that I like this? Why, every time that I pass a British soldier in the street, I long to get out and take him by neck."² Such reactions on his part, however, do not seem to have been motivated by any noble nationalist sentiments, but by his selfish interest in his personal rule which Britain had restored only to control herself. Otherwise, Taufiq never diverged from the characteristic feature of his nature; he remained 'loyal'³ to the Occupation regime.

The national movement in its wider sense had died down with the exile of Arabi. British was now the supreme power in Egypt. The only checks to her unlimited authority were the Capitulations, France and the Porte. The silent native resistance, besides their hopes of liberation in view of the continuous British pledges to evacuate the country and

1. Ibid., p. 15

2. Dicey, writing in the Nineteenth Century of February, '92 cited by Raw^e, p. 33

3. Moberley Bell summed up Taufiq's Character in the word 'loyal': See "Khedives and Pashas", p. 4; see also, Raw, p. 289

the mutual negotiations of Britain and the Porte to get an honourable solution to that effect, was also a factor to be reckoned with.

France, taking advantage of the Capitulatory rights, made the Occupation regime uneasy. In 1892, there were twenty-five newspapers published from Egypt in European languages, and most of them were in the French language. They attacked British policy and administration in Egypt, and lost no chance of fishing in the troubled waters. Important among these papers were Sphinx, Phare d'Alexendrie, and Bosphore Egyptien.¹ Even an Arabic paper, al-Ittihad al-Misri, was being edited by a Frenchman in 1886².

Bosphore Egyptien was the most offensive of all these papers. It had been started from Cairo in pre-Occupation days³. It exploited every chance to instigate the Egyptians against Britain. In the crisis-period of 1881-82, it had openly supported the national movement led by Arabi.⁴ In February '85, the proclamation emanating from the Mahdi, already alluded to, was published in this paper⁵. It was closed down by the Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister under the new regime⁶;

1. Rae, pp. 243-44, 245-46

2. Landau, p. 104

3. Rae, p. 240; Colvin, p. 115

4. Rae, p. 297

5. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 163-64; Colvin, p. 116; Milner, p. 129. Milner gives the month as April instead of February.

6. Under Occupation Sherif was the first Premier; Nubar replaced him.

but the Capitulatory rights came in between, and Nubar had to take back his order¹. After about seven years, a contemporary writer cited some more examples of its being a permanent agitating element in the Egyptian politics: In the issue of January 4, '92, the Paper ridiculed the so-called reforms brought about by the Occupation regime. The entire structure stood on sand, it remarked². The same language was repeated in the issue of January 8, '92. On January 21, the Paper published another article of the same nature. About the English it remarked: "We see but a single category of individuals in Egypt that can hope to fish in the troubled waters...."³

As for the native Press, it was too feeble to come out with such boldness. In 1892, there were twenty-one newspapers in Arabic issued from Cairo and Alexandria, and only a few of these were important enough to be described by any contemporary writer, and fewer still which dared to criticize the Government⁴. Al-Mugattam, which started in

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1. Milner, p. 120. On February 29, 1884, the Egyptian Government issued orders to suppress the paper. But Capitulations came in the way. "For thirteen months, the Government put up with the open defiance of its authority. But when at the beginning of April, 1885, the Bosphore published a pretended proclamation of the Mahdi inciting to rebellion in Egypt, and on the day following ... reproduced the document in an Arabic translation, the cup of endurance overflowed."
 2. Rae, p. 241
 3. Rae, pp. 240-41
 4. See Rae, Hartman and Browne.

March 1889, was a pro-Occupation paper edited by Syrian Christians¹. In the Pall Mall Gazette of October 14, '91, an interview of Dr. Nimar, the editor of this paper, appeared. He said that there was no national activity whatsoever of any kind in Egypt, and as such there was no Egyptian Question².

Al-Ahram and al-Watan were moderately critical of the existing state of affairs, and al-Ahram supported France and Turkey.³

Another paper al-Muayyad, which started in December 1889, was mildly critical of British policies. It was edited by Ahmad Mazi and as-Sayyid Ali Yusuf, and from November, 1891 onwards, the latter was the sole incharge of the paper. Its policy was nationalist-cum-Islamic, and it played quite a significant role during this period. It campaigned against the foreign hold and kindled the fire of nationalism at a time when pessimism had overtaken the people of Egypt⁴.

v

During the period following the Occupation, the liberation movement of Egypt was represented abroad by the

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1. Sarruf, Nimar and Makarius. See Marshall, "Egyptian Enigma", p. 28, Rae, p. 249
 2. Rae, p. 249; Browne has called it as 'unhealthy influences of British control'.
 3. Rafi'i, pp. 162-63; Rae, pp. 247-48;
 4. Rafi'i, p. 249; Wood, p. 154; Browne, pp. 331-32

weekly al-Urwat al-Wuthqa, of al-Afghani. Interned in Calcutta during the days of Arabi Revolt, al-Afghani was allowed to leave India, and he sailed for England on September 23, '83. On his way from Port Sa'id he wrote to his exiled disciple Muhammad Abduh informing him about his future programme¹. Instead of proceeding to England, al-Afghani reached Paris and there set himself to work for the liberation of Eastern countries in general and Egypt and the Sudan in particular. Abduh had responded to his call and had joined him in Paris. They founded an International organisation, al-Jam'iyat al-Urwat al-Wuthqa by name. It was a secret political society and al-'Urwah was made its organ². Al-'Urwah was despatched to every Muslim country and to eminent politicians of the world. Among its main objectives were: resistance to and freedom from Imperialism, revival of the golden period of the Orthodox Caliphate by the establishment of Islamic rule, and bringing out reforms in Islamic faith; the immediate object was, of course, the liberation of Egypt and the Sudan.³

Al-'Urwah was edited by Muhammad Abduh and al-Afghani together. The character of the paper was not different from that of director of the policy of the paper, al-Afghani himself, who was a staunch anti-Imperialist, had frequently visited and resided in many Islamic countries, and had political connections with most of these countries. Hence he conceived the entire Muslim world as an organic whole. To him, the political problems of Iran, Afghanistan or India were the same as those of the Sudan, Egypt or Turkey, the only difference being that of degree. Broadly speaking, all these countries

1. Rashid Reza, "Tarikh al-Ustad al-Imam", vol. 1, pp. 281-82

2. Ibid., pp. 283-288

3. Ibid., p. 283

were confronted with the same question, namely, how to face Imperialism. Al-Afghani's sole aim was to awaken the political consciousness of the people and to create unity amongst them so that they might be able to oppose Imperialism of Russia, France and Britain. The question of Egypt and the Sudan was, however, an immediate one as it was resulted from the latest Imperialist moves.

Al-'Urwah claimed that its aims were in no way sectarian. "The objective is to awaken the Eastern people in general and the Muslims in particulars to the danger of foreign domination.... The particularization in addressing to the Muslims is because they comprise the majority of the inhabitants of those countries which have been dominated by the foreigners," al-Urwah explained ~~the~~ its policy¹.

The first issue of the journal appeared on March 13, 1884, and the last on October 16 of the same year. Al-Afghani was the director of the policy (Mudir as-Siyassat), and Abduh was its editor-in-chief. Mirza Muhammad Baqir of Iran was assistant ~~of~~ to the editor and translated news from the European press². Rashid ^{Rifa} ~~Reza~~ asserted, on the authority of Amir Shakib Arsalan, that the contents of the paper were of al-Afghani, whereas the writing was that of Abduh's³. Most probably, the form and the matter were the result of their combined efforts.

1. Al-Urwat al-Wathqa, May 15, '84, p. 190

2. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p. 81

3. Rashid ~~Reza~~, vol. I, p. 289

Abduh, no doubt, belonged to an Arabic speaking country by birth, and al-Urwah¹ was in Arabic. But he lacked the qualities of the dynamic personality of al-Afghani, in whom a statesman, a thinker and a journalist were fused in one. Moreover, al-Afghani had the opportunity of residing in Egypt for about nine years, and for an intelligent person as he was, this period is sufficient to acquire a thorough knowledge of, and a command over, the Arabic language¹. Al-Urwah, in its entirety betrays the spirit of al-Afghani rather than of Abduh or anyone else, and it is not ex^ageration to say that in every page and every composition of the journal, al-Afghani's voice was clearly discernible².

It is interesting to note and signifies the importance of the paper that even before it started, the news of its publication had alarmed the Imperialists who were annoyed with the very idea of such paper. British papers, launched a campaign against it, warning their Government to take step beforehand³.

Apart from the problems of India, Aghanistan, Iran and Turkey, and the news in brief of the most important events of the world, greater part of the journal was devoted to Egypt and the Sudan. On the Egyptian Question, al-'Urwah

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1. On al-Afghani's stay in Egypt, see above, p. 111
 2. It is significant that Muhammad Abduh, after departing from al-Afghani, never wrote anything in that particular forceful style of al-'Urwah which style may easily be distinguished among the contemporary Arabic writings of the period.
 3. Al-'Urwah, April 10, 1884, pp. 112-13

expressed the view that the sovereign rights belonged to the Sultan-Caliph. It admitted that Egypt had become a concern of the Powers due to its financial obligations as also by virtue of possessing the maritime highway through the Canal. Keeping this situation in view, al-'Urwah proceeded on its mission, attacking the maladministration, caused by the Occupation regime and the tyranny and injustice, perpetrated by the Imperialists, and encouraged its readers to rise against slavery and foreign domination.¹

Its main objectives were "the preservation of the independence of the Eastern people, and the admonishing of the English Government,"² But the main emphasis always remained on the Egyptian Question. In fact, on one occasion al-'Urwah declared the defence of Egypt as its main objective. Most of the editorials were written on the Egyptian Question, wherein the Occupation was criticized and the situation was analysed scientifically so as to inculcate among the Egyptians the spirit of revolt. Instigating the people to rise against the Occupation, it emphatically proclaimed that to defeat the Occupation forces was an affair hardly of a few days³.

There is no evidence, however, of the actual influence it exercised on Egypt or the reactions it caused

1. Rashid Reza, vol. I, p. 331

2. Letter of Abduh to Blunt, dated April 11, '84 Blunt, "Gordon at Khartum", p. 541

3. Al-Urwah, August 3, '84, p. 60; Al-Urwah, September 24, '84 pp. 203-204

there. This much is certain that the Paper was banned by the Egyptian Government¹, which indicates that it did exercise considerable influence.

Besides leading the campaign for Egyptian freedom through the press, al-Afghani and Abduh continued their struggle through talks with influential personalities in political circles and by issuing statements in various papers of England. In August '84, Abduh visited London, met the top-politicians there, and argued with them over the genuineness of the Egyptian cause. Again, interviewed by the Correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette on August 17, he said: "We Egyptians of Liberal party believed once in English liberalism and English sympathy; but we believe no longer for facts are stronger than words..... You have ruined everything that was good in us so that you may have an excuse for keeping possession of our country..... Before the war and during the war, we quarreled with each other. We wished to break down the tyranny of our rulers; we complained of the Turks as foreigners; we wished to improve ourselves politically and to advance as the nations of Europe have advanced in the path of liberty. Now we know that there are worse evils than despotism and worse enemys than the Turks; We see in them our brothers in religion, not in race and if you would only leave us alone with them we should know how to get on in peace."²

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1. Ibid., May 22, 1884 pp. 212-214
 2. Blunt. Op.cit., p. 623

After making a strong plea for Evacuation, Abduh argued for the appointment of a new ruler for Egypt for a term of a few years, and finally the people would elect their ruler themselves. However, his visit proved of no avail. He returned to Paris dejected and disappointed. Al-'Urwah wrote about this mission and enumerated with deep regret the causes of its failure. The essence of al-'Urwah's appraisal was that the Imperialists were not going to leave their possession so easily¹.

From July to October 1885, al-Afghani was in London. With the combined efforts of Blunt, Lord Randolph Churchill and al-Afghani, Wolff had been agreed to take al-Afghani in his company to Constantinople with a view to get his assistance in the Anglo-Turkish negotiations². Wolff, however, changed his mind at the eleventh hour and informed about it on August 15. The chances of an honourable agreement were lost³.

On the whole, throughout the period under review, the liberation movement continued to remain weak. Al-'Urwah, at least deserves a high place as regards its role in the entire struggle. Its struggle did not bear fruits in its lifetime, but, certainly, it had some significant far-reaching effects, and it must have had its influence in creating in the next generation some bolder and most powerful fighters for the cause of their country.

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1. Al-Urwah, August 14, '84, pp. 113-14
 2. Blunt, op.cit., p. 475-78
 3. Ibid., p. 481

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF NEW NATIONALISM

"Twenty years before, it was possible to question even the very existence of Egyptians.... But since a tremendous change has occurred. These twenty years that have been passed under the domination of a righteous foreign rule, have helped them reviving the patriotic thinking and its paraphernalia. The Egyptians of today know, as they ought to know, that they have a responsibility towards their Motherland which demands certain duties to be performed."

——— Lutfi Juma: "Tahrir Misr", p.116
(published in 1906)

"My country! my country! For thee,
my love, my heart; for thee my
life and existence, my soul and
blood...; verily thou, thou art
the life, and there is no life
without thee, O Egypt."

——— Kamil
cited by Haikal: "Tarajim", p.1

"Through the spoken word, through the newspapers,
and through the books, I will strive
to awake my countrymen's patriotism,
so as to restore Egypt to the Egyptians
and the Egyptians to Egypt."

——— Kamil
(Letter to Mme. Adam, in 1892
cite, Kohn

On January 7, 1892, the 'loyal' Taufiq died, and with him severed the Englishman's 'admirable link'¹ between Egypt and Britain. Taufiq ruled Egypt only in name. Virtually, he had completely surrendered to, and was under the direct control of

1. Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol. II, p. 331

Cromer¹. Cromer's legal position was that ^{of} primus inter pares in relation to the Consuls of other Powers, and in fact he was the virtual ruler of Egypt. A veiled Protectorate² worked smoothly and Taufiq never dared to resist any attempt of encroachment upon the Khedivial authority.

Abbas Hilmi, a youth of eighteen, succeeded his father Taufiq as the new Khedive of Egypt. He was educated at Vienna, was brought up in a free atmosphere and hence was unfamiliar with the ways and means of the dual government of Egypt. That is why he became a source of trouble to the Supervisors of Egyptian Government. Abbas did not form a good opinion about his loyal father; he revered Isma'il who did not willingly surrender to foreigners³. During his first interview with the Khedive, Cromer found in him a youth who was "going to be very Egyptian."⁴

On his accession, the first thing Abbas had to encounter with was a show of sovereignty on the part of the Sultan. A Caliphal Firman of investiture to each new ruler of Egypt was a time-honoured tradition and a prerogative of the Porte. The sovereignty of the Sultan had been displayed in the case of Isma'il's deposition, and, for a second time, in the negotiations with Britain and with other Powers on the

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1. Dicey, "The Egypt of the future", p. 23; Dicey: " The Story of the Khedivate", p. 337
 2. In 1898, White (A. Silva) asserted that even without a declaration Britain had a Protectorate as France had in Tunis and Madagasear, without any formal usage of that word. See White, op.cit., p. 359
 3. Cromer: " Abbas II ", p. 12
 4. Ibid., p. 4: Letter to Lord Rosebery dated February 21.

Egyptian Question, before and after the Occupation. This time again, the Sultan had the opportunity of making a show of his sovereignty. The incident was not in itself significant but its consequences were far-reaching.

The new Firman of investiture laid down the Egyptian frontiers as "drawn from Suez to El-Arish"¹; the Sinai peninsula was to revert to Turkey. Britain, in its own interest, interfered and the Sultan at last had to surrender.² It took about three months to settle the matter, and after it had come to an end, it had left some permanent impressions on the youthful mind of Abbas as to exploit the sovereignty of the Porte against the British Supervisory regime.

Cromer saw in Abbas an Egyptian patriot, who would be ready to listen to those advisors who would support the idea of an autonomous Egypt³. He hated those Egyptians who had reconciled with the Occupation. He liked Tigrane Pasha because Tigrane was a true Egyptian⁴, but he hated Mustapha Fehmi⁵, who was "too English."⁶ Narrating the events of 1892-93, Blunt observed that the Khedive had "managed to gather about him the nucleus of a new National party which consisted of what elements there were in Egypt either of

1. Cromer: "Modern Egypt", vol. II, p. 268

2. Ibid., pp. 268-69

3. Cromer: "Abbas II", pp. 9-10

4. Tigrane was the son-in-law of Nubar. He collaborated with the political party, "Young Egypt" which was working to get rid off the Occupation and was almost exclusively composed of levantine and Armenian Christians. See Dicey : The Story of the Khedivate; also: Cromer: "Abbas II", p. 11

5. Fehmi, who later became prime minister and proved to be too loyal to Occupation.

6. Cromer, op.cit., p. 10 quoting Abbas, the Khedive.

discontent or of such patriotism as was to be found in the country... which resented the presence of foreign and Christian rule.... By the end of the year 1892, the Young Khedive was already popular with his native subjects...."¹

In August 1892, Liberals again came to power in England. Gladstone's pledge of Evacuation still stood unimpaired. In Egypt, the young Khedive started behaving like a real ruler of the country. He made tours round the provinces, met the Sheikhs and the Ulema, visited academic and other institutions, enquired into the affairs of various branches of administration, and made observations regarding the discrepancies in the departments of Education and Army, and in general administration². Unexpected as such behaviour was to the British Agent, it was most unwelcome and as such was not appreciated. Yet Cromer took matters lightly in view of the changed atmosphere.³

In December 1892, Mustapha Fehmi, the pro-Occupation Premier of Egypt, fell seriously ill. The question of his successor, in the event of his death, perplexed everyone. However, Fehmi improved and got well. But the 'very Egyptian' Khedive had found an opportunity to get rid off the British tooge and he gave orders for his dismissal on January 15, '93, appointing Fakhri Pasha in his place. Along with Fehmi, another Minister of the same group was also dismissed⁴.

1. Blunt: "My diaries", vol. I, p. 104

2. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p. 235

3. Cromer, op.cit., p. 18

4. Dicey, op.cit., p. 461; Cromer, op.cit., pp. 18-21

Cromer saw in these dismissals an obvious intention on the part of the Khedive to give a decisive blow to British influence; he feared that Arabist ideas were being revived under a new garb of Khedivialism¹. He telegraphed the position to the British Foreign Office, stating that " the whole situation not only of the English officers here, but also of English Government will be changed if the Khedive is permitted to act as he has done in this matter...."² Cromer strongly urged his Government to act firmly at least regarding the nomination of the Premier, and the Foreign Office forthwith sent a telegram strongly objecting the appointment of Fakhri and insisting on the maintenanceⁿ of status quo³. At last a compromise was reached. Instead of Fakhri, Riaz was nominated as Premier, to which, Abbas, considering it a lesser evil, gave his consent⁴. For Cromer, neither of the parties had come out with a decisive victory⁵. Perhaps he was not satisfied with his victory at least.

In the meanwhile, Riaz himself had somewhat changed. With an anti-European bias which he had developed, he was keen to see the British influence reduced to the minimum. He encouraged the shadow-representative institutions to assert themselves against the Occupation⁶. He gave his full

1. Cromer, op.cit., p. 33

2. Ibid., p. 23

3. Dicey, op.cit., p. 463; Triall, op.cit., p. 285; Cromer, op.cit., p. 24

4. Dicey, op.cit., p. 462-63; Triall, p. 288; Royle, op.cit., p. 499; Cromer, op.cit., p. 23

5. Cromer, op.cit., p. 27

6. Ibid., pp. 43-45

support to the Khedive in his anti-British activities and observed that " the Khedive's conduct had immensely raised him in the popular estimation and that all the Egyptians were on his side."¹

Abbas had actually become very popular among the masses. The native press described his recent action as a decisive victory over the British Agent². Demonstrations were held in front of the office of the pro-British paper al-Mugattam. Many meetings were organised to condemn the British policies and deputations came to the Khedive to congratulate him on his firm stand³.

At this juncture Abbas thought of exploiting the sovereignty of the Porte and of fighting another duel with Cromer, after securing the support of the Sultan. In the summer of 1893, he visited Constantinople where he endeavoured to enlist the sympathies of the Sultan. Simultaneously, a deputation of the Egyptian Sheikhs arrived to present a petition to their sovereign to save Egypt from the foreigners. But the Sultan, always wavering in his policies, could not muster enough to oppose Britain quite openly. The deputation was treated indifferently and the Khedive was advised to resign himself to the dictations of the fate. Abbas returned

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1. Ibid., p. 36.
 2. an-Nadim's articles in his weekly al-Ustadh under the title "Lau Kuntum Mithluna la F'altum F'iluna" (If you were in our place, you would have done like us "Salaf al-Un-Nadim" vol.II, p.61; See also, Ahmad Amin, op.cit., p.238
 3. Cromer, op.cit., p. 38; Ahmad Amin, p. 238

to Egypt completely disappointed and dejected¹.

In July 1893, Abbas appointed Mahir Pasha as the under-Secretary in the War department, and Mahir set himself to undermine the authority of the British General, Kitchner². In January '94, accompanied by Mahir, Abbas went up the Nile, inspected the native troops, made critical comments on the organisation of the army, and 'insulted British officers.'³ Matters came to a head when on January 19, ~~M~~ Abbas, making various observations in connection with the army, at Wadi~~h~~ Halfa, publicly remarked that "it was in his opinion a disgrace that the Egyptian army should be so insufficient,"⁴ Upon this, General Kitchner launched a formal protest, tendered his resignation and telegraphed the situation to Cromer who was himself in search of a "suitable opportunity for striking a decisive blow."⁵ Now, he could easily allege that the Khedive "had begun to encourage disloyalty and disobedience on the part of the soldiers towards their own officers."⁶ He had found a favourable ground on the basis of which he could inflict upon the Khedive "a severe humiliation than has ever befallen the ruler of Egypt since the days of Arabi."⁷ In a telegram

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1. Cromer, op.cit., pp. 45, 46; Blunt, op.cit., pp. 205, 255-56. To Blunt, Abbas related his failure-visits, and complained after his second visit in 1895, of the indifferent attitude of the Sultan; See also Triall's remark that the reaction of these visits "balanced" the mind of the Khedive, Triall, op.cit., p. 308
 2. Royle, op.cit., p. 50; Triall, op.cit., pp. 301-303
 3. Cromer, op.cit., pp. 51, 57
 4. Ibid., p. 51: Kitchner's Telegram; See also, Blunt, op.cit. pp. 155-59
 5. Cromer, op.cit., p. 50
 6. Ibid., p. 52
 7. Milner, "England and Egypt": Preface, xx

to the British Foreign Office on January 20, Cromer explained the whole situation and asked for sanction to remove Mahir Pasha from his office. The Foreign Office responded to his call and the following day instructions came in the following terms: "The removal of Maher Pasha ... and the issue of an order ... in commendation of British officers and the army is the only reparation which ... the Khedive can make. In the event of his refusing to give just satisfaction, stringent measures must be considered...."¹ At last, the Khedive had to yield and in an open letter expressed his full satisfaction with the General and his organisation of the Egyptian army. Mahir was replaced by a nominee of the General². Soon after, Riaz was replaced by Nubar and, when Nubar retired due to ill-health, the Premiership returned to Mustapha Fehmi in 1895. The Young Khedive seemed to have been exhausted, as he raised no objection against the appointment dictated^{ta} by Cromer.

In the "struggle with Abbas"³, as Cromer puts it, Cromer's diplomacy had seemingly won the day, and as such, Cromer marked the year 1894 as a decisive turning point in the British diplomatic history⁴. Blunt also remarked that the insurgent nationalism died in 1894 only to emerge late in 1906⁵. With Fehmi commenced a new era which was to last

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1. Cromer, op.cit., p.57: Despatch of Rosebery to Cromer.
 2. Ibid., p. 59
 3. Ibid., p. 65: Letter of Rosbery
 4. Ibid., pp. 63-64
 5. Blunt, op.cit., p. 171

for about a decade during which time Cromer was supreme, "governing through merely dummy native Ministers with Mustapha Fehmi at their head."¹ Abbas had completely surrendered to his fate.

In fact, the insurgent movement of 1892-94 was not a national movement. It was a ~~none~~-man struggle for securing his own personal dignity. It had no deep roots amongst the people of Egypt. The middle-class of Egypt had not yet become fully conscious of the political importance of the situation. Yet, this one-man struggle gave some impetus to the popular movement which was still in the making. Moreover, it had emboldened the common man, who, following the example of the aggressive Khedive, had begun thinking in terms of self-respect². He was re-assured that with the backing of the legal ruler of the country, he could now openly criticise the Occupation and its policies. The Khedive, had to quit the battlefield. He had succeeded, however, in creating among the people a critical spirit and a bold Outlook.

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In the pre-Occupation days, the Egyptians were divided mainly into two groups: the Fallahin, mostly belonging

1. Ibid., p. 251

2. Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol.II, p. 200 : Letter of an Egyptian Sheikh dated February 2, 1894

to Muslim faith, and the Turco-Circassians. After the advent of Britain in Egypt, the Turco-Circassian class began to identify its interests with those of the middle or lower middle classes of the natives. This change in their attitude came only after the passage of time. Thus, in sharp contrast to Arabi Movement which signified the struggle of the lower class both against the Europeans and the Turco-Circassians, the post-Occupation period had dissolved to a great extent the class spirit in face of a foreign domination. In the new situation, the leadership was also to be changed. The modernising measures of British administration, and the spreading of Western education since the pre-Occupation days, were giving birth to a new middle class politically more conscious than even the pasha group of the pre-British era. Settled conditions of order, peace and prosperity had made them thoughtful of the problems beyond those of bread and butter. "Already richer than ever in their history, everyone seems to be striving after independence", remarked a contemporary traveller.¹

The new emerging leadership respected the Sultan as their spiritual head but not as their temporal sovereign. Even in the Firman incident of 1892, few Egyptians took the side of the Sultan. Once again, when in 1906 the question of Sinai peninsula arose, strong pro-Turkish feelings were temporarily roused among the people, but they soon vanished

1. Kelly: "Egypt painted and described", p. 231; see also Chirol, op.cit., p. 85; Cromer, p. 14

away and died a natural death¹. They hated foreign yoke, whether it was British or Turkish.

Freedom of press and platform enabled the Egyptians to voice their grievances. "The best gift that England has yet given to Egypt is... the freedom of the Press", observed a naturalized Egyptian writer in the early years of the present century². The Press kept the people informed of political developments in the contemporary Islamic world, outside Egypt. It also increased their knowledge of European culture and institutions. As a result, they became more politically-conscious. The native press was often blunt and harsh towards the Occupation regime, and in its criticism it followed the pattern of the Franco-Egyptian press.

One of the French papers, *Journal Egyptien*, referred to above, published in its every issue "the pledges of Great Britain."³ The following statement was regularly printed in every issue of the paper: "The policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Egypt has no other object than the prosperity of the country and its full possession of the liberty which it obtained by virtue of the successive firmans of the Sultan down to, and including, that of 1879. The tie which unites Egypt to the Porte is, in our conviction, an important safeguard against a foreign intervention; and

1. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, pp. 169-70

2. Browne, *op.cit.*, p. 334; see also Mahbub Alam, edited by Abid Reza, *Burhan*, November 1958; Amritsari, edited by Abid Reza, *'Burhan'*, October 1958

3. Wood, *op.cit.*, pp. 58-59

for that reason our object is to maintain that tie such as it exists today. Any intention on the part of our Government or the other (French or English) to enlarge its influence would be sufficient to destroy this useful cooperation. The Khedive and his Ministers may be rest assured that Her Majesty's Government does not aim at any departure from the line of conduct which it has itself hitherto traced. (Despatch of Lord Granville)."¹

Another paper of this type was Sphinx, which severely criticized the Occupation². The Phare d'Alexendrie was said to have been subsidized by the Khedive so as to work against the Occupation³.

The main period of the French journalistic activities lasted until 1892, but since then it was mainly the native Arabic press which gave the lead, educated the people, informed them with national and international affairs and led the agitation and resistance movement.

In 1892, the total number of newspapers and journals published in Egypt was about fifty⁴. In 1898, the number had reached to about two hundred⁵, and in 1904, it was almost double that number. In 1904, 188 papers were being published in Arabic; of the remaining, fifteen were in Greek, three in French, three in English, six in Italian, three in Turkish, two in French-Arabic-English, two in English-French-Italian, and one in French-Arabic⁶

1. Ibid. pp. 58-59

2. Rae, op.cit., pp. 243-44

3. Wood, op.cit., p. 41; Rae, pp. 245-46

4. Rae, op.cit., pp. 338, 239-40

5. Young, op.cit., p. 180

6. Al-Hilal, January, 1905, p. 542

The Egyptian Press did not only give expression to public opinion and public sentiments. It moulded it too. Political groups were centred round these newspapers which began to be used as party-organs. As a matter of fact, the entire movement for national liberation had been concentrating on using the papers as their mouthpiece, and seemed as though it had turned into a newspaper warfare. Among the leading papers were: al-Muayyad of Sheikh Ali Yusuf (estd. December 1, 1889)¹ and, al-Liwa of Mustafa Kamil (estd. January 2, 1900)²; second in importance were: al-Ahram, Fellah, and the Egyptian Herald, all the three being pro-Turkish³. Abdullah an-Nadim's weekly, Ustadh, (estd. August 23, 1892), might have become the leading paper, had its life not been cut short soon after its inception. It made severe criticism of European culture, and aimed at reform in politics as well as in the society. Besides, encouraged both indirectly and as well as directly by the attitude of the Khedive, al-Ustadh openly opposed the Occupation and its continuation⁴.

As for al-Muayyad and al-Liwa, inspite of their differences in methodology, their objectives were common,

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1. Brown, op.cit., p.154; Al-Manar, October 30, 1913, p. 154
 2. Rafi'i, "Mustafa Kamil", p.68: In the beginning, the Daily contained four pages; but since 1906, the pages were increased to six. The English edition of al-Liwa, "The Egyptian Standard", was started on March 3, 1907, and the French, "L'Etandard", on March 2, 1907
 3. To explain the trend of al-Ahram: it wrote in one of its issues that till the autumn of 1896, within six months, Britain would vacate Egypt. See wood, op.cit., p.119, f.n., 121-122
 4. Ahmad Amin, op.cit., pp.235-38; see also: an-Nadim's article published on January 17, 1893, wherein he analysed the structure of Imperialism and encouraged his countrymen to gather round the Khedive to safeguard their legal rights (Salafat an-Nadim, vol.II, pp.64-83). It may also

CONTINUED.....

namely the education of public opinion and the Evacuation of British forces. They supplemented each other. "In the militant articles of al-Liwa was heard the heart beatings of the nation, while al-Muayyad represented the deep thinking intellect of Egypt."¹ Ali Yusuf was a journalist in the true sense of the word, while Kamil was a political agitator and a public orator, and this was the difference between the two papers. Thus each represented a separate way of thinking and methodology. Ali Yusuf adopted a moderate viewpoint, whereas Kamil was nothing less than an extremist².

Al-Liwa represented the majority of the Egyptians, but before its publication, there was no match to al-Muayyad. Writing about Sheikh Ali Yusuf in 1898, Hartmann wrote: "His paper is a power to be reckoned with. Moslems read it with pleasure, finding in it what most delights their hearts."³

1. Hamza, op.cit., p. 107

2. Al-Manar, October 16, 1913: Article on Ali Yusuf.

3. Hartmann, "Arabic Press of Egypt", pp. 13; H.A. Browne's remark on the paper is worth quoting. The remark comes from his, as a contemporary of Ali Yusuf, who met him. Browne was also a keen observer of the developments of Egyptian politics. The remark is about the year 1907.

"His paper is a power to be reckoned with. Moslems read it with pleasure, finding in it what most delights their hearts...! When I add that this man is a man of thought, of great self-restraint, endowed with patience, energy and perseverance, I have drawn the picture of one who, in any community, must exercise a large influence as a journalist but amidst a people like the Egyptians, so little prone to think for themselves, must indeed be a power to reckon with. As a fact, he has done more to guide and mould Moslem opinion in Egypt than any other ten men that could be named," Browne, op.cit., pp. 331-32; see also, Hamza, pp. 88-9

The spread of education had produced a considerable number of literates among the Fellahin who read the papers and passed on the gist orally within their circles of influence. Contemporary observers confess the influence and popularity of the native press. Everything that appeared in black and white was accepted by the Fellahin, specially if the charge made was one that appealed to their "instinctive dislike and distrust of foreign rulers."¹

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Apart from the journalistic activities, many poets and authors had joined hands with the nationalists in opposing the Occupation. Mahmud Sami al-Baroudi (d. 1904), the leading revolutionary of 1881-82, left his impress on the poets of his age. He had brought about a drastic change in the style and presentation of poetry as also in its subject-matter. The aim was to make poetry as simple real and natural as possible². The new generation had emerged as more humanist

1. Dicey, "The Egypt of the Future", p. 195

2. Umar ad-Dasuqi, "Mahmud Sami al-Barudi", pp.34-35, 45, 51-52

Continued from p. 168.

be noted that the article appeared amidst the duel between Cromer and Abbas, on the question of appointment of prime minister. The duel had awakened the Egyptians to the danger of dissensions caused by the Occupation. See also Ahmad Amin, p. 238

and practical. Among them was Khalil Matran (1870-1949), a nationalist poet of a very high calibre. He composed the first non-official national anthem for the Nationalists¹. Hafiz Ibrahim (1871/72 - 1932), the soldier-poet had devoted his entire potentialities to the cause of the liberation of Egypt. He was among those eighteen officers who had rebelled in the Sudan in 1899. He wrote inspiring nationalist poetry in satire and wit. His ode on the 'Dinshawai Tragedy' stirred the Egyptians and precipitated the fall of Cromer. Hafiz was a close friend of Kamil, Muhammad Abduh and S'ad Zaghlul; and inspite of his less polished diction, his compositions bore the stamp of a staunch nationalist². Ahmad Shawqi (1868-1932), who for many years was against any kind of nationalistic activities, and had ridiculed Arabi and his movement in his verses, turned into a patriot after the death of the 'loyal' Khedive Taufiq. He became very close to Kamil, who appreciated his poetry. Inspite of an aristocratic tinge in his poetry, he soon became rival of Hafiz in patriotic poetry. Pride in ancient history and the glories of Islam and Arabic language were his chosen subjects.³ Among the other nationalist poets of lesser

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1. Islamic Culture, April, 1949. Article on 'Hafiz Shawqi and Matran'
 2. Ahmad Amin: Introduction to the Divan of Matran, pp. (in Arabic) j,k,m,kh,gh; see also, Ghorbal, "Tarikh al-Mufawaza al-Britainia", vol. I, p. 32
 3. See Shawqiat: 4 vols.

importance, the names of al-Hashif al-Ghayati, and Isma'il Sabri are worth mentioning¹.

The nationalist poetry of this period is full of vigour and enthusiasm. The compositions of all these poets on the events of national importance, such as Dinshawai, Cromer's fall, and lately, the Suez issue and the murder of the Copt Premier Butrus Ghali, are the typical examples of such poetry².

Prose writings of the period also contributed to a certain extent to national awakening, but not as much as poetry did. Apart from the works of Kamil, and the writings of famous journalists, small amount of political literature was produced in prose. The Syrian refugee Abd ar-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) is a solitary example who, in 1899, wrote his famous monograph Taba'i al-Istibdad, a critique to Islamic States, and Umm al-Qura, a critique to Islamic people. The works proved to be most effective and gave an impetus to new revolutionary thoughts in the coming generation³.

Most of the prose-writings of any worth deal with the social rather than the political problems of the country. Among such writings those of Muhammad Abduh⁴ (d. 1905), and Qasim Amin (1865-1908) are representative ones. Qasim Amin was the pioneer worker for the emancipation of woman in Egypt. In 1899 and 1900, he published his "Tahrir al-Mar'at"

1. Hamza, op.cit., pp. 84-97

2. See Divan of Matran; Shawqiayat; Divan of Hafiz

3. Antonius, "Arab Awakening", pp.95-98; Md. Husain, op.cit., pp. 251-268

and ^{al-}Mar'at al-Jadida", which exercised a great influence on contemporary social thinking¹. Abduh's main interest was in the problem "how to bring Islam and its ways into harmony with modern society²." To achieve this end, he made efforts to carry out reforms in al-Azhar and its curriculum. As a matter of fact, his famous Tafsir of the Quran, edited by his disciple, Rashid Reza, is also a complementary work with the wider aspects of Abduh's aims. Next in importance was Tal'at Harb, the author of Tarbiyat al Mar'at; then Farid Wajdi, a prolific writer on the subjects of religious and social reforms; and lastly, the entire al-Manar group which, though reactionary in politics, had distinct progressive ideas on social and religious reforms³.

The word 'reform' was so much in vogue that it became a journalistic term of daily use⁴. The reformist movement advocated by prominent authors and journalists included some of the Government officials also, e.g. Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, who translated the book "Sirr Taqaddum al-Injliz", in 1899, and wrote a thought-provoking Introduction

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1. Haikal, "Tarjim", p. 164; Muhammad Husain, op.cit., pp. 278, 291-93
 2. Cromer, "Modern Egypt", vol. II, p. 182
 3. Hamza, op.cit., p. 40
 4. Ibid., p. 39

Continued from p. 172.

4. In his new role, Muhammad Abduh never revived the old spirit of an active political career. After Reconciliation, his entire life in Egypt was spent in socio-religious reforms, which, however, had no significant direct bearing on the development of nationalism as such.

to it, wherein he dwelt on the cause of the Egypt's backwardness and inferiority in comparison to the West, which according to him mainly lay in ignorance and illiteracy¹

Inspired by this translation, Muhammad Umar produced in 1902 an original work entitled "Hadhir al Misriyyin au sirr Ta'akhhurihim" ("The present state of the Egyptians or The cause of their retrogression"), with an introduction by Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul. Umar divided the Egyptians into Upper, Middle and Lower classes, diagnosed the maladies of each class and discussed their remedies².

Lutfi Jum'a's "Tahrir Misr" followed these pioneer works, and was published in 1906. In that period of Cromerian regime, his book was indeed an indirect revolutionary pamphlet though presented in the most tolerable, and serious style. The questions that confronted Egypt, the inception of those questions, and finally the immediate action that should be taken in order to make their country free, these were some of the themes, the book dealt with. No clear solution was laid down, but at least an urge was made to search out the solution³.

Social trends were manifested even in light literature, such as story-writing, which was evident with the appearance of "Hadith Isa bin Hisham" published in book

1. Ibid., p. 41

2. Umar: "Hadhirul Misriyyin au sirr Takhkhurihim",

3. Lutfi Jum'a : "Tahrir Misr".

form in 1907 by Ibrahim al-Moelhi (1858-1913), a disciple of al-Afghani. Al-Moelhi analysed the causes of general decay and demoralization in the Egyptian society, which according to him were European culture and its blind imitation

Such were the general trends of contemporary Egyptian literature. These literary pursuits were not directly connected with political movement, nor any solid outcome, as a direct result of these writings, may be produced. Literary pieces has, as a matter of fact, no direct off springs anywhere. Nevvrtheless, they contributed a great deal towards the social and political awakening of the Egyptian people.

iv

The Legislative Council and the General Assembly were the other vehicles through which the voice of Egypt could be heard though moderately. The nationalist group that had secured some seats in the Council and the Assembly was inevitably of a moderate type. But most of the members were

1- Gibb. B.O.A.S, 7, 1933-35, pp. 5-6; Muslim World, January, 1952:- "Modern Arabic books", by Kermit Sehounver, p.5; Hamza, op.cit., pp. 45, 49

experienced and therefore self-confident. Towards the end of 1895, following the example of their legal ruler, Abbas, the Councillors protested against the discrepancies in the British-run administrative system¹. Since 1892, the Council seemed to have been asserting itself and mildly criticizing the Government on questions like the expenditure incurred on the Occupation army, the Sudanese campaigns, and British apathy and negligence with regard to public education².

Among the Councillors, there were some prominent figures who had open nationalist ideas. These were: al-Moelhi, Sheikh Ali Yusuf, Isma'il Muhammad Pasha, and Muhammad Abduh³ who was appointed to the Council in 1899. This group, with some of their followers, formed the 'party of opposition' in the Legislature. Chirol cites an example of the Council's assertive nature when on one occasion, an Egyptian Minister, supporting an item dictated to him by his British Advisor, was violently attacked by the members, and in the end having lost his courage, he confessed that he supported the measure simply because the English wanted it⁴. The Councillors had acquired enough courage to criticize any measure that they

1. Landau, p. 46, f.n.

2. Blunt, op.cit., p. 150; Rafi'i, p. "Misr wa's-Sudan", p. 180, referring to the year 1894

3. Landau, pp. 47, 48

4. Chirol, op.cit., p. 210

thought was against the interests of the people. The Ministers had to listen to their point of view and discuss their suggestion which were usually accepted, and if they rejected them, they had to give sound reasons for doing so¹.

As in other fields of nationalist activities, the Anglo-French Entente of 1904² affected the natural growth of representative institutions also. Heretofore, they did not interfere with the budget or raised any objections to it. They did not even launch any serious protests against a national tragedy as the Dinshawai incident. Popular voice, however, echoed through the native press and was taken up here as well. The General Assembly, in its session of the year when the Dinshawai Tragedy occurred, passed several resolutions which demanded: release of the Dinshawai prisoners; a Constitutional and representative Government; Egyptians to be appointed on all high official posts; an Egyptian Municipality for Cairo; Arabic to be the only official language of the country; abolition of the use of

1. Ibid., p. 90

2. By virtue of a convention between Britain and France, a declaration 'on Egypt and Morocco' was signed on April 4, 1904. Its important provisions which affected the national movement of Egypt were as follows:

"His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation.... "(Art.1)

"His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require." (Art. 2)

English sovereign as coinage; and finally, concessions to foreign companies to be ceased¹.

On the whole, these Council and Assembly of Egypt, keeping in view [✓]the limitations of such institutions at that time, performed ^{the}its task of creating a feeling of nationalism among the people well. Their speed was slow, but that could not be helped, for as long as the British Resident supervised their activities, there was no other choice.

V

Political groups that had evolved round the newspapers organised themselves as political Parties. These Parties, in most of the cases, were led by the editor or proprietor of a particular paper, who was the real spirit behind the organisation. Again, the Parties varied between

1. Kohn, op.cit., pp. 195-96; Landau, p.50

Continued from p. 177

"The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco." (Art. 9)

"The mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years." (Art. 4). *Aurevitz, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 263-264*

moderates and extremists depending upon the political outlook of their leaders. The moderates adhered to constitutional means, whereas the extremists advocated and practised the employment of any means as long as the main object was achieved.

Sheikh Ali Yusuf, the editor of al-Muayyad, was the leader of such a political group which on December 15, 1907, was organised as a political Party and was named al-Hizb al-Islah, ad-Dasturia,¹ i.e. Party of Constitutional Reform. Ever since he started his journalistic activities, Ali Yusuf was contemplating and shaping a political group of distinct ideas. He was born in 1864/65 (1280 A.D.), completed his education at al-Azhar and started from Cairo, a weekly, al-Adab, a religio-political paper². In 1890, he joined the staff of al-Muayyad, which was being published by Sheikh Ahmad Mazi since December 1889. Three years later, when Ahmad died, he became the sole proprietor of the paper. According to Blunt, al-Muayyad was the first nationalist paper issued from Egypt since the defeat at Tel-al-Kabir³. Another contemporary author, Browne, has given it the title of the chief opposition paper⁴. Before joining al-Muayyad, Ali Yusuf used to write frequently in al-Ahram⁵.

1. Browne, op.cit., p. 331

2. Al-Manar, vol. XI, No. 16, 1913

3. Blunt, op.cit., p.139; Hartmann, op.cit., p. 12

4. Browne, op.cit., p. 139

5. Al-Manar, op.cit.

But inspite of all humanitarian outlook of that paper, and its identification with the nationalist ideas, al Ahram had certain limitations by virtue of being the property of Christians. The majority of the Egyptians were Muslims and, as such, the national movement must have inclined towards acquiring some Islamic character. Al-Muayyad provided this¹. Soon it became the vehicle of al-Azhar and the reformer group and got a wide circulation not only in Egypt, but in the entire Islamic world².

As a moderate in politics, Ali Yusuf always tried to create an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation between the Egyptians and the English so much so that he was criticized in some circles as having been purchased by the English³. Al-Liwa group called his paper "al-Muqattam al-Ahmar al-Azhar", i.e. the red Muqattam, simply because his criticism of the English and the Khedive was never harsh or violent⁴. However, although he employed constitutional moderate means in his struggle against the foreign domination, he never accepted a compromise with the Occupation. In an interview given to Browne, he expressed himself as follows:

"Whatever may be good things that have been brought by the fact of the Occupation, they are as nothing when compared with the ultimate object, which is to arrive at a destruction of the political life of the country. Before the

1. Ibid.

2. Browne, op.cit., p. 332

3. Ibid., pp. 332-33

4. Al-Manar, November, 29, 1913, p. 951; /p. 333

Browne

last years¹, all Egyptians were able to look with a satisfaction upon the reforms accompanying the British Occupation, because they always had the encouragement that the English would one day keep their promise. But since three or four years, the English having shown, or having perhaps declared, that they will not evacuate the country, those reforms are not esteemed by the Egyptians."²

To the question of the capability of the natives for self-government, he retorted: "So long as the present state of affairs lasts, that is to say so long as we have the Occupation, the capacity of the Egyptians to govern their own country will diminish. We think that the English seek to monopolize all the administration and to hinder the Egyptians from being capable of governing; and that makes us lose all hopes.... We claim our independence and that is the view we stand by in the programme of our journal."³ Continuing his reply, Ali Yusuf proceeded to say: "Our objection to foreign Occupation applies with the same strength to Turkey, were the Turkish suzerainty to become an active force.... We say 'Egypt for the Egyptians'. If we are exhibiting an inclination towards the French, it is the English themselves who have caused it."⁴ This interview

1. This interview took place about the year 1907.

2. Browne, pp. 144-45

3. Ibid., pp. 149.150

4. Ibid., p. 152

explains at length the views of Ali Yusuf and his co-thinkers, and their attitude towards Turkey and France also.

Ali Yusuf had thought over the causes of the failure of national movement of 1881-1882, and he held that it was mainly due to the non-cooperation of the Porte. Hence he emphasised cordial relations with the Sultan as long as they did not clash with the national interests¹. With this dual strength he tried to win the battle through constitutional means, his ultimate objectives being Evacuation and Autonomy².

vi

Mustafa Kamil, the editor of al-Liwa, was the founder of another political party al-Hizb al-Watani i.e., the National party, which emerged from the group that had centred round his paper. Kamil was born on August 14, 1874. His father, Ali Muhammad was a military Engineer, and his brother, Husain Wasif who supported Kamil after the early death of his father, in 1896, was the Minister of Public Works³.

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1. Al-Manar, November 29, 1913, pp. 947-56; Chirol, op.cit., p. 92
 2. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 114, 135; Haikal, op.cit., p. 31
 3. Rafi'i, "Mustafa Kamil", pp. 12, 13

Kamil had imbibed nationalist feelings in himself from his boyhood days. He had already come in contact with an-Nadim in 1892, after the latter's return from exile, when he ¹published his weekly al-Ustadh. From an-Nadim, Kamil learnt the secrets of the Arabi Movement, as also the causes of its failure. The main causes, as he learnt, were : firstly, its dependence upon a particular section of the people i.e. the army; and secondly, the break up with the Khedive. Keeping in view this past experience, when Kamil launched his movement, he tried to get cooperation of every section of the people as well as the sympathies of the Khedive ¹. In January 1893, a demonstration of the Law College students against Cromer and Mustapha Fehmi and in ~~faour~~ favour of the Khedive was organised, and Kamil as a student of that college took leading part in it ². Isma'il Sidqui, the erstwhile Premier of Egypt, refers to another demonstration which was organised by Sidqui in collaboration with ~~the~~ Kamil during their college days in which the demand for a Constitution was made ³.

Kamil completed his education in France and took his Law degree from Tolouse in November 1894. While in France, he continued his political activities against the Occupation ⁴. There, he came in close contact with the French statesman,

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1. Rafi'i, p. 30; Ahmad Amin, pp. 246-47
 2. Rafi'i, p. 28
 3. Isma'il Sidqui, " Muzakkarati ", p. 7
 4. Rafi'i, p. 32

Deloncle, who was very anti-British, and with Mme. Juliette Adam, a dominating literary figure of Parisian society. Through Mme Adam, his contacts grew still wider, and many of the political and literary dignitaries used to have regular meetings at her house. Mme. Adam (1836-1936) was herself interested in the Egyptian Question, and later in 1922 she even published a monograph on that topic entitled "England¹ in Egypt".

Kamil returned to Egypt in December 1894. He already had some experience of editing a journal. When a student of Law College at Cairo, he edited the journal al-Madrasa. After his return, he began to write on Egyptian problems in al-Ahram and al-Muayyad².

On February 1895, a decree was passed by virtue of which a special court was to be installed to try those natives who offended British soldiers. Kamil strongly protested against this despotic decree and wrote an article in al-Ahram under the title "Sawa'iq al-Ihtilal", i.e. the lightnings of the Occupation³. However, he felt that his main field of work was not Egypt but Europe. Unless Europe was well-informed of the Egyptian point of view, there would be no support in the international forum, and without an international support the Evacuation was impossible. Hence he proceeded to France in May 1895 with an organised plan of mass scale propaganda⁴.

1. Ibid., pp. 44-45; Landau, op.cit., p. 108

2. Ibid., pp. 33-37

3. Haikal, op.cit., p. 148; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 28

4. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 39-40

In France he made speeches, wrote articles in French papers and met the influential figures of the country in order to acquire their support for the Egyptian cause. He published there a painting in which Egypt was shown asking for French help, in getting rid of the British Occupation¹. Three Arabic verses with their French translation were written below the picture. Kamil sent its copies to important newspapers of the world and presented one copy to the President of the French Assembly requesting him to respond to the Egyptians' cause and come to the rescue of the Egyptian people¹.

He then published a pamphlet entitled "Le peril Egyptien," on the dangerous consequences of the British occupation². In July 1895, he published a record of his speeches under the title "Conference sur l'Egypte faite a Toulouse."³ In January 1896, he returned home and stayed at Alexandria. There he started giving public speeches and educating the people in political thinking. The main topics of his speeches were: the demand for a Constitution; Evacuation and protests against the British-led Sudanese campaign⁴.

He made efforts to unite dispersed and disintegrated nationalist elements and gathered around him a group of

1. Zaidan, vol. I, p. 296; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 41; Haikal, op.cit. p. 149. Haikal has given the description of the painting, as follows:

In the picture, France was shown standing... and seeing Egypt imprisoned supervised by a British soldier; a gathering of Egyptian people asks France for help. On the painting three verses were written in Arabic and French which also invoked the French people for help.

2. Haikal, op.cit., p. 150; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 44

3. Landau, op.cit., p. 108

4. Kohn, op.cit., p. 188

intellectuals who were ready to work with him. Prominent among them were: Latif Salim and his son Fuad Salim; Ali Fakhri; Muhammad Farid; Muhammad Salim; Waisa Wasif; Muhammad Labib and the poets Shawqi, Hafiz and Matran¹. This entire group, with Kamil as their leader, awakened the political consciousness of the people through word and through pen.

At the same time Kamil made continuous effort to secure the cooperation of the Khedive, since he realized that his movement may fail if there was opposition from these quarters, as had been evidenced in the case of the Arabi Movement. Kamil was successful for a while in winning over the Khedive as Abbas himself disliked the Occupation regime. In 1895-99, they had very cordial relations, and in 1899 Kamil was made Pasha. Since December 1901, Cromer banned their mutual meetings, and, at last, having given hope of winning in the struggle, specially after the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, Abbas reconciled with the Occupation.²

Kamil also tried to get the support of the Sultan in his struggle against the Occupation, and he partly succeeded, but he could never completely depend upon it.³

On the other hand he made attempts to unite the two religious communities of the country, the Copts and the Muslims, for the common aim of Egyptian independence. It was his credit

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 68, 164-66

2. Ibid., pp. 144-46; Young, op.cit., p. 181

3. Young, op.cit., p. 181, Landau, op.cit., p. 121

that for the first time Egyptian Muslims and Christians were united against 'Christian' Britain. He used to say that religion and patriotism are complementary to each other, and that every sincere religious man must have a passion for his Motherland¹.

He felt that the apathy and indifference of the people towards the liberation of their country was due mainly to lack of education and information. To remedy this situation, he founded a non-official school in 1899, and there he started giving lectures himself². In his opinion the Egyptian children, whether boys or girls, needed a healthy education which would teach them to love their motherland. The girls, he said, were the mothers of tomorrow, and as such, if they were educated on correct lines, the coming generations would certainly be balanced, healthy and patriotic³.

To educate the masses on a wider scale, he started a daily paper, al-Liwa in 1900. It published reports of the activities of the nationalists, their speeches, addresses, proceedings of their meetings and articles on the Egyptian Question, which essentially aimed at Evacuation and the achievement of a Constitution (Inkhila wa'd-Dastur)⁴.

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 195; Landau, op.cit., pp. 118-20; Steppat: op.cit., pp. 264, 274, 267

2. Rafi'i, p. 65

3. Sit. Steppat, op.cit., pp. 320-321, 324; Rafi'i, pp. 112-13

4. Rafi'i, pp. 70-73; Landau, pp. 110-11, 122-23

Besides this Daily, a fortnightly paper was also issued which supplemented its activities.

Outside Egypt, Kamil carried on his propaganda campaign both through the press and the platform. He toured the European countries every year, convincing the people about the genuineness of the Egyptian cause and winning their support for it¹. In December 1900, he published from Paris, a collection of his speeches and writings on the Egyptian Question entitled "Egyptiens et Anglais", which was later reproduced in French papers in extracts². European papers published his original articles as well as translations from al-Liwa. Thus it was that for the first time Europe listened to the voice of nationalist Egypt.

Meanwhile the movement received some setbacks, which, however, instead of weakening it, further strengthened it. The failure of the Khedive to assert himself and finally his break-up with Kamil, did great damage^a to the movement as it lost a great supporter. On December 11, 1898, the Fashoda incident occurred in the Sudan where France in spite of its support to the Egyptian cause, tried to assert its sovereignty over a part of the Egyptian territory. Had not the British forces threatened with a firm action in response, the French offensive forces would not have retreated³. Though it was a

1. Rafi'i, pp. 49, 54, 59, 97, 106

2. Ibid., pp. 87, 320

3. Ibid., p. 61

incident, yet it betrayed the real motives of the French behind their support of the nationalists. Further, it resulted in creating self-confidence and a feeling of strength among the nationalists. Then the conquest of the Sudan at the hands of the British forces, and a forthwith declaration of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium on January 10, 1899 shocked the nationalists¹. They just could not conceive how it could be possible for a foreign nation to share the government of a territory that was a part of Egypt². Finally, the Egyptian Question entered a new phase, when an Agreement was signed by France and Britain, in January 1904. Under this Agreement, a joint declaration was issued on April 4, wherein the two Governments agreed not to interfere in their respective spheres of influence. His Britannic Majesty's Government declared that they had "no intention of altering the political status of Egypt", and the Government of the French Republic on their part, declared "that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain by asking that a limit of time be fixed for British occupation" (Art. 1). In bargain, the same rights of French Government were recognised in Morocco (Art. 2). Moreover, adhering to the Canal Treaty of 1888, Britain declarat

1. Ibid., pp. 63-64

2. The Egyptian nationalists, in general (and Kamil was not an exception here) thought in this connection always on pure Imperialist lines. They were never prepared to give the Sudanese people the same status as they themselves demanded ~~from~~ Britain.

from

that the stipulations of that treaty should now be put in force (Art. 6). Lastly, the two Governments agreed "to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco." (Art. 9)¹

Whatever hopes there were left with regard to France had now completely shattered, and there was complete disappointment. The Agreement had changed the whole situation, and the Egyptian Question became less acute as an international problem, after the conclusion of this Agreement. The cleavage with the Khedive and the departure of France caused the Movement to change into a truly popular and pure national movement.

Early in 1906, the Occupation authorities and the Porte clashed on the question of sovereignty over the Sinai peninsula. The Porte claimed the disputed area as Turkish territory, while the Anglo-Egyptian authorities asserted their own claim². The Porte, due to its weakness had however to yield and as such the incident had little significance. But its repercussions on the people of Egypt were far-reaching. Cromer's Report of that year mentions some "unrest" among Muslim population.² For the first time, the Caliph-Sultan, still the legal sovereign of Egypt and the spiritual head of

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1. Anglo-French Declaration. Text in Hurewitz, "Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East", vol. I. pp. 263-65
 2. Annual Register, 1906, p. 408

the Islamic world, was openly dishonoured in the land which was his, and among the people who still believed in the Grand Caliphate¹. This unrest, at last, manifested itself in a "brutal assault on an English soldier in Cairo, for which two natives were sentenced to ten and seven years imprisonment. However, it left no more serious aftereffects.

With the tragedy of Dinshawai, the national movement received a real momentum. On June 13, 1906, five British officers went near a village named Dinshawai, to shoot pigeons. They had been informed beforehand that the villagers did not like pigeon-shooting. A village woman was accidentally wounded by one of the officers, and a peasant-hut was set on fire either deliberately or by accident. The villagers became furious and besieged the officers and injured three of them. One of the injured ones died during his flight².

Lest it might create a sense of superiority among the natives, the Occupation regime took strong measures against the villagers and sentenced some of them to death and some others to various terms of rigorous imprisonment. The death sentences were carried out in the Dinshawai village itself³.

1. Ibid., p. 410

2. Annual Register, 1906, pp. 410,411; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 90-92; Kohn, op.cit., p. 195

3. An especial Tribunal was installed for the trial of the villagers who were arrested in scores. The judgement as a 'command affair' was passed forthwith. On June 10, the sentences were passed. Four of the fifty-nine accused villagers were sentenced to death, two to penal servitude, one to fifteen years imprisonment, six to seven years

This action resulted in a general outburst of protests and agitations. Even in England, the liberals protested against these cruel measures.¹ In the modern history of Egypt, this was the first incident of its kind. The tragedy gave an opportunity to the discontented elements, and soon the passive resistance changed into active violence. The murder of the Copt Premier Butrus Ghali, a few years later, was one of the direct consequences of this tragedy.² The Egyptian Press turned violent and made the Cromer regime a target of continuous attacks. Special publications dealing with the tragedy appeared in several languages.³ The Dinshawai tragedy was the single factor responsible for a sudden general awakening and political consciousness among the Egyptian people.⁴

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1. Annual Register, op.cit., p. 410; Marshall: "The Egyptian Enigma", p. 83
 2. Marshall, pp. 83-84; Kohn, p. 195. Butrus Ghali had presided over the special Tribunal which consisted of two Egyptians and three Englishmen. (Rafi'i, p. 94)
 3. A Pamphlet written in Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Urdu was published in Constantinople and was circulated in Egypt. Its Arabic title was "Khulasa Waqa'i Dinshawai". In 1907, Mahmud Tahir Haqqi published his book "Adhra Danishwai". In 1908, another book entitled "Haditha Dinshawai" appeared in Cairo. These books contained several photographs of the Tragedy. (Landau, pp. 45-50 f.n.)
 4. Qasim Amin was the eye-witness of the tragedy and its repercussions. Giving the account of the sentences, he says: "I saw every person, I encountered with, heart-wounded.... Grief and sorrow lingered on every face... The people seemed as if they were gathered in a house of dead, or if the souls of the crucified men wandered everywhere in the town. The consciousness, however, remained hidden in their hearts finding no outlet for coming outside." cit. Rafi'i, p. 97; See also Marshall, p. 83: "It was the plan on which the Nationalist movement was founded and provided a platform for the late Mustafa Kamil, the apostle of nationalism. Before the Denshawai incident, he had not managed to create any impression on the mass of the people, but the trial unfortunately gave him a hearing even outside the limits of his own country."

The immediate effects of the tragedy were: the acceleration of national movement, the attention of world Press drawn towards the Egyptian Question, and finally a shift to moderation in the policy of Occupation regime. Again, it was this tragedy that led to the fall of Cromer¹ (April 1907) and Mustapha Fehmi, as well as to the appointment of an Egyptian (S'ad Zaghlul) as the Minister of Education. The tragedy was also responsible for the formation of organised political parties. Finally, it accelerated the movement launched for the establishment of a National University².

Kamil was in Europe when the news of this national tragedy reached him. He led a fierce campaign against the inhuman treatment of the Egyptians. On July 14, 1906, he visited London and pleaded the case of human grounds³. Questions were raised in the Parliament and Cromer's action was criticized. On October 15, Kamil returned to Egypt³.

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1. Hodges: "Lord Kitchner", p. 198
 2. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 104; Landau, p. 113
 3. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 97-103

Continued from p. 191.

imprisonment, three to fifteen lashes and one year imprisonment and five to fifteen lashes. (Annual Register, 1906: pp. 410-11; Rafi'i, op.cit, pp. 90-2; Kohn, op.cit., p. 195). Later on, after much agitation and demonstration and criticism in Press and in the British Parliament itself, the Anglo-Egyptian authorities reconsidered their decisions and in December 1907, it was decided to relieve the prisoners of Dinshawai. They were freed in January, 1908. (Rafi'i, pp. 134-35)

It has already been pointed out that the formation of political parties was one of the direct results of the Dinshawai tragedy. Most important among these parties was the National Party of Mustafa Kamil. The tragedy, however, was not solely responsible for giving birth to the Party. In fact it was the growing political consciousness and the unanimity over the necessity of organised political propaganda that necessitated the formation of the National Party, together with some other Parties, with which we will discuss later on. The Dinshawai incident, however, made the nationalists feel the necessity of an early realization of their vague ideas about the formation of the parties.

The National Party, al-Hizb al-Watani, came into existence on October 27, 1907¹. Its Programme had already been made public in the month of May. The ten-points programme included the demands, firstly, for the revival of Egyptian autonomy as agreed in the London Treaty of 1840, and endorsed by the Sultan, and secondly, for the formation of a native Ministry responsible to a European type of Egyptian Parliament. (Arts. 1 and 2). According to the Programme, the Party was to strive for: the spread of national education with the help of the wealthy class of the nation; making efforts for the development of agriculture

1. Landau, op.cit., p. 115

and industry in Egypt in order to achieve both intellectual and economic independence; educating public opinion, inculcating national spirit, and making them conscious of their political rights and duties; and creating unity and harmony between the two religious communities of Egypt. (Arts. 4-8). The Programme also declared that the Party would honour all international treaties and obligations regarding the indebtedness of Egypt, and even in the event of getting autonomy, would accept a European financial control such as the Anglo-French Condominium, until the time Egypt was in debt to Europe, and Europe wanted such control. (Art. 3). Finally it was pledged that the Party would strive for strengthening the bonds of friendship with European Powers on the one hand and with the Ottoman Empire on the other, and thus would try to win over the international moral support for the Egyptian cause. (Arts. 9-10)¹. With a thirty-members Executive headed by Kamil himself, the first popular political Party came into existence².

On February 10, 1908, the leader of the Movement died an immature death at the age of thirty-four. "It was for the first time since Dinshawai that the heart of Egypt sank to the lowest level", wrote Muhammad Husain Haikal³. Another contemporary observer, remarked: "Never was there such a spontaneous and universal demonstration of grief, for... there is no doubt that he gained the affection of the Egyptian public as no other Egyptian patriot has done before or since. Huge crowds of mourners among whom were

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1. Programme of the National Party cit. steppat, "Nationalism", pp. 338-339
 2. Landau, pp. 115-16
 3. Haikal, op.cit., pp. 140-41

many of his vigorous political opponents, collected in the neighbourhood of El-Liwa to participate in the pathetic scenes of public mourning.... His funeral, the following day, was one of the most impressive sights ever witnessed in Cairo in modern times."¹

Kamil was the leading spirit of the national movement during the period commencing with the accession of Abbas Hilmi and ending only with him. He had a positive outlook and a definite criterion with which he judged all matters, always keeping in view the perspective of national liberation. All of his views centred round this single aim of his life.

He was clear in his conceptions of nation, community and religion and their inter-relationship. He was a Muslim and gave a high place to Islam as a religion; but his Islam did not come in his way of joining hands with the Christian Copts who were the sons of the same soil. For the first time under his leadership, Muslims and Copts were united on the basis of a national philosophy which Kamil had evolved² Kamil had a due respect towards the Sultan, but that only as a spiritual head like Pope of the Christian world³. He called himself an Ottoman Egyptian, but that only in technical sense; otherwise, he never imagined to offer his loyalties to any thing except Egypt⁴.

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1. Alexander: "Truth about Egypt", p. 139 cit. Kohn, p. 190; also Sladen, op.cit., pp. 95-96
 2. Steppat, op.cit., pp. 274, 255-56
 3. Ibid., pp. 284
 4. Ibid., pp. 287-88

His incessant linking up his country with the Ottoman Empire was only to secure a permanent shield to fight the war of independence; otherwise, he expressed time and again that by virtue of the Firmans of 1840-41, the Sultan had already given Egypt a complete autonomous status¹. As to Muslim-Copt relations, he asserted that, so far as the political goal of the nation was concerned both the communities were indivisible parts of the same whole, the Egyptian nation. The Egyptian nation, he held was composed of the Copts who were the ancient Egyptians, the Arabs, who were residing in Egypt since a millenium, and the foreigners i.e. the Circassians as well as those Europeans who supported the national cause; everyone residing in Egypt and striving for national liberation was, to him, a true Egyptian². This Egyptianhood, he held, did not clash with any religion; so far as Islam was concerned, tolerance was the spirit of all Islamic teachings³. Thus he cemented the two diverse elements of Egyptian nation into one national aspiration.

He was also clear in his attitude towards the Occupation. Estimating the blessings of British advent in Egypt, he commented: "To us Orientalists, material civilization is not genuine civilization. True civilization is based on the moral rectitude and freedom of the peoples. Of what

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1. Ibid., p. 289
 2. Ibid., pp. 257-58
 3. Ibid., p. 267

value to us are the telegraph, the telephone, the gramophone, and all European mechanical inventions, if we are oppressed by the inventors of those fine appliances and if they only serve to hasten our subjection. I would rather a thousand times wander a horseback in the desert and feel free, than fly with the threefold rapidity of a motor-car across a country dominated by the English.¹ Emphasizing the popular basis of civilization, he said: "Egyptian civilization cannot endure in the future unless it is formulated by the people itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the pupil, in fine every single Egyptian, knows that man has sacred intangible rights; that he is not created to be a tool, but to lead an intelligent and worthy life; that love of country is the most beautiful sentiment which can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without independence is a nation without existence. It is by patriotism that backward peoples come quickly to ~~the~~ civilization, to greatness and to power."² For inculcating this spirit of patriotism, he stressed that the system of national education should be organised at a vast scale. National academic institutions should be established which may produce patriots and not the Civil servants to serve the British masters. The movement for a national University was an annexee to the same idea.

In his methodology, Kamil remained too precautions not to quarrel either with the Khedive or with the Sultan. For quite a considerable period, he had cordial relations

1. cit. Kohn, op.cit., pp. 188-89: Speech delivered in 1904

2. cit. Stoddard, "The new world of Islam", p. 151

with the nationalists; Kamil never attacked his person. To him, the Khedive was the symbol of the technical and legal independence if not of national autonomy, and as such he was to be respected at any cost.¹

Kamil did not believe in violence, and yet he was never prepared to compromise as^{to} the question of independence.² His immense love for his country and a passionate desire to see it a free self-governing independent state had reached its extreme limits. His journalism³, his poetry⁴, and other writings⁵, in fact his whole life was devoted to this single aim of his life.

Kamil, like Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, died unmarried. Like al-Afghani, he had married his nation. Although, on the whole, he was simply an agitator, yet he was the fittest person to lead the Movement at this stage. Within a short period of ten or twelve years of his active political career, he created among the middle class of Egypt a living sense of nationalism and a passion to achieve their ideal. He used the Press and platform for his propaganda and agitation, and although he did not achieve the chief desire

1. Steppat, op.cit., pp. 323-324, 326-27

2. Ibid., pp. 293, 314

3. As a matter of fact, Kamil's whole personality can be summed up in the word Journalist. From his boyhood days, when in his college he edited al-Madrasa, till his death, when he left besides his other legacies, a well-established popular paper al-Liwa, his entire life is that of a Journalist.

4. Some of his beautiful verses filled with patriotic fire have been quoted by Yasu'i, "Tarikh al-Adab al-Arabiyya", pp. 44-45

5. Apart from the collections of his speeches and writings in al-Liwa, two monographs are worth mentioning: one is the History of Spain and the other is on Japan entitled "The Rising Sun" (ash-Shams al-Mushriqa).

of his heart, namely, independence, yet he was able to bring about the end of Cromer's regime and to create among the people a national consciousness, which served as the foundation of the future movement for independence.

During these sixteen years (1892-1907), the national movement had advanced with an unprecedented speed. The British Agent, however, continued to report the situation as though no change had taken place. "Over and over again, it has been urged on me that the (Nationalist) party consists merely of a few noisy individuals whose action is often due to no very reputable motives, and in no way represent the real wishes of their countrymen. I believe this view to be subsequently correct."¹ Not until Cromer had to say good-bye to Egypt, that he smelt the revolt in the air. The Movement, in spite of receiving serious set-backs within the short span of one and a half decade, had been firmly rooted and had become a mass movement².

As for the 'White man's burden' of making the uncivilized and backward people civilized and training them in the part of self-government, the Occupation regime did

1. cit., Kohn, pp. 195-96

2. "There is no village in Egypt in which there is not some Mullah or Mahdi or holyman... who was only too glad to announce to his adherents that the downfall of the infidel was at hand, and that the day was coming when Islam would once more become supreme." (Low: "The new Spirit in Egypt", p. 260, quoting from Dicey in 1907).

perform some welfare work for the society and the State¹, but it did nothing to educate the Egyptians in the art of self-government. In spite of the repeated pledges of Evacuation on the part of the British Government, the grip² was never loosened. On the contrary it became more firm. The real aim of the policy of British Agent as also of the Foreign Office had been clearly stated by Cromer in an interview with a friend of Dicey: "There is no need for any

1. It was claimed by British writers that they had done the following for Egypt:

- i. Increase in revenue.
- ii. Increase in export and import.
- iii. Check against famines.
- iv. Building of barrages and dams.
- v. Abolition of Corvee and kurbash and the use of tortures.
- vi. Reduction in taxes.
- vii. Betterment of fellaheen.
- viii. Construction of roads & railways.
- ix. Purity of administration of justice.
- x. Opening of hospitals and lunatic asylums.
- xi. Abolition of Bakhshish.
- xii. Raising and regularising the payment of salaries. (Sladen, pp. 18-20)

2. "We have not only done nothing to render Egypt more fit for independence than she was previously to our military occupation, but on the contrary we have done much to weaken such small capacity for self-government as she possessed at the time when our troops entered Cairo and took possession of the Citadel...." (Dicey, "The Egypt of the Future", published in 1907., p. 34; See also de Guerville's summing up of the situation in 1906.

"Each Englishman constitutes himself a legislator, and attempts to modify the law as it suits him. He submits his work to the Minister and Council, which, as every one knows, is an assembly of mutes, who sign whatever is put before them. The only control exercised is by the Legislative Council. But this assembly has only a consultative power, and the members of it who are upto their work are very few....

"An Egyptian moudir in a province is assisted by an English inspector. Normally, the moudir in-a-ppe should administer, and the inspector control his work. But it is not so. The moudir takes no responsibility; he submits everything, however insignificant, to the inspector and awaits his orders, which he is ready to carry out." (A.B. De Guerville: "New Egypt", published in 1906. p. 162)

formal declaration; we have got to go on as we are already doing now, and some fine day the world will discover that we have established a Protectorate without anybody knowing that we have done so."¹

People in the villages used to believe that "the Khedive is under Lord Cromer; Lord Cromer is king."² However, the new middle class leadership, filled with a sense of national responsibility, never bowed down before Cromer. Even such a staunch Imperialist as Dicey could not help confess that the fictitious belief in British circles that the natives looked towards them with grateful eyes, was absolutely erroneous.³

1. Dicey, op.cit., p. 192
2. Wood, p. 201
3. Dicey, in 1907: "The Egypt of the Future", p. 211; also, Brown, op.cit., pp. 144-45 quoting Sheikh Ali Husuf.

CHAPTER VI

THE RISE OF NEW NATIONALISM:

The last Phase.

"In my time I remember, that everyone, from the humblest to the greatest, demanded a Constitution. 'Yehie el Destour' was the rallying cry, the password of liberty."

_____ Abbas (Hilmi) II:

" A few words on Anglo-Egyptian Settlement." p. 87

"We are not popular in Egypt. Feared we may be by some; respected I doubt not by many others, but really liked I am sure, by very few."

_____ Sidney L^yW

" Egypt in Transition", p. 261
Published in 1914.

About the year 1908 and since, some of the Eastern lands were undergoing a drastic change. Persia had a revolution. Indian nationalism was struggling hard against British Imperialism. Japan, raised to eminence after the victory over Russia in 1905, was a source of inspiration to

other Eastern countries as also to the Egyptians¹. The most important of this series of revolutions was the Turkish Revolution of July 1908 brought about by the Young Turks, which ended the corrupt and despotic era of absolute monarchy. Naturally, it had its repercussions in Egypt also, as, legally speaking, Egypt was still a province of the Ottoman Empire². The Egyptian nationalists now more passionately inclined towards the Constitutionalist Turkey, and many of them were prepared to welcome a Turkish intervention or even Turkish rule, as their main desire was to oust the infidels³. There was a general belief that but for Turkey, Britain would have annexed Egypt. Many of the nationalists had come in close contact with the Young Turks. Some of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, settled in Cairo, were in close touch with various groups of educated young Egyptians who were opposed to the autocratic rule of the Khedive and were against foreign domination⁴.

After the success of the Young Turks, a Young Egyptian Party was founded in Egypt by Idris Raghib⁵. The Young Turks movement continued to exercise its influence in Egypt throughout the period preceding the First World War.

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1. "The Egyptians are fond of comparing themselves to the Japanese, as an example of an Oriental people ready to take its place among the Western nations." (Sladen: "Egypt and the English", pp. 6-7). Douglas Sladen is an eye-witness of the period. His account of Egypt was published in 1908.
 2. Sladen, op.cit., p. 136; Lutfi as-Sayyid: "Safhat Matwiyya" pp. 36, 240-41; Annual Register, 1911, p. 411.
 3. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 1-2;
 4. Ibid., p. 136; Rafi'i, "Muhammad Farid", p. 451
 5. Low, op.cit., pp. 23-24; Landau, op.cit., p. 146. Idris was editing a paper "L'Egypte" in 1910 which seemed to be quite in conformity with the policies of the National Party

Even as late as July 1912, there was a terrorist group existing in Cairo and having intimate relations with the Young Turks¹.

Lord Cromer was recalled in April 1907 and was replaced by Sir Eldon Gorst as the new British Agent. "The departure of Lord Cromer was rightly interpreted by the Nationalists as the deposition of Cromerism"². In 1906, Liberals had captured power in England, and the new Agent seemed to have been influenced by Liberal ideas and traditions, and, as such, was in the early stages, in sympathy with the interests of the Egyptian people; but, later, he proved to be more a diplomat than Liberal³.

In this first public statement, Gorst reiterated the old promise of Evacuation after the Egyptians were trained in self-government. In his announcement, he promised to reexamine the Anglo-Egyptian relations, to enlarge the Powers of the Council of Ministers and to give more authority to local self-government bodies⁴. In the early months of 1908, a draft with a view to enact these measures was placed for discussion in the Legislative Council. It was postponed because of lack of interest, they

1. Low, op.cit., pp. 23-24; Lutfi, op.cit., pp. 240-44

2. Young, op.cit., p. 185

3. Fyfe, "The new Spirit in Egypt", p. 125; Elgood, op.cit., p. 183

4. Fyfe, op.cit., pp. 165-66; Elgood, op.cit., pp. 184-85; Chirol, "The Egyptian Problem", pp. 109-110

say, shown by the Legislators, and was not passed until April 1909¹. However, it fell too short of the nation's demands. Before the close of the year 1908, resolutions demanding a Constitution had been passed by the Legislative Council and the General Assembly². If the reforms promulgated by the new Agent were in response to those resolutions, they were utterly disappointing.

The new movement, a natural continuation of the Cromerian period, was still being led by lawyers and journalists and was followed by the educated youths³. It was now acquiring a positive form and character. Contemporary writers use the word 'Café' Nationalists',⁴ a very appropriate word for the leaders of the movement. Tarbush⁴ as against hat became the anti-British symbol. The anti-British character of the national movement was rapidly turning into an anti-Christian one. The Egyptian Muslims felt that it was against their religion to be ruled by the Christians⁵. This religious animosity was not restricted to the educated middle class, It influenced the majority of the Muslim peasantry as well, who were grieved to see their country governed by the 'infidels'. "He thinks less of reforms than of the grievances under which he suffers or believes to suffer", remarked a contemporary observer⁶.

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1. Lloyd: "Egypt since Cromer", vol. I, p. 90
 2. Ibid., p. 91
 3. Low, op.cit., p. 266; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 189-90; Fyfe, op.cit., p. 175
 4. Sladen, op.cit., p. 36; also, Young, p. 192
 5. Sladen, op.cit., p. 36
 6. Low, op.cit., p. 269

On March 27, 1909, Gorst reported to his Government that "the only course open is to wait patiently until the present excitable and undisciplined frame of mind which seems to have influenced a considerable portion of the upper class, has passed away."¹ Towards this end, the British Agent devised the old Imperialist formula of 'divide et Imperia', for which he had vast field of work². He had been serving in Egypt in different responsible positions since 1886, and he knew the Egyptians too well³. He was a model diplomat and was more successful in breaking up the nationalists' unity and force than was the autocrat and straightforward Cromer.

The first thing that Gorst did was to win over the Khedive and detach him completely from the nationalists. In this, he was helped by favourable circumstances. Kamil and his Party had already estranged their relations with the Khedive after the final rupture in 1904. Furthermore, Abbas also feared the repercussions of the Turkish^{14th} revolution. According to an account of 1908, : "The latest opinion is that the Khedive is anxious in any case to retain the army of Occupation lest the forces awakened by the reformers should go out of hands."⁴ Even as early as May 1907, the first

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1. cit., Lloyd, op.cit., p. 91
 2. Young, p. 186
 3. Elgood, op.cit., pp. 183-84
 4. Sladen, op.cit., p. 114

month of the new regime, Gorst had the courage to express the idea that there was no use opposing the Occupation, and that the British occupation was better than any other¹. As for the Constitution, the poet-laureate, Ahmad Shawqi, obviously writing at the initiative of the Khedive himself, said: "The Khedive is personally in favour of granting the Constitution, but the Constitution cannot be granted unless the Occupying Power takes an active part in the promulgation...."² Either the Khedive was too timid, or he tried to befool the people.

Gorst was able to create communal dissension among the nationalists themselves. Here again, he was helped by circumstances. The death of Kamil had created a vacuum in the Movement. His successors were neither as popular as he was, nor were they so farsighted. They were more Islamists than nationalists. Dicey had observed in 1907 that the Egyptian Muslims did not regard the Egyptian Christians as their compatriots and fellow countrymen³. They doubted their sincerity towards national aspirations because of their affinity in creed to the Occupying Power. Besides, the pro-British Christian papers of Egypt, like al-Muqattam, had less sense of responsibility and added fuel to fire by their pro-Occupation writings⁴. Moreover, Gorst's policy of an ostentatious favouritism towards the Muslims had also

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 63-64

2. Sladen, op.cit., Introduction, xxiii

3. Dicey, op.cit., p. 143; also, Cromer, op.cit., vol. I, p. 230

4. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 59-60

embittered the Copts¹. The nationalists began to purge their parties of the Christian element, and the Copts began to think that nationalism meant a political struggle for Muslim supremacy².

In November 1908, Butrus Ghali, who was a Copt, was appointed Premier to succeed the loyal Mustapha Fehmi³. Then in 1909, the question of the extension of the period of the Canal Concession was raised. It was moved and supported by the Egyptian Government. The resolution stipulated the extension of the Concession upto December 31, 2008 in return of some remuneration to Egypt⁴. It was publicly criticized by the nationalists⁵. In October 1909, the members of the Legislative Council and the General Assembly, the Provincial Councils and Local self-Government bodies, met informally and unanimously resolved to send a telegram to the Egyptian Government asking them not to take any decision on the measure before the session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly met the following year, debated the issue from February to April and almost unanimously voted against the adoption of the measures⁶.

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- 1- Mikhail, "Muslims and Copts under British rule", pp. 12, 20, 51
 - 2- Ibid., Preface, viii; Elgood, op.cit., p. 194
 - 3- Zaidan, op.cit., vol. II, p. 171
 - 4- Rotzantin "Tarikh al-Mas'alat al-Misriyya", pp. 376-77; Rafi'i, p. 131
 - 5- Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 134-35; Al-Hilal, May 1, 1910
 - 6- Al-Hilal, May 1, 1910; Landau, op.cit., p. 51; also, Fyfe, op.cit., p. 135

The issue caused widespread indignation among the masses particularly against the Copt Premier, who, as President of the Council of Ministers, had moved and supported the issue. The discussion was still continuing in the Assembly, when, on February 10, 1910, Butrus was shot dead by an Egyptian youth, al-Wardani¹. This marked the culmination of the communal trend in the national movement. It also gave rise to a new cult in the movement, namely, the cult of terrorism. Actually, as the assassinator himself insisted, the murder of Butrus was motivated from a political end rather than a communal one². It would have taken place even if the victim were a Muslim. But entire communal atmosphere of the time gave it a communal colour easily because a Copt was murdered by a Muslim.

There is no doubt that after Kamil, the basic character of the Movement had become that of 'Islamic nationalism'. Ninetenth of the population of the country was Muslim, and even the poor uneducated Fellah knew this much that the English belonged to an alien religion and that the followers of Muhammad should not be dominated by the followers of the Christ³. Sladen remarked in 1908: "When they use the word National or Egyptian, they mean Moslem. I am obliged to think that Nationalism is Islamism."⁴ A considerable section of the Muslim Press had turned fanatic, and even the pure nationalist papers were affected by the general trend. Al-Liwa, the organ of the chief nationalist party, violently attacked the Copts. "They should be kicked to death", the editor of al-Liwa wrote in an article in 1908⁵.

1. Lloyd, op.cit., p. 97; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp.154-55

2. Haikal, op.cit., p.41; Lloyd, op.cit., p.97; Rafi'i, op.cit.,

It seemed that the murder of Butrus took place as a result of the continuous instigation of al-Liwa itself.

The assassin, Ibrahim Nasif al-Wardani, a Chemist by profession, who was educated in France, belonged to a secret group of terrorists. The murder was preplanned beforehand. With him eight other persons were also arrested as being accomplices in the murder¹. In the trial, al-Wardani readily confessed the murder. The charges he made against his victim were, from his point of view, a sufficient justification for his act of murder. He accused the victim in the following terms: "As minister of foreign affairs he had signed away, in January, 1899, Egypt's sovereign rights over the Sudan; as minister of justice, in 1906, he had presided over the Dinshawai trial; as prime minister, he had revived the press law², and advocated acceptance of the Suez Canal Company's offer."³ During the trial, al-Wardani had become a popular national hero. People sang in the streets of Cairo: "Wardani, Wardani _____ who killed the Nasrani."⁴ A number of papers and 'seditious' pamphlets began to be circulated, but

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1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 154-55; Haikal, op.cit., p. 41; Lloyd, op.cit. p. 97: Other comrades of al-Wardani were, Ali Murad, Abdul Aziz Rif'at and Muhammad Anis, the engineers; Shafiq Mansur and Muhammad Kamil al-Barquqi, the students (Shafiq Mansur, later came into full limelight in connection with the assassination of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, in 1924); Abdul Khaliq Atiyya Wikil, and Habib Hasan, a Professor.
 2. Press Law of 1881 was revived in March 1909. It provided for a compulsory registration, deposit of security and suppression of any paper after a due warning. (Lloyd, op.cit., p. 94; Rafi'i, pp. 101-104)
 3. Elgood, op.cit., p. 193
 4. Ibid., p. 194, f.n.

they were soon suppressed¹. On May 18, 1910, al-Wardani, pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, and was hanged on June 28². From the day of the murder of Butrus and more so since the execution of al-Wardani, the Muslim-Copt relations became estranged and a bitter feeling between the two communities prevailed. Many nationalists belonging to the Coptic community deserted the Movement³. Muslims themselves were in a mood of revenge and inspite of the best efforts of the sober-minded nationalists⁴, little was achieved towards easing the tension. On the contrary, later events further deteriorated the situation.

In March 1911, a Coptic Congress was held at Assiut. It demanded equality of rights and opportunities for the Copts and the Muslims. It demanded equal chances in the administration, facilities for separate Coptic education and a fair electoral system for a fair Coptic representation⁵. In the following month, a Muslim Congress, patronised and sponsored by the Egyptian authorities, met in Cairo⁶. It was presided over by a Minister, Riaz Pasha, and strangely enough, not a single word was uttered against the Occupation. The

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1. Lloyd, op.cit., p. 101
 2. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 155; Lloyd, op.cit., p. 97
 3. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 156
 4. Mikhail, op.cit., pp. 28-29
 5. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 244 quoting Muhammad Farid
 6. Mikhail, pp. 31, 34, 35

Continued from p. 210.

- pp. 154-55
3. Sladen, op.cit., p. 110
4. Ibid., p. 56
5. cit., Sladen, op.cit., pp. xxi-xxxiii

Congress, passing a resolution condemning the Copts, declared that Islam should be declared the official religion of Egypt. It also passed resolutions opposing, point by point, the demands of the Coptic Congress. The Congress was held in a rash atmosphere and violent speeches were delivered¹. Its aftereffects were much worse. The Press took up the issue. Al-Alam, the Organ of al-Hizb al-Watani, and Misr al-Fatat abuse² and ridiculed the Copts². "Down with the Christians" and "let the Christians go" were the common slogans raised in the street disturbances in Cairo³.

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Apart from the communal cleavage, the nationalists were divided into several groups and factions even on matters of policy. There were those who liked to have a supervision of Britain in the administration and government of the country whereas others were deadly opposed to the Occupation. A third group was that of go-betweens. They quarrelled amongst themselves and abused each other⁴.

1. Ibid., p. 35

2. Elgood, op.cit., p. 197; also, the Times, March, 1911; Fyfe, op.cit., p. 125

3. Fyfe, op.cit., p. 155

4. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 105, 116

With the detachment of the Khedive, many half-hearted nationalists turned away from nationalism and rallied round the Khedive. Such, for example, were those who founded the Party of the Nobles¹. Among other political groups which developed round some important figure, mostly an editor or proprietor of a paper, were: the pro-British al-Muqattam group, then the al-Muqtataf group organised under the name of "The Free National Party" (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Hurr), and some other minor groups led by Akhnukh Fanus, Idris Raghib and Hafiz Awad². The religious group, i.e. the al-Azhar party, rallied round al-Manar³. All these groups were satisfied to a large extent with the Occupation and demanded at the most a liberal Constitution and some internal administrative reforms⁴.

The hegemony of the Movement was, however, in the hands of three large groups centring round the most popular papers of Egypt, al-Muayyad, al-Liwa, and al-Jarida. These groups fulfilled, to a considerable extent, the essentials of a political party and were the pioneer political parties in Egypt⁵. Al-Muayyad group, called the Constitutional Reformers, was led by Sheikh Ali Yusuf and was moderate in

1. Landau, op.cit., p. 144

2. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 138-43; Fyfe, op.cit., p. 125

3. Al-Manar group was represented by the editor of al-Manar, Muhammad Rashid Rida, himself.

4. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 138-143; Landau, op.cit., pp. 142-43

5. I have been using the word 'group' instead of parties, for most of the political organisation of Egypt. This is because, as I have already mentioned above, these were loose organisations centred round some important figures and had little of the essentials of a real political party.

its attitude towards the Occupation regime. This Party was founded on December 15, 1907. In its general policy, it was opposed both to al-Liwa group as well as to al-Jarida group¹. It campaigned through its organs, al-Muayyad and al-Mimber, for a Parliament and the people's right to legislate and administer their country². As for the withdrawal of the Occupation, they favoured Evacuation by stages. Occasionally, the Reformers turned somewhat extremists, but their basic approach to political problem was that of a moderate party³.

Ali Yusuf led the Party till his death in October 1913⁴, after whom little was heard of any significance regarding its political activities.

The People's Party, "al-Hizb al-Umma", was founded in October 1907 and centred round the paper al-Jarida⁵. It was led by Hasan Abd ar-Raziq, and after his death, by Mahmud Sulaiman⁶. Among its outstanding members were: S'ad Zaghlul, Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, and Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid. In its early phases, it demanded improvements and reforms in gradual stages. But later, it stood for complete independence, whereupon certain of its members left the Party. The extremists of the dissidents joined the National Party and the moderated

1. Sladen, op.cit., p. 114

2. Haikal, op.cit., p. 31; Landau, op.cit., p. 14

3. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 134-35, 137

4. Al-Manar, October 30, 1913; Landau gives his death year as 1911, which is incorrect. Landau, op.cit., p. 142

5. Haikal, op.cit., p. 30; Lloyd, op.cit., p. 50; Landau, op.cit., p. 137

6. Mahmud Sulaiman (d. 1929) was a thorough-educated and liberal-minded patriot. see, Haikal, op.cit., p. 198

went to the fold of Constitutional Reformers¹.

Ahmad Lutfi was the ruling spirit of the Party. He edited al-Jarida, the organ of the Party². Al-Jarida did a lot in educating public opinion. At the same time it represented the noblest example of a balanced Arabic Press. Ahmad Lutfi was held in high esteem amongst his countrymen. He was one of the two advocates who represented the case of the Dinshawai victims³. His paper was also very popular. But the National Party and the Constitutional Reformers continued to ridicule his policy⁴.

His policy in itself, was neither pro-British nor pro-Khedive, nor even pro-Turkish. It was simply pro-Egyptian. He strongly supported the demand for an independent Constitution "We have formed the Peoples Party to arouse public opinion which is the strongest force"⁵, he stressed. "The English are, after all, English, and, Sir Eldon Gorst, with all his Cooperation (Ittifaq) with the legal ruler of Egypt, is a greater danger for us than his predecessor", he explained⁶. In various articles, contributed to al-Jarida, he analysed the situation of the country and made suggestions on the following lines:

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1. Haikal, op.cit., pp. 200-201; Landau, op.cit., p. 138
 2. Mohd. Husain, op.cit., pp. 77-78, first issue of al-Jarida on March 9, 1907
 3. Haikal, op.cit., p. 30
 4. Haikal, "Muzakkarat", p. 31
 5. Lutfi, op.cit., p. 31
 6. Ibid., p. 9

"Our government is autocratic... and, like any other autocracy, looks after the interests of the governors rather than the governed"¹. Then: "The Ministry wavers between the people thatⁿ demand a Constitution and the Condominium that oppose it"². We do not wish a change in the personnel; instead, we want a change in policy, whereas, there seems to be little factual change, one Ministry falling while another prototype returning to power³. We only demand our Ministry to be that of 'Sherif Pasha' and not that of 'Asquith'⁴. As for the question of the capability of the people for representative institutions, this idea (of considering the natives unqualified) was invented by the English in India long ago and now they have transferred it to Egypt."⁵ "It is incumbent upon us not to depend upon ^{any} anyone else for help save ourselves, as did the Ottomans upon themselves"⁶. We should become united on 'Egyptianism'... We should become united on 'Egyptianism' No doubt, unity of faith is an important factor, but not the sole factor (for national unity), or the German and the English nations would be one (because both professed Christianity). None would dare say that there is a single ^cgypt who prefers Abyssinian interests to those of Egyptians, or that there is

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1. Ibid., pp. 250-51
 2. Ibid., p. 263
 3. Ibid., p. 257
 4. Ibid., p. 248
 5. Ibid., p. 22
 6. Ibid., p. 32

a single Muslim who would prefer the interest of Turkey to that of Egypt¹. There is no doubt that the British Occupation is solely responsible for creating bad feeling between the Muslims and the Copts².

Lutfi had a very clear-cut conception of 'nation' and 'nationalism'. He did not adhere to pan-Islamism in whatever form it might come. He was totally against extra-territorial loyalties. To be Egyptian and nothing but the Egyptian, was his motto³, and it was for the Egyptian people that he demanded a self-governing Constitution.⁴ To achieve this objective, he scrupulously adhered to means that were completely peaceful. Formulating and arousing public opinion and explaining peoples' demands to the Occupation regime and to the Khedive were the main lines on which he and his Party worked.

Al-Liwa group represented the extreme-wing of the National Movement. It had organised itself into the National Party in the lifetime of Mustafa Kamil, and was still the leading nationalist party as far as the adherence and popularity was concerned⁵. Demanding immediate withdrawal of

1. Ibid., p. 34

2. cit., Nineteenth Century, 1910 and quoted by Mikhail, op.cit., p. 86

3. cit., MEA, August, - September, 1951, p. 280 Quoting Slama Musa from "farbiyat Salam Musa".

4. cit., Hamza, op.cit., pp. 151-52

5. Sladen, op.cit., pp. 37, 49

the Occupation army, and promulgation of a liberal Constitution, the National Party, after Kamil's death, had turned more 'Islamic nationalist' than Egyptian nationalist. Dissensions occurred frequently. Many of the Coptic colleagues of Kamil deserted the Party and with them a number of sober-minded Muslims also left it. Ahmad Hilmi, one of the sub-editors of al-Liwa, joined another Paper, al-Akhbar, whence he launched a campaign against al-Liwa. He accused that the Paper no longer followed the policy of its illustrious founder. It was claimed in the columns of al-Akhbar, that Ahmad Hilmi was the man who made Kamil such a popular leader among the masses¹.

However, inspite of dissensions, Muhammad Farid, the new leader of the Party, continued to struggle hard for maintaining the old traditions of the Party. He himself stood for communal unity from the very beginning². With unity, he stressed, everything could be achieved, "a Constitution, and Parliament, the effective control over the Government", and finally even the Evacuation².

When Farid took charge of the Party, the Khedive had already been won over by the new British Agent, and British Foreign Office had announced that before granting any Constitution, the Khedive will have to consult the British

1. Ibid., pp. 147-48

2. Ibid., p. 110

authorities beforehand. Farid denounced this declaration in his first speech as the leader of the National Party. He advised the Khedive not to pay attention to it, prophesying that "the English would not be able to offer any opposition or else they would appear in the eyes of Europe as despots and tyrants"¹. He advised the people that "the Egyptians must on no account submit to England the question of Egypt having a Constitution.... This would be an irreparable error, for it would be tantamount to an official acknowledgement of the Occupation "²

Al-Liwa, the organ of the Party, was being edited by Sheikh Abdul Aziz ash-Shawish. It bitterly criticized the way the British engineered a ~~v~~ialed Protectorate over Egypt. In an article, reveiwing Cromer's monograph on Modern Egypt, ash-Shawish accused Britian of crushing the native industries and handicrafts and using Egyptian cotton as raw-material for Lancashire³. In another article, he enumerated the 'blessings of the Occupation-regime as follows:

" 1. The ruin of the educational organisation of the country, the killing of the Arabic language...; (2) struggling against Egyptian patriotic spirit and the punishment of whoever shows any love of liberty and independence;

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1. Ibid., p. 11
 2. cit., Sladen, op.cit., p. 112
 3. Al-Liwa, 1908, cit. Sladen, op.cit., p. 129

(3) playing fast and loose with the laws and institutions of the country, until the judicial and administrative affairs became proverbial for anarchy everywhere; (4) the facilities ... afforded to foreign countries which robbed Egypt's great blessings and left her in stringent crisis ...; (5) the failure to prepare Egypt, by every possible means, for self-government."¹

An editorial of 1909, probably written by ash-Shawish himself, reads as follows:

"This land was polluted by the English, putrified with their atrocities as they suppressed our beloved destour, tied our tongues, buried our people alive and hanged our innocent relations, and perpetrated other horrors at which heavens are about to tremble Let us take a new step. Let our lives be cheap while we seek independence. Death is far better than life if you remain in your present condition".²

With its forceful agitating language and harsh criticism of the Occupation, al-Liwa produced a commotion in the younger generation, who started thinking in terms of using force, if possible, for the attainment of their national goal. Even the murder of Butrus, as has already been referred to, is said to have taken place at the instance of al-Liwa.³ "It is to the Liwa principally that the Young Egypt has been

1. cit., Sladen, p. 130

2. cit., Stoddard, op.cit., p. 118

3. Fyfe, op.cit., p. 120

accustomed to look for guidance", Fyfe summed up the situation as he witnessed it¹.

As a result of the influence of these "Born agitators" terrorist groups were formed. Other papers, such as al-Qutr al-Misri, also used the same language³. In its issue of January 1910, after citing some examples of bad rulers who deserved assassination at the hands of their subjects, and emphasising that the rulers were the cause of the misfortune or the good fortune of a country, the paper concluded:

"Par un Cureux hasard et arrive que si un tel souverain ne faste meurt, est arrive a sa out, a Charles I d'Anglettre, a Louis XVI de France l'etat du peuple change du malheur, dela pan verte a richesse de la nistere a la prosperete cela par pavient pas a paneterar."⁴

Al-Liwa (and later on the successor of al-Liwa named al-Alam etc., when because of some disputes with the relations of Kamil, the National party had to leave away al-Liwa)⁵

1. Ibid., p. 118

2. Sladen, op.cit., p. 117

3. Al-Manar, May 1908; ~~ibid~~ Sladen, op.cit., pp. 147-48

4. cit., Lloyd, p. 110; see also, Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 118. Soon after it was stopped.

5. Al-Liwa was replaced, in the beginning, by al-Alam, and lately, by ash-Sh'ab. The English and French organs of the Party were closed in the beginning of 1910 due to financial difficulties. The editor of the English organ, Theodore Rotzentine, busied himself in writing a book which was published under the title "Egypt's Ruin" in 1910. It introduced a wider scale the Egyptian problem to the European readers at large. Afterwards the author joined the staff of Egypt issued by Blunt from London. The Egypt was however banned by the Egyptian authorities. After the October Revolution, Rotzentine became Lenin's Personal Assistant. See Preface to the Arabic translation of "Egypt Ruin" done by Ahmad Shukri".

continued to lead the nationalist forces constantly agitating for the cause and educating public opinion. The bitterness of the Imperialists against al-Liwa is manifested in a comment at by the staunch Imperialist, Sladen, on the alleged charger of the Paper: "It sticks to no lie, no calumny, no baseness¹ of any kind. It is demagogue in the worst sense of the word."

When Kamil died, Muhammad Farid, an eminent lawyer, a reputed scholar and a well-known patriot and trusted friend of Kamil, was elected the President of the National Party. Farid had come in contact with Kamil in Paris in 1895, and had since then remained a close associate and advisor to Kamil. He had accompanied him in his various trips to Europe and in 1907 had also acted in his absence as the chief Editor of the Party's Organ. He was the first Secretary of the Party and Kamil wanted him to become his successor.²

Farid was born in 1868 and was the son of a Pasha, Ahmad Farid. He obtained his law degree at the age of nineteen, and since then held several responsible posts in the Egyptian administrative service. From 1877, he started contributing

1. Sladen, op.cit., p. 135

2. Rafi'l, op.cit., pp. 7, 8, 18, 22, 24

articles to Ali Yusuf's journal al-Adab, and at the age of twenty-four wrote a monograph al-Bahjat at-Taufiqiyyah fi Farikh Mu'assis al-'A'ilat al-Muhammadiyyah. Three year later, he completed another book on the histroy of the Ottoman Empire¹ In the meanwhile he had come in close touch with the Nationalists, and slowly the scholar, loyal to the Khedive and the Sultan, changed into an extreme nationalist. Even as late as 1902, he was busy with his scholarly pursuits and was writing a history of the Roaman Empire. But very soon the scholar redirected all his intellectual energies and acumen towards the cause of the Egyptian people².

In February 1908, Farid had to shoulder the responsibilities of leading the Nationalists. He became the President of the National Party, while Ali Kamil Fehmi, brother of the deceased leader, was entrusted with the Secretaryship of the Party³. Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ash-Shawish⁴ became the cheff Editor of al-Liwa. Other prominent members of the Party were: Amin ar-Rafi'i⁵, Ismail Labih, Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafi'i⁶, Hafiz Ramadan and Muhammad Zaki Ali. Extra-ordinary

1. Ibid., pp. 7,8,18,22,24

2. Ibid., p. 25

3. Ibid., p. 45

4. Ash-Shawish, the "unofficial successor of Kamil", as Fyfe calls him, was an ex-Professor of Arabic at Oxford. He remained editting the paper till February 1912 when he migrated to the Porte. (Fyfe, op.cit., p. 164; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 55; Lloyd, op.cit., p. 89)

5. Born in 1886, Amin got his degree in law in 1909, and then joined the staff of the organ of the National Party. On September, 14, 1909, the anniversary of Tel-al-Kabir was celebrated on his instigation, and the Party's paper of that date was published with black margins, abusing the Occupation regime and instigating people for a national revolt. In 1909-10, he continued writing against the extension of the Canal concession and against the new black

meetings of the Party were held on occasions of national importance such as the birthday of the Prophet, death anniversary of Kamil, Celebrations of Hijra new year's day, anniversary of Tel al-Kabir, etc. In Europe, the Egyptian students held congresses, which were attended by the leaders of the National Party. European Press was also used for nationalist propaganda¹.

Towards the end of 1908, Farid proceeded to England. There he published in the 'Manchester Guardian', a programme of his Party. It demanded immediate Evacuation, restoration of the Egyptian Constitution of 1882, and reorganisation of educational system; Egypt in turn would honour its international obligations as well as the privileges already enjoyed by the European residents in Egypt².

In Egypt, Farid led a powerful agitation for the Destour and endeavoured to maintain national harmony. "Beleive me", he wrote, "that there is no power on earth to stand against the public opinion when it is united, and against a nation when it is one, indivisible one"³. On another occasion

1. Haikal, op.cit., p. 43; Landau, op.cit., op.cit., 124-28

2. Landau, op.cit., pp. 124-25; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 110-15

3. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 250

Continued from p. 224

Act of Press. In 1910-11, he was struggling for a more liberal Parliament. In 1912, he succeeded to ash-Shawish as the chief editor of the Party-organ. He died in 1927.

(Anbar: "Dhikra Faqid al-^yatan",
pp. 1,2,8,15,16,20,21,33,103.)

6. Abdurrahman ar-Rafi'i, the famous historian of the national movement of Egypt, alive to this date.

he said: "Leave aside these cleavages, disputes and religious differences, and be all of you brethren, the sons of one motherland. Be Egyptian before anything else."¹ Again: "Would that we were one hand, one heart, one soul in numerous bodies and left aside our differences..., we would have achieved the Constitution, the Parliament, self-Government and even the Evacuation... of our beloved country"².

During this period, Cromer's successor, Gorst, adopted several repressive measures and passed several decrees to that effect. The Press Law of 1909 was one, the Exile Law another. The Exile Law passed in July 1909, stipulated that any 'dangerous person' could be arrested and exiled at any time. The passage of these decrees was followed by demonstrations on the part of the people, and the leaders of the National Party led strong protests against the adoption of these despotic measures³.

In March 1910, while the heated discussion on the Canal Issue was still continued, President Roosevelt of the United States visited Egypt and addressing a gathering of students of the Egyptian University⁴ told them that the Egyptians were not yet mature for independence and self-Government. His speech was bitterly criticised in the native

1. Ibid., p. 449; also, Sladen, op.cit., p. 110

2. Ibid., pp. 101-104

3. Ibid., pp. 117-18

4. The movement for establishing a national University initiated by Kamil and then led by Qasim Amin, S'ad Zaghlul and others, achieved its goal in embryo form to a certain extent in 1908, when the Egyptian people on their own initiative, started a University.

Press and student demonstrators demanded the withdrawal of those words. A general wave of injured pride swayed the politically-conscious middle class¹. Again, on June 28 of the same year, al-Wardani was executed and his death was mourned throughout the country. "Numbers of students and schoolboys were mourning for the murderer, "Fyfe, a contemporary writer, observed².

In the early days of 1910, there appeared a nationalist book entitled "Wataniyyati". It was the divan of Sheikh Ali al-Ghayati, and its introductions were written by Muhammad Farid and Abd al-Aziz ash-Shawish. The Egyptian authorities declared the book 'seditious' and the author and Preface-writers were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, the author for one year, Farid for six months and ash-Shawish for three months³. On his release, ^{Farid} wrote an article entitled "Min as-Sijja ila's-Sijn", that is, 'from one prison to another'. In this article he said: "I passed six months of imprisonment and I never felt suffocated except at the time of my release, when I came to know that I was coming out of one prison only to enter another one, namely, the prison of the Egyptian nation where one single individual rules over the whole country supervised by the Occupation"⁴.

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1. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 160-61; Fyfe, op.cit., p. 175
 2. Fyfe, op.cit., p. 175
 3. Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 239-40, see also Mohd. Husain: "al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyya", pp. 68-69
 4. Ibid., p. 420

In March 1911, Abd ar-Rahman ar-Rafi'i published his "Huquq ash-Sh'ab" i.e. 'the rights of the people'. It aimed at "the revival of the nationalist spirit".¹ It supported the Constitutional movement and urged the people to seek their legitimate rights. Explaining the system of the working of a Constitutional government, the book dwelt at length upon the ways and means of achieving an independent Constitution.¹

There was a popular demand for a Destour, and peoples' demonstrations and student agitations had become very common². This year, however, the Muslim-Copt relations had also reached their worst stage. The nationalists, inspite of their hard struggle, were not able to achieve anything significant, except that some degree of general political consciousness was discernible among the masses. The British policy of 'divide and rule' was successful and the comment that "the killing of the national movement was Sir Eldon Gorst's"³, had proved to be true.

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Gorst had gone to England early in 1911. He died there in July of the same year⁴. His successor, Lord Kitchner,

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1. Ibid., p. 259
 2. Maikal, p. 32; Rafi'i, pp. 189-90
 3. Young, op.cit., p. 194, quoting from al-Ahram
 4. Annual Register, 1911, p. 194

arrived in Cairo in September. Kitchner was returning to Egypt after an absence of twelve years¹. He had served Egypt for about twenty years in different capacities, and held the command of the Egyptian army. As a commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, he had quarrelled with the Khedive in his early years of Khedivate. Now the same military-man, with a strong bias against the Khedive, had come to Egypt as the master of its destiny. As a military man, he wanted to change Egyptian politics into a military affair². In his first speech before the Khedive, he explained that he had come for "watching over... the prosperity of Egypt"³. Hitherto no British authority had spoken in so blunt a way about the British position in Egypt. His speech aroused public indignation. The Egyptian Press remarked that a new era of Anglo-Egyptian relations had begun⁴.

The day Kitchner arrived in Egypt, Italy had sent an ultimatum to Turkey and it was a question of ^{hours} ~~honours~~⁵ before the war between the two countries was to break out. The event caused a general resentment in Egypt against Europe, and strong sympathies were expressed for the Turks. The Egyptians were, however, helpless and were unable to offer any assistance to their 'brethren' in their fight against the 'infidels'⁶. With a view to check the rising nationalist

1. Elgood, op.cit., p. 194

2. Haikal, op.cit., p. 38

3. cit, Sidney, "With Kitchner in Cairo", p. 34

4. Ibid., pp. 34-35

5. Ibid., p. 28; Al-Hilal, October 1, 1911

6. Sidney, op.cit., p. 33; Haikal, op.cit., p. 49; Young, op.cit., pp. 192-93

upsurge, the administration of Kitchner adopted some more repressive measures. Besides the Press Censorship Act, the Criminal Conscription Act, Cafe Act, Theatre Laws, and School discipline Act were passed¹. Nationalists were interned, and in large numbers tried under the Exile Law². The new British Agent had now become the master of the situation. Every decree was named in the Press as that of Kitchner³. He had overshadowed the Khedive completely. The Khedive had already surrendered on the question of relinquishing the charge of the Awqaf⁴. However, along with these repressive measures, several enactments for the amelioration of the plight of the people were also made⁵. But the nationalists were not satisfied with any amelioration without self-government.

Within a few months of Kitchner's Agency, five Arabic papers were stopped. They were: Misr al-Fatat, Wadi an-Nil, al-Akhbar, al-Liwa and al-Alam⁶. Blunt's "Egypt" was banned in the country⁷. New papers were not allowed to be issued⁸. Farid who was accused of endangering the peace and tranquillity of the country and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, had left Egypt towards the end of 1911, never to return again⁹. He continued his struggle

1. Haikal, op.cit., pp. 57-59

2. Young, op.cit., p. 190

3. Ibid., op.cit., p. 194

4. Sidney, op.cit., p. 80

5. Ibid., p. 32-63; Five Feddan Law was passed by virtue of which every peasant was under obligation not to sell or mortgage his land if it was below or equal to five feddans. Saving Banks for the peasants were also established.

6. Sidney, op.cit., pp. 11, 18, 92

7. Ibid., pp. 18, 92-3

8. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 268

9. Ibid., p. 111

in Europe and at the Porte¹. Ash-Shawish had also left Egypt for the Porte, where he was appointed the editor of "al-Hilal al-Uⁿma"². Amin ar-Rafi'i had succeeded him as the editor of the organ of the Party (al-Alam), which was stopped in 1914. It seemed as though the nationalist forces were dissipated and there was no force left behind the movement.

In such an atmosphere, underground activities seemed to have been the only choice left to the people. In July 1912, a plot to murder the Khedive, the Premier and the British Agent was discovered. Three nationalists while discussing the plan were arrested red-handed in a cafe. These were Muhammad Inam Waqid, Muhammad Abd as-Salam and Muhammad Tahir al-Arabi. They were tried and, in August of the same year, were sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment³.

In August of the same year, a book entitled al-Math-urat ath-Thauriya" appeared in Alexandria. It was written

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1. Early in 1912, he visited the Porte, where he was given a hearty welcome by the Egyptian students and ash-Shawish who was already there. While Farid was staying there, the government at the Porte changed and the pro-British Kamil Pasha came to power. Farid, with his friend, Labib, left the Porte for Paris in the month of July. In September, ash-Shawish was arrested and was sent to Egypt. Farid remained in Europe, and continued his struggle against the Occupation, voicing the cause of his country in the International Conferences and other Conventions held in Europe. In November 1914, after the outbreak of War, Abbas, the Khedive, now staying at the Porte, joined with Farid and proclaimed 'Destour' for Egypt. Farid died in Berlin in 1919. (Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 277-78, 282-85).
 2. Ash-Shawish was deported and remained out of picture till he died in 1929, after coming back to Egypt a few years before his death: Muslim Gazette(Urdu) Oct., 30, 1912: al-Hilal (Urdu), July 13, 1912
 3. Rafi'i, pp. 286-87; see also, al-Hilal (urdu) August 14, 191

by Ahmad Mukhtar, a student of Military College at the Porte. It was suspected that some organised revolutionary party was working behind it. Hence several arrests were made in this connection¹. It is quite probable that this book appeared as a consequence of the trial of and imprisonment of the three nationalists, which had caused a ^pidespread resentment in the country. However 'seditious' propaganda started among the people, and on October 31, a furious riot broke out in Bulaq². There was general unrest and indignation against the coercive measures adopted by the new Agent. Even the welfare measures adopted for the uplift and amelioration of the peasantry were suspected and resented³.

However, the report of the British Agent for the year 1912^{bas}, after the Imperialist fashion, complascent and optimistic. Concluding his Report, Kitchner said that within the national party there was a growing feeling of confidence in the Government particularly among the sober mass of the people⁴.

The Turco-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan war of 1912 had roused the pan-Islamic sentiments of the Egyptians⁵,

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 297

2. Annual Register, 1912, pp. 433-34

3. Elgood, pp. 204-205; Rafi'i, pp. 300-301

4. Annual Register, 1912, p. 435

5. Rafi'i, pp.451-52; Al-Hilal (Urdu), Vol. 3, No.1, p. 12; Divan of Hafiz, vol. II, pp. 61-64

and although there was no capable leader to lead the national movement, the masses had become fully politically conscious. The younger generation bred on the slogans, 'al-Jila wa'd-Dastur' i.e. Evacuation and Constitution, though keeping Evacuation as the ultimate goal, desired the immediate promulgation of a liberal Constitution as their first step. In its session of March 1912, the General Assembly pressed for the immediate promulgation of a new Constitution; it was only in this manner that the spread of terrorism and extremism could be checked¹.

In July, 1913, Kitchner announced the new Constitution in the name of the Khedive. It closely followed the Indian Reform Act of 1909², as every successful 'experiment in India was also applied to Egypt. This Constitution stipulated a one-Chamber Legislative Assembly of 66 members elected by an electoral college, and 17 members nominated by the Government so as to give representation to professional and religious minorities. The President and one of the senior vice-Presidents of the Assembly were to be nominated by the Government. The term of the Assembly was six years, and one-third of its membership was to be replaced every two years. It was a consultative and debating body, and its function was only to discuss, suggest or criticize and not to

1. Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 456

2. Chirol, op.cit., p. 111; Young, op.cit., p. 197

legislate or to control the Executive. It could, at best, check the increase in taxation and debate foreign affairs. It could also introduce a bill, but here the final authority to pass a bill lay with the Government. The Government had powers to dissolve the Assembly in case of differences between the Legislators and the Government. The Assembly could delay some legislation and could ask the Ministers to justify their insistence on certain measures. However, the final authority remained with the Ministers as the spokesmen of the Government. Provincial and local self-government bodies were given more powers than previously enjoyed under the Organic Law of 1883¹. But the thing that counted was the affairs at the centre, and here nothing was done towards self-government or promulgation of a liberal Constitution.

Elections were held in the month of December, and very little interest was shown on the part of the people². S'ad Zaghlul was the leader of the Constitutional movement at this time. He also enjoyed the support of the National Party. Sa'ad was elected and became the vice-President of the Assembly. Mazlum Pasha was nominated as President of the Assembly, and S'a'id Pasha as the Prime Minister³.

In his political ideology, S'ad was anti-Khedive and a moderate Constitutionalist. At this stage he was not so much anti-British as he became later on, after the First World War. He had taken an active part in the Arabi Revolt and was arrested with other revolutionaries, but was later set free. Since then, coming in good books of the Khedive

1. State Papers, 1913: pp. 417-927; The Texts of Constitution Electoral Law; also, Sidney, op.cit., p. 66 ~~(1882-1883)~~^{the}, op.cit., p. 130

and the Occupation regime, he had served in several administrative and ministerial capacities. But now he had become completely disappointed with the Occupation regime and had decided to come out openly against the dual Government¹

All the sixty-six members along with S'ad were opposed to the Ministry. At last, the pro-Khedive, or rather, pro-British, Prime Minister, Sa'id Pasha, had to resign in August 1914, and was succeeded by Rushdi Pasha². The session of the newly created Assembly lasted from January to June, and, in most cases, the Government accepted the advice of the Assembly³. This session of the Legislative Assembly was the first as well as the last, as it remained suspended during the War.

The Assembly made no significant contribution in the development of nationalism. However, one positive achievement was that the various nationalist elements that were dispersed so far had now gathered together in one place in the form of the Assembly⁴. Here the delegates debated various questions of national importance and had the opportunity of voicing peoples' demands freely and fearlessly, at times

1. Landau, op.cit., pp. 55-57

2. Elgood, op.cit., pl. 206; Chirol, op.cit., p. 116; Rafi'i op.cit., p. 36; Landau, op.cit., p. 57

3. Chirol, op.cit., pp. 115-116; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 56; Landau, op.cit., pp. 56-57

4. Beaman, op.cit., p. 56

Continued from p. 234

2. Fyfe, op.cit., p. 130

3. Chirol, op.cit., p. 114; Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 313-16; Young, op.cit., pp. 197-98; Landau, op.cit., pp. 55-57

expecting a favourable response from the authorities. It was here in the Assembly that Isma'il Abaza had summarised the 'blessings' of the Occupation and presented in consolidated ~~from~~ the essence of British rule in Egypt. "I take the British Agent to ask for Press Laws", he protested, "... for treating journalists as brigands and for attacking the authority of the Legislative Council....We are progressing in brutality, loquacity, drink and debts.... What is the remedy? Self-government; and for the last thirty years we have not moved an inch towards self-government¹ It was an excellent appraisal of the period 1883-1914.

In August 1914, hostilities broke out between Germany on the one hand and Allies led by British^{ain} on the other. Turkey joined hands with Germany and declared war in November. "Recognising the respect and veneration with which the Sultan is regarded by the Mohammedans of Egypt", Britain announced not to call upon the Egyptians to assist the Allies in War operations². But inspite of these announcements, Egypt was treated as an appendage of the British Empire, and therefore, indirectly at war with Germany. In August 1914, on the pretext that with the presence of British forces in Egypt, Egypt was liable to be attacked, the

1. Ibid., pp. 56-57

2. Cit., Chirol, op.cit., p. 130

Anglo-Egyptian authorities declared German ships in the Egyptian waters as belligerent¹. Finally, on December 18, Britain declared Egypt a British Protectorate. The following day, Abbas Hilmi was deposed in absentia and Husain Kamil, his cousin, was proclaimed the new ruler with the title of the Sultan². The last tie with Turkey had been severed.

The nationalists were pained to see their country become an appendage of the British Empire. Their intentions were apprehended beforehand and ash-Sh'ab, the new organ of the National Party, protested against the policy followed by Britain. As a result it was stopped in November. A Manifesto, appearing on behalf of al-Azhar, boldly denounced the declaration by which Egypt was made a Protectorate, and endorsed all demands of the Nationalists. But these protests, declarations, and announcements were of no avail. Instead, stringent measures were adopted to crush down what meagre nationalist forces were still alive. The nationalists and specially the members and adherents of the National Party were at their worst. Arrests, inquisitions and deportations followed the declaration of the British Protectorate over Egypt³.

The national movement was suppressed during the war period. But within a decade after the War, it once again acquired the same force and momentum, and under the leadership of S'ad Zaghlul, a mass movement was started, demanding complete independence. Within a few years of this movement, Egypt became free and acquired its cherished goal of political independence.

1. Ibid., p. 122; Rafi'i, op.cit., p. 346

2. Since the advent of Kitchner, Abbas had turned pro-Turkish and was said to have been acting under the orders of the Porte. In this announcement on November 5, '14, of ad-Dastour al-Kamil, a war-declaration with Britain was also enjoined. Consequently he was deposed. (Rafi'i, op.cit., pp. 344-45)

3. Al-Hilal (Urdu) September-November, 1914

S U M M I N G U P

To sum up my analysis of the development of nationalism in Egypt brought upto the year 1914. The origin may be traced to its early stages ~~and~~ in the closing years of the eighteenth century when the miserable conditions of the masses gave birth to a vague desire for a change in the existing state of affairs. At this stage, concepts of 'nation' or 'nationhood' were not yet formed. But the discontentment had resulted in resentment which in turn had taken the form of an undercurrent, in which all the pre-requisites of a national movement were discernible. It is in this wide-spread misery of the people that an indogenous and natural genesis of the Egyptian nationalism is found.

The impact of Napoleonic invasion; the 'pan-Arabism' of Muhammad Ali, and the political autonomy he brought to Egypt; the Westernizing measures adopted by Muhammad Ali and his grandson Isma'il; all these nourished the crude desire for-a-change. It was towards the end of this period of Egyptian history that the crude nationalists forces accumulating in the form of a militant movement joined hands with the educated intelligensia against native despotism as well as the increasing ^lhood of Britain and France.

Finally, it was the British Occupation which served as a catalytic agent in the entire process of evolution of nationalism from its early immature form to its more developed and Westernized form.

The post-Occupation period of about three decades is totally different from the pre-Occupation days in so far as the national movement was now completely modelled on European lines. The leadership came into the hands of the middle class, ^{the} lawyers and the journalists, who fused in it the up-to-date concepts of Western nationalism.

It was only the beginnings of the neo-nationalism that the War intervened and abruptly closed the pre-War chapter of the national movement in Egypt. But, it was the continuation of the movement of this very period that emerged in the form of the mass upsurge of 1919, which hastened the end of the British Protectorate and finally resulted in the declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Egypt.

The post-War developments in the Egyptian national movement are the subject of yet another study which may rightly be brought upto the Nasser-revolution of July 1952. My work, as such, provides an appropriate background to this second phase of the development of nationalism in Egypt.

APPENDIX I.

BRITISH POLICY ON EGYPT

16 October 1879

(Great Britain, Public Record Office, F.O. 78/2997)

As you will shortly proceed to Egypt to take up the appointment of Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in that country, I think it right to address to you some observations as to the principles by which your conduct should be guided.

The leading aim of our policy in Egypt is the maintenance of the neutrality of that country, that is to say, the maintenance of such a state of things that no great Power shall be more powerful there than England.

This purpose might, of course, be secured by the predominance of England itself, or even by the establishment of the Queen's authority in the country. Circumstances may be conceived in which this would be the only way of attaining the object; but it would not be the best method. It would not in the present state of affairs confer any other advantages than opportunities of employing English people and introducing English capital; and these would be outweighed by the responsibilities, military and financial, it would entail. The only justification of such a policy would consist in its being the only available mode of assuring the neutrality of Egypt towards us.

With this object in view it is obvious that we can have no jealousy of Native rule in itself. On the contrary, its continuance is, for us, the easiest solution of the problem. But it must not degenerate into anarchy, or perpetuate the oppression of recent years. Egypt is too much ~~in~~ view of the whole world, and there are too many interests attaching to it, to be suffered to relapse into the barbarous administration which in Persia and Burmah has resulted in misery so acute as to produce depopulation. An opinion would grow up in Europe in favour of intervention, which, in this case, would mean occupation; and if England could not satisfy it, she would not be able to prevent some other Power from doing so.

For this reason there is a value in the present relations between Egypt and the Porte, however anomalous they may appear to be. In case of extreme misgovernment, they furnish a machinery for changing the ruler, without any violation of Treaties or breach of diplomatic comity. They enable us to exercise a general control without taking over the government.

We have no present reason, therefore, for wishing any formal change in the position or institutions of Egypt; and the only change in the present, or rather the recent, practice which we desire is, that these institutions shall be worked with tolerable honesty, and with economy and humanity. Thus worked, they furnish what we want — an Egyptian neutrality which has a fair chance of permanence. Our Representatives in Egypt should, therefore, do all in their power to sustain the Native Government in its efforts to govern the country well; and this, for the present, must be an object with which no other should be allowed to interfere. So long as the country is formally independent, the Natives only can govern it. If they cannot do it, no one else can do it — without military occupation. It has been sufficiently proved that the Mussulmans will not willingly obey a Government which is nominally European, or of which the prevailing and most conspicuous elements are European. Their reluctance can only be overcome by force; and force the Europeans do not possess without military occupation.

It becomes, therefore, matter of great moment to make the Native Government succeed. For this purpose it should in its own interest, employ Europeans largely, and should be pressed to do so, if insensible to its own interest in that respect; but they must be kept as much in the background as possible. They should not be used in sufficient numbers to destroy the apparent authority of the Native Government; and the employments to which they are named should be selected rather with a view to the effective exercise of power, than to the possession of conspicuous official rank. The posts which confer the greatest influence and excite the least jealousy, are the posts which should be sought for Europeans.

In the performance of their duty as counsellors of the Egyptian Government, the Representatives of Her Majesty will be distinguished by one peculiar mark from those of any other Power. The policy they counsel will not be shaped by the interests of any particular class of creditors. It is their duty to do what they properly can to secure any rights Englishmen may possess in the country; they will not exclude English creditors from the benefit of this rule; and, for the sake of Egypt herself, they will wish that she should pay her debts. If, therefore, it shall appear that any particular claim, or class of claims in which Englishmen are largely interested, is being unfairly treated by reason of the diplomatic support given to competing creditors of other nationalities, the English Agent cannot refuse to interfere. But the protection of the private interests of creditors or others will be an object of a merely secondary kind, and will not compete with the important political aims which it is their chief duty to secure.

This singularity of their attitude in regard to the Egyptian debts is likely to be brought speedily into view. One of the questions which will be the most hotly debated in the ensuing winter at Cairo will be the proportion in which the various classes of creditors are to be paid. Almost all must forego some portion of their claim, and the sacrifices demanded may be larger than any of them expect. It will of course be the duty of the English Agent to interpose if any English claimant should be subjected to manifest injustice. But, save in such a contingency, which is improbable, the controversy will not affect English interests; and the English Agent will do wisely to be sparing of his advice in respect to it so long as it concerns the interests of the creditors alone.

It cannot, however, be long restricted within these limits. It must either at first, or in the end, take the form of an issue between the interests of the creditors and the interests of the Egyptian Administration. The amount of the assets which will remain for the creditors to divide will depend on the amount which is first taken out of the revenue to pay the costs of Government. It will be for the interest of the creditors to put this sum at as low a figure as they can, and their zeal to do so may possibly lead them to proposals incompatible with the efficiency of the Administration. The present attitude of the Governments of Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, favour the conjecture that in this dispute they will lean rather to the side of the creditors than to that of the Government.

In such a policy, if they pursue it, Her Majesty's Government cannot follow them. To England the efficiency of the Administration is of paramount importance; in comparison with it the interests of the creditors must take an inferior place. On this point Her Majesty's Representative will be forced to separate himself very decidedly from his colleagues, if they take the course I have anticipated. Without favouring extravagance, he must urge on the Khedive the reservation of a sufficient sum to ensure the preservation of order, the due administration of justice, and the efficient maintenance of the public works on which the prosperity of the country depends.

What I have said refers to the present order of things; it serves the interest of England better than any that apparently could be substituted for it, and the efforts of Her Majesty's Agent must be chiefly directed to insure that it shall work efficiently, and thus continue to exist.

But the contingency of a failure in these efforts must be contemplated. The character of the present Khedive gives ground for hope; on the other hand, the character and capacity of the men by whom he is surrounded, and from whom

his Ministers must be chosen, justify apprehension as to the future. It may be that the causes of decay which at present threaten all the Mahomedan countries of the world will prove incurable in Egypt also. Such an issue is, however, in any case, probably distant, and the conditions under which it may take place cannot be foreseen now. But the possibility of it must be borne in mind. When it comes, if it is to come, it must find England as strong as any other country in substantial influence.

If any tendency betrays itself so to arrange the European appointments that a preponderance either in importance or number is assigned to other European nations, a state of things is being created which in the case of a collapse of Egypt would be dangerous to English interests. Her Majesty's Agent should, therefore, watch these appointments with vigilance, and interpose on any symptom of a hostile inclination on the part of the Government in this respect. I should be disposed to attach less importance to the distribution of Native appointments. In all Oriental countries where Embassies are powerful, the Native competitors for place are very ready to enrol themselves as clients of one Power or the other. But their friendship is not trustworthy, and their success of little real value to the Power of whom they are nominally partisans. Foreign Representatives in supporting them are apt to allow their exertions to degenerate into a race for small diplomatic victories, and in the struggle the object of appointing the best man is entirely forgotten. To us, whose chief interest in Egypt is that the Government should last and work well, it is much more important that the best men should be employed than that the partisans of England should be promoted. This principle, however, must not be stretched so far as to sanction the abandonment of Native statesmen or officials who, by listening to the advice of England, had exposed themselves to the resentment either of some other Agency, or of the Native authorities.

It should further be borne in mind that if the Ottoman Empire were to fall to pieces, and Egypt become independent, the part of Egypt which interests England is the sea-coast, including the railway and other communications across the Isthmus. If it should happen that Egypt were divided, and the sea-coast and communications remained under the dominant influence of England, while the interior were to be otherwise disposed of — supposing the stability of such an arrangement could be guaranteed — England would have no reason to be dissatisfied with it.

In the disposal, therefore, of European appointments, it is of primary importance to keep in English hands, as far as

may be possible, the harbours, customs, lighthouses, and the communications by land and water from sea to sea. It is only of course to a limited extent that this can be done; and the necessity is not sufficiently urgent at present to justify steps which would awaken the jealousy of other Powers. But the extension and consolidation of English influence upon these points is the object which, as regards the future, must be kept in view. Whether it shall be pursued slowly or energetically must depend upon the circumstances of the moment.

Hurewitz:

"Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East"

vol. I, pp. 191-194

APPENDIX II.

FOREIGN SECRETARY GRANVILLE'S CIRCULAR

OUTLINING BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT

3 January 1883

(Gr. Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1883, vol.83, pp. 38-40)

The course of events has thrown upon Her Majesty's Government the task, which they would willingly have shared with other Powers, of suppressing the military rebellion in Egypt, and restoring peace and order in that country. The object has happily been accomplished; and although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country, and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority, will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress.

The subjects to be treated may be divided into two categories: those which concern other countries, and are matters for the consent or concurrence of the European Powers; and those which are matters of internal administration.

To begin with the former class: one result of recent occurrences has been to call special attention to the Suez Canal, firstly, on account of the danger with which it was threatened during the first brief success of the insurrection; secondly, in consequence of its occupation by the British forces in the name of the Khedive, and their use of it as a base of the operations carried on in His Highness' behalf, and in support of his authority; and thirdly, because of the attitude assumed by the Direction and officers of the Canal Company at a critical period of the campaign.

As regards the first two of these points, Her Majesty's Government believe that the free and unimpeded navigation of the Canal at all times, and its freedom from obstruction or damage by acts of war, are matters of

importance to all nations. It has been generally admitted that the measures taken by them for protecting the navigation, and the use of the Canal on behalf of the territorial Ruler for the purpose of restoring his authority, were in no way infringements of this general principle.

But to put upon a clearer footing the position of the Canal for the future, and to provide against possible dangers, they are of opinion that an agreement to the following effect might with advantage be come to between the Great Powers, to which other nations would subsequently be invited to accede:—

1. That the Canal should be free for the passage of all ships, in any circumstances.

2. That in time of war a limitation of times as to ships of war of a belligerent remaining in the Canal should be fixed, and no troops or munitions of war should be disembarked in the Canal.

3. That no hostilities should take place in the Canal or its approaches, or elsewhere in the territorial waters of Egypt, even in the event of Turkey being one of the belligerents.

4. That neither of the two immediately foregoing conditions shall apply to measures which may be necessary for the defence of Egypt.

5. That any Power whose vessels of war happen to do any damage to the Canal should be bound to bear the cost of its immediate repair.

6. That Egypt should take all measures within its power to enforce the conditions imposed on the transit of belligerent vessels through the Canal in time of war.

7. That no fortifications should be erected on the Canal or in its vicinity.

8. That nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to abridge or affect the territorial rights of the Government of Egypt further than is therein expressly provided.

Passing to the financial arrangements which have been the subject of agreement with all the Powers in connection with the Law of Liquidation, Her Majesty's Government are induced to believe that greater economy and simplicity may be attained in regard to the management of the Daira Estates and some other Administrations by certain changes of detail which would not diminish the security of the creditors. They

trust shortly to be in a position to lay before the Powers definite proposals for this purpose.

A question in which all the Powers are interested, and which connects itself with the general subject of finance, is that of the equal taxation of foreigners and natives. Her Majesty's Government feel convinced that the Powers will be prepared to join them in accepting any equitable proposals of the Egyptian Government for the purpose of placing foreigners on the same footing as natives in regard to taxes from which they are at present exempt.

As regards the Mixed Tribunals which have been established in Egypt by international agreement for the decision of civil suits between natives and foreigners, you are aware that the prolongation of the present system, which was agreed to in January last, would naturally expire on the 1st February next. Her Majesty's Government have advised the Egyptian Ministry to propose a further prolongation of a year, in order to give time for the discussion of amendments in the Codes and procedure which was interrupted by the events of the present year.

This concludes the list of questions which are matters of direct international arrangement with the Powers.

Her Majesty's Government communicate this outline of their views, as the initiative seems, after what has occurred, to fall on them, and submit it for the consideration of the Powers, in the hope that it will meet with their approval.

With reference to the second class of questions, the first and most pressing of the measures of internal administration is the organization of a force for the maintenance of public security against external or internal attack. Both on grounds of economy and of safety, Her Majesty's Government think it desirable that the Egyptian army should be a small one, and that the duty of maintaining order within the country should be discharged, as far as possible, by a separate force of gendarmerie and of police. The Khedive and his Ministers have expressed a strong wish that British officers should be lent, to fill certain posts in the army, under the Commander-in-chief of the Khedive, and to this Her Majesty's Government have expressed their willingness to agree for a time, and on a system which would give Egyptian officers access to some of the higher commands. The details of the scheme are still under consideration, but the general principles are sufficiently indicated in what I have stated.

Among the administrative arrangements of recent years, one of great importance was the institution of the English and French Controllers-General, with certain attributions in relation to the revenue and expenditure of the State, to which the French Government, and more recently that of England, became parties.

Upon this subject I inclose, for your information, and for communication to the Government to which you are accredited, a copy of a note officially delivered by the Egyptian Government to the British and French Agents in Egypt on the 7th November, containing a proposal for the abolition of the Contrôl, and a statement of the grounds on which that course is advocated. I also inclose a copy of the instructions which Her Majesty's Government have addressed to the Earl of Dufferin in reply to this communication, from which it will be seen that, for the reasons therein stated, and subject to a reservation as to the appointment for the present of an European official as financial adviser to the Khedive. Her Majesty's Government are prepared to accede to the proposal of the Egyptian Government. In this measure they earnestly desire the concurrence of France.

Her Majesty's Government have urged strongly upon the Khedive the necessity of at once introducing an improved system for the administration of justice to natives throughout the country, and they trust that in a short time effective measures will be taken for this purpose.

The question of the suppression of the Slave Trade, and of the abolition, as far as possible, of slavery in Egypt, is one which Her Majesty's Government have much at heart. They will lose no favourable opportunity of advising the Khedive to take such steps as may be judicious for the attainment of these objects.

There remains the question of the development of political institutions in Egypt. It is one of great importance and complexity, and requires for its treatment careful study of the circumstances of the country and people. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the prudent introduction of some form of representative institutions may contribute greatly to the good government of the country and to the safety and regularity of the Khedive's rule. But they await further Reports from their Representatives in Egypt before coming to a conclusion as to the shape which would be best suited to the present occasion, while affording opportunities for future growth.

Her Majesty's Government have wished to give full information to the Powers on all these matters, which are immediately connected with the peace, security, and social order of Egypt, and on which, accordingly they have thought it their duty to advise the Khedive as to the best mode of exercising his governing power. They trust that the spirit in which they have proceeded will be found to be in consonance with the views of the other Governments who take an interest in the welfare of that country.

You will communicate a copy of this despatch to the Government to which you are accredited.

Hurewitz:

"Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East"

vol. I, pp. 197-199

APPENDIX III

TEXT OF THE EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION OF FEBRUARY 7th, 1882

Art. 1. The Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected. An ulterior and special Law will make known the conditions of electorability and of eligibility for election, and at the same time the mode of election to the Chamber of Deputies.

Art. 2. The Members of the Chamber of Deputies ^{are elected} for a period of five years. They receive an annual payment of £ E.100.

Art. 3. The Deputies are free in the exercise of their mandates. They cannot be bound either by promises or by (government) instructions, or by an (administrative order, or by menaces of a nature to interfere with the free expression of their opinions.

Art. 4. The Deputies are inviolable. In case of crime or misdemeanour committed during the course of the Session, they cannot be put under arrest except with the leave of the Chamber.

Art. 5. The Chamber may also, after its convocation demand, provisionally and for the duration of the Session, that any one of its Members who has been imprisoned shall be set at liberty, or that all action directed against him shall be suspended during the Chamber's recess, if for a criminal matter, where no judgement has yet been pronounced.

Art. 6. Each Deputy represents not only the interests of the constituency which has elected him, but also the interests of the Egyptian people in general.

Art. 7. The Chamber of Deputies shall sit at Cairo. It is convoked each year by Decree of the Khedive, and according to the advice of the Council of Ministers.

Art. 8. The ordinary annual Session of the Chamber of Deputies shall be for three months, viz., from the 1st November to the 31st January, But if the work of the Chamber

is not finished by the 31st January, it may then demand a prolongation of fifteen to thirty days. This prolongation will be accorded by Decree of the Khedive.

Art. 9. In case of necessity the Chamber will be convoked in Extraordinary Session by the Khedive. The duration of the Extraordinary Session will be fixed by the Decree convoking it.

Art. 10. The Sessions of the Chamber shall be opened in the presence of the Ministers either by the Khedive or by the President of the Council of Ministers, acting by the delegation of the Khedive.

Art. 11. At the first sitting of each annual Session an opening Speech shall be pronounced by the Khedive, or in his name by the President of the Council of Ministers. It shall have for its object to make known to the Chamber the principal questions to be presented to it in the course of the session. After the reading of the opening speech the sitting shall be adjourned.

Art. 12. During the three following days, the Chamber, having named a Committee for the purpose of preparing a reply to the opening speech, shall vote its reply, which shall be presented to the Khedive by a deputation chosen from amongst its members.

Art. 13. The reply to the opening speech may not treat of any question in a decisive sense, nor contain any opinion which has been the object of previous deliberations.

Art. 14. The Chamber shall submit to the Khedive a list containing the names of three Members whom it may propose for the office of President. The Khedive shall name by Decree one of the Members, thus designated, President of the Chamber of Deputies. The office of President shall continue for five years.

Art. 15. The Chamber shall elect two Vice-Presidents which it shall choose from among its Members, and shall name the Secretaries of its Bureau.

Art. 16. An official report of the sittings of the Chamber shall be drawn up under the direction of the Bureau of the Chamber, composed of its President, Vice-Presidents, and Secretaries.

Art. 17. The official language for the Chamber shall be Arabic. The proceedings and reports of the Chamber shall be drawn up in the official language.

Art.18. The Ministers shall have the right of being present at the sittings of the Chamber, and of speaking there, when they shall think fit. They may cause themselves to be represented there by high state officials.

Art.19. If the Chamber decides that there is reason for summoning one of the Ministers to appear before it to give explanations on any question, the Minister shall appear in person or cause himself to be represented by another official to give the required explanations.

Art.20. The Deputies shall have the right to supervise the acts of all public functionaries during the Session, and through the President of the Chamber they may report to the Minister concerned all abuses, irregularities, or negligences charged against a public official, in the exercise of his functions.

Art.21. The Ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Chamber for every measure taken in Council, which may violate existing rules and regulations.

Art.22. Each Minister is individually responsible, in the cases foreseen in the preceding article, for his acts occurring in the exercise of his functions.

Art.23. In case of persistent disagreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministry; when repeated interchanges of views and motives shall have taken place between them, if then the Ministry does not withdraw, the Khedive shall dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, and decree that new elections shall be proceeded with, within a period of time not exceeding three months, counted from the day of dissolution to that of re-assembly. All Deputies thus dismissed shall be eligible for re-election.

Art.24. If the new Chamber confirms by its vote that of the preceding Chamber which had provoked the disagreement, this vote shall be accepted as final.

Art.25. The Bills and Regulations emanating from the initiative of the Government shall be brought into the Chamber of Deputies by the Ministers, to be examined, discussed and voted. No Law shall become valid until it has been read before the Chamber of Deputies, Article by Article, voted clause by clause, and consented to by the Khedive. Each Bill shall be read three times and between each reading there shall have been an interval of fifteen days. In case of urgency a single reading shall, by a special vote of the Chamber, be declared sufficient. If the Chamber judges it necessary to demand the introduction of a Bill from the Council of Ministers, it shall make the demand through the intermediary of the President of the Chamber, and in case of the approval of the Government, the Bill shall be prepared by the Ministry and introduced to the Chamber according to the forms fixed by this Article.

Art.26. The Chamber shall choose from amongst its Members a Committee, charged to examine all Bills and Regulations submitted to it. This Committee may propose to the Government amendments of such bills as it has been charged to examine; in which case, the bill and the amendment proposed shall be sent back, before any general discussion, by the President of the Chamber, to the President of the Council of Ministers.

Art.27. If the Committee does not propose any amendments original text or if those proposed are not adopted by the Government, the original text of the Bill shall be placed for discussion before the Chamber. If the amendments proposed by the Committee are accepted by the Government, then the text thus amended shall be placed for discussion before the Chamber. In case the Government should not accept the amendments proposed by the Committee, then the latter shall have the right of submitting its opinion and observations to the Chamber.

Art.28. The Chamber of Deputies may adopt or reject all Bills submitted to it by the Committee. It may also return them to the Committee to be examined a second time.

Art.29. The President of the Chamber shall convey to the President of the Council of Ministers the Laws and Regulations voted by the Chamber.

Art.30. No fresh tax — direct or indirect — on movable, immovable or personal property may be imposed in Egypt without a Law voted by the Chamber. It is therefore formally forbidden that any new tax shall be levied, under whatever title or denomination it may be, without having been previously voted by the Chamber of Deputies, under penalty, against the authority which shall have ordered it, against the employes who shall have drawn up the schedules and tariffs and against those who shall have effected the recovery of the amounts, of being prosecuted as peculators. All contributions thus unduly levied shall be returned to those who have paid them.

Art.31. The Annual Budget of the Receipts and Expenditures of the State shall be communicated to the Chamber of Deputies not later than the 5th November of each year.

Art.32. The General Budget of Receipts shall be presented to the Chamber, accompanied by notes explanatory of the nature of each receipt.

Art.33. The Budget of Expenditure shall be divided Department by Department, and shall be subdivided into sections and chapters, corresponding to the various branches of the public service depending upon each Ministry.

Art.34. The following cannot on any account be objects of discussion in the Chamber:

The service of the Tribute due to the sublime Porte.
The service of the Public Debt.
Also all matters relating to the Debt and resulting from the Law of Liquidation, or Conventions existing between the Foreign Powers and the Egyptian Government.

Art.35. The Budget shall be sent to the Chamber, to be examined and discussed there (under reserve of the preceding Article).

A Committee composed of as many Deputies, and having the same number of votes as the Members of the Council of Ministers and its President, shall be named by the Chamber to discuss, in common with the Council of Ministers, the Budget Estimates, and to vote them either unanimously or according to the majority.

Art.36. In case of an exact division of votes between the Commission of the Chamber and the Council of Ministers, the Budget shall be returned to the Chamber and, should the Chamber confirm (by its vote) that of the Council of Ministers, this vote shall become executory (executoire). But if the Chamber should maintain the vote of its Committee, then the procedure shall be according to the Articles 23 and 24 of the present Law. In this case, the credits of the Budget Estimates which shall have caused the division of votes, if they figured in the Budget of the preceding year, and if they are not affected to any new object of expenditure, such as public works or others, shall be employed provisionally and until the meeting of the new Chamber, according to Article 23.

Art.37. If the new Chamber confirms the vote of the preceding Chamber, on the Budget, this vote shall become definitely executory, in conformity with Article 23.

Art.38. No Treaty or contract between the Government and third parties and no forming concession shall acquire a final character without having been first approved by a vote of the Chamber, provided that such Treaty, contract or concession does not relate to an object for which a sum has already figured in the approved Budget, corresponding to the year for which the Treaty, contract or concession shall have been proposed. Likewise no concession for public works, the execution of which shall not have been foreseen by the Budget, and no sale, or gratuitous alienation of the State domains, nor concession of privilege of any kind shall become definitive until it shall have been approved by the Chamber.

Art.39. All Egyptians may address a petition to the Chamber of Deputies. The petitions shall be sent to a Committee chosen by the Chamber from among its Members. Upon the report of this Committee the Chamber shall take into consideration or reject the petitions. The petitions taken into consideration shall be sent back to the Minister concerned.

Art.40. All petitions relative to personal rights or interests shall be rejected if they are outside the competence of the Administrative and Civil Tribunals, or if they have not been previously addressed to the competent administrative authority.

Art.41. If during the recess of the Chamber grave circumstances shall demand that urgent measures be taken to avoid a danger menacing the State, or to assure public order, the Council of Ministers may, then, upon its own responsibility and with the sanction of the Khedive, order those measures to be taken, even if they should be within the competence of the Chamber, supposing the time to be too short for the convocation of the latter. Nevertheless, the affair should be submitted for examination, at its next sitting, to the Chamber.

Art.42. No one may be admitted to explain or discuss questions or to take part in the deliberations of the Chamber other than its Members, with the exception of the Ministers or of those who are assisting or representing them.

Art.43. The votes of the Chamber shall be given by the holding up of hands or by the calling over of names or by ballot.

Le on Art.44. The vote by calling over of names shall only/the demand of at least ten Members of the Chamber of Deputies. All votes which may affect the provisions of Article 47 shall be made openly.

Art.45. The naming of the three candidates for the Presidency of the Chamber, as well as the election of the two Vice-Presidents and the nomination of the first and second Secretaries to the Chamber shall be made by ballot.

Art.46. The Chamber of Deputies may not validly deliberate unless at least two-thirds of its Members are present at the deliberation. All decisions shall be taken absolutely according to the majority of votes.

Art.47. No vote entailing Ministerial responsibility shall be given without a majority of at least three-quarters of the Members present.

by
Art.48. No opinion shall be given/proxy.

Art.49. The Chamber of Deputies shall elaborate its own internal Regulations. These shall be made executory by Decree of the Khedive.

Art.50. The present Organic Law may be amended after agreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers.

Art.51. The interpretation of all Articles and phrases of the present law which it may be necessary to make clear shall be made on agreement between the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers.

Art.52. All the provisions of Laws, Decrees, Superior Orders, Regulations, or Usages contrary to the present Law are and shall remain revoked.

Art.53. Our Ministers are charged, each in what concerns him, with the execution of the present Law.

_____ Blunt:

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